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ABSTRACT 
 
The Metrics of Death: Emotions and the Effects of Casualties on Public Opinion in 
Militarized Disputes and Terrorism. (December 2008) 
Katrina N. Mosher, B.A., Mansfield University of Pennsylvania 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Nehemia Geva 
 
Recent terrorist events (e.g., London, Madrid, and Bombay train bombings), as 
well as the attacks on September 11, 2001, have highlighted the impact casualties can 
have on domestic audiences. These incidents led to major foreign policy shifts, massive 
security expenditures, and the removal of an incumbent government (i.e., Spain). Yet, 
when we compare the number of those killed in terrorist events to those killed in 
militarized disputes, there are more negative public responses to casualties of terrorism 
than to militarized disputes. My dissertation examines this “over reaction” by comparing 
reactions to different casualty contexts. The comparison of casualties across different 
hostility contexts is a unique contribution to the field.  
I posit a model in which the characteristics of the casualty event generate 
emotional reactions. The emotional response affects the way information about the event 
is processed by individuals, and alters individual’s support of aggressive/non-aggressive 
foreign policies. Furthermore, my model proposes that different types of negative 
emotions have different impacts on the process, as well as on the preferences for distinct 
foreign policies. I expect that different casualty characteristics such as the hostility 
context (terrorism and militarized disputes) and the characteristics of the targets (number 
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killed and their identity) influence the specific negative emotions experienced by 
individuals. Thus, variations in these characteristics should alter public preferences for 
foreign policies.  
I use a multi-method approach to test my theoretical propositions. First, I utilize 
experimental methods that introduce different scenarios to the participants. Each 
scenario varies the casualty characteristics, and measures individual preferences for 
foreign policies. Second, I compiled a daily event data set that contains both terrorism 
and militarized dispute casualty statistics and public reaction data for Israel in 1969. This 
period provides wide variations along the independent variables. My results support the 
idea that casualty characteristics play a pivotal role in emotional responses to these 
events as well as in how individuals respond to casualty events. This work is unique in 
that it examined the role of the number of casualties in conjunction with the context in 
which they occur and who those casualties are. 
v 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Puzzle and Research Question 
A multitude of events over the last several years illustrates that casualties play an 
important role in international relations. More specifically, terrorist attacks throughout 
the world (e.g., Madrid, London, Jerusalem, New York, and Washington) have resulted 
in substantial changes in both domestic and international foreign policy. For example, 
the terror attacks on Washington and New York in 2001 resulted in a number of direct 
and indirect changes in U.S. foreign policy. The most dramatic of these changes was the 
war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and the war in Iraq against Saddam Hussein. 
Domestically these events led to the creation of a new cabinet level department 
(Homeland Security), the restructuring of and changes to the way security is conducted 
at airports and federal buildings, and the restructuring of the national intelligence 
community. In addition, both wars and the changes to the national government cost 
billions of dollars each year. These effects happened even though the number of people 
killed in these incidents was much smaller than the number of those killed in most wars. 
Indeed these types of effects are not limited to the United States. For example, the terror 
attacks in Madrid, Spain in March 2004 are viewed as responsible for the fall of the  
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Spanish government and the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.  
These terror events highlight that there is an effect of these casualties on the 
public, but they do not detail how that effect works. The effect of terror casualties is 
contrasted with the somewhat limited attention and reaction to the casualties from the 
wars in Afghanistan and the Second Gulf War. It seems that, the casualties from terror 
attacks result in immediate and stark responses (e.g., public anger, rallies, calls for 
action, etc.) and policy changes. The casualties from recent wars seem to result in a more 
limited public response and fewer policy changes. Rather than changing foreign policy 
in terms of involvement in the war, it has changed policies more subtly. For example, the 
second Bush administration’s reaction to the publishing of photos of soldiers’ flag-
draped coffins demonstrates that U.S. leaders are sensitive to the potential consequences 
of casualties on the public. On January 21, 1991, the first Bush administration banned 
the release of photos of soldiers’ flag-draped caskets as they returned home from the war 
in Iraq (Bash, 2004). The publishing of dozens of pictures of soldiers’ caskets in 2004 
caused controversy not only on whether these types of photos should be released but also 
about the possible political motives for reinstating the ban. Indeed, opponents argued 
“…the White House is trying to prevent Americans from seeing daily images of death 
that could sour support for the war” (Bash, 2004). From these events and the ongoing 
wars, it is clear that casualties are important in international relations. We can also see, 
however, that the impact of the casualties is often radically altered by the context in 
which they occur.  
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The contrasting impact of the contexts discussed above leaves several questions 
about the nature of the impact of casualties. Evidence indicates that casualties have a 
negative impact on leaders and the public. What is unclear is what the ‘actual’ effects of 
casualties are. Do casualties in different international conflict contexts truly have 
different impacts? If so, then what is the difference and why do these differences occur? 
 
Objectives of the Dissertation 
The objective of this work is to tackle these questions concerning the role of 
casualties in international relations on public responses. Two ideas are proposed to 
address these questions. The first idea is that the role that casualties play in international 
relations is more than a simple calculation of the cost (e.g., what is lost versus the 
benefits) of a conflict. Research on the effects of casualties on public opinion indicates 
that there are differences in the impacts of casualties given different contextual factors 
such as time, pattern of accumulation (Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, 
and Wilkening 1997; Mueller 1973), and deaths due to terrorism (Mueller 2004). These 
findings indicate that while all deaths represent a cost of the conflict as suggested by 
some studies (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Stam 1996; Nincic and Nincic 1995), not 
all casualty costs are equivalent. Some deaths may have a greater or lesser impact than 
others. This implies that casualties occurring in different circumstances will have 
different impacts on the policy preferences of the public.  
The second idea is that emotions invoked by these casualties may have an impact 
on foreign policy outcomes (Mueller 2004). Specifically, Mueller points to certain 
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instances where the reactions to the casualties were out of proportion with what should 
be expected from the same number of casualties in wars. The implication of this is that 
the ‘over reaction’ is caused by an emotional reaction to terrorism. Therefore, it is 
important to examine both the emotional impact of casualties as well as their value/cost. 
This work addresses this issue by trying to relate one of the major consequences of 
international conflict, casualties, to the emotional responses they trigger, and how in 
turn, these emotions mediate the public’s support of policies relating to international 
conflict.  
 
The Underlying Premises and Research Questions of the Dissertation  
From the above discussion, two premises are presented that will form the basis 
from which the research questions can be explored.  
1. Casualties matter in international relations. 
2. Casualties affect the public’s preferences for involvement in international 
relations. 
There are several theoretical questions highlighted by the above premises. The literature 
demonstrates that casualties have an effect. The main question is “How do casualties 
affect international relations?” Studies (Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, 
and Wilkening 1997) reveal that casualties sometimes have a greater effect in some than 
in other circumstances. Additionally, it is seems that the effect of casualties may be 
mediated by whether the casualties occurred as part of an accumulation of or series of 
casualty events. Thus, the research questions in this dissertation are: (a) how do 
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casualties affect public responses to foreign policies, (b) what is the impact of context on 
the effects of casualties, and (c) what role do emotions play in the effects that casualties 
have? 
 
The Plan of the Dissertation 
This section briefly describes the outline of this dissertation.  
 
Literature Review 
Chapter II has two major sections that review the pertinent literature in 
international relations. The first section reviews the literature on casualties in 
international relations. Specifically, it focuses on the effects of casualties on public 
reactions. In addition, it focuses on the effects of casualties on the public’s support for 
different foreign policies. This section also examines the role of contexts in terms of 
terrorism versus war, on the impact of casualties on the public. Lastly, this section offers 
the definitions of the contexts of casualty conflicts explored in this work.  
The second section of Chapter II examines the literature on the role of emotions 
in international relations and foreign policy decision making. In particular, this section 
reviews the effects of specific emotions on behavior and foreign policy preferences. In 
essence, different negative emotional responses to international conflict events result in 
different foreign policy responses and preferences. 
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The Theoretical Model 
Chapter III combines the two distinct literatures on casualties and emotions and 
integrates them into a model of the role of casualties in international relations. In 
addition, this chapter establishes the underlying assumptions of the model and initial 
hypotheses to be tested in the remainder of this work. This model suggests that the 
characteristics of casualty events evoke distinct emotions and, therefore, have distinct 
effects on foreign policy preferences. In particular, the specific emotion evoked by the 
casualty event is expected to alter the policy preferred by individuals. 
 
The Empirical Sections 
Chapters IV, V, and VI report three experiments that test the effects of the 
independent variables, including the context of the event, identity of the casualties, the 
number of casualties on emotions, and foreign policy preferences. Because of the 
disparate effects of casualty numbers in the literature, one of the crucial factors that 
received attention in these three experiments is variations in the current number of 
casualties in an event as related to previous casualties. To augment the experimental 
results Chapter VII presents an events dataset of the effect of these variables on civilian 
responses to casualty’s events in Israel.  
More specifically, Chapter IV reports the results of the first experiment. 
Experiment I addresses the effects of a single casualty event within differing conflict 
contexts (war and terrorism) on foreign policy preferences and emotional reactions. In 
addition, this experiment explores the effects of differing casualty identities. 
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Chapter V reports on the findings of the second experiment. Like the first 
experiment, Experiment II examines the role of the context, identity, and emotions on 
foreign policy preference formation. The primary difference revolves around the 
treatment of the number of casualties. Specifically, this experiment tests what is the 
information role of previous casualties on responses to casualty events. This is done by 
placing single casualty events within the context of an accumulation of previous casualty 
numbers. In this case, the number of current casualties is held constant.  
Chapter VI reports the results of the third experiment. This study examines the 
role of the number of both current and previous casualties. In Experiment III, both 
current and previous casualties vary, allowing a more complete understanding of the role 
of numbers on emotional reactions and foreign policy preference formation. This 
experiment, like the first two, also examines the effects of numbers in different 
international contexts (war and terrorism) and identities of casualties.  
Chapter VII analyses and reports on the daily events data set collected on a daily 
basis from the Jerusalem Post. Specifically, casualty events in Israel from January to 
December 1969 are examined. This period marks the beginning and a major portion of 
the “War of Attrition” which lasted from March 1969 until the fall of 1970. This case 
allows for the examination of the contexts of terrorism and war, two types of casualties 
(civilians and soldiers), and variations in the number of casualties. In addition, this 
period also marks a time of increased terrorism from a variety of sources. Few instances 
in history offer the variation in the independent variables that this case offers. At various 
points in history, a nation may experience a terrorist attack or a war, but few nations 
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experience both at the same time. Thus, Israel in this period offers a unique opportunity 
to examine these variables simultaneously. In addition, the Jerusalem Post is written in 
English, allowing for coding of civilian reactions to events that would otherwise be more 
complicated for a non-Hebrew speaker.  
 
A Multi-method Approach 
This combination of methods tests the variables of the model with both 
experiments and event datasets strengthen the robustness of the empirical findings in two 
ways. First, the results of the experiments establish the internal validity of the model. 
Secondly, an event dataset was compiled that strengthens the external validity of the 
model. Unlike other studies, this dataset examines public reactions to casualties in the 
context of both terrorism and war. Thus, project is a unique addition to the literature on 
casualties.  
 
Conclusion 
Chapter VIII summarizes and discusses the findings and implications of the 
above studies. It first summarizes the findings, and then discusses the theoretical, policy, 
and methodological implications of these findings. Finally, Chapter VIII offers 
suggestions for future research regarding the effects of casualties on public reactions to 
casualty events. 
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CHAPTER II 
CASUALTY SENSITIVITY AND EMOTIONS 
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
Introduction 
On January 21, 1991, the first Bush administration banned the release of photos 
of soldiers’ flag-draped caskets as they returned home from the war in Iraq (Bash, 2004). 
While this ban has not always been upheld, the recent publication of dozens of pictures 
of soldiers’ caskets has re-ignited the debate over whether or not these pictures should be 
released. In further support of this policy, the Senate voted to uphold this ban. 
Furthermore, opponents of the ban argued “…the White House is trying to prevent 
Americans from seeing daily images of death that could sour support for the war.” 
(Bash, 2004).  
What seems clear from this policy and reactions to it is that the national 
leadership of the U.S. assumes that casualties have an impact on the public’s support of 
U.S. foreign policies. Work by Kull and Ramsey (2001) indicates that U.S. elites 
perceive the American public as unwilling to tolerate casualties. This is despite the fact 
that there has been little evidence of this intolerance in U.S. public opinion polls (Kull 
and Ramsey 2001, p. 205). Indeed, over half of the respondents to Kull and Ramsey’s 
survey of foreign policy experts (2001, p. 206) would go so far as to say, “The majority 
of Americans want the U.S. to disengage from the world.” Thus, decision makers often 
wish to hide casualties from the public. However, at nearly the same time as this ban on 
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photos was occurring, military briefings in Iraq began to publicize the number of U.S. 
soldiers’ casualties in comparison to the number of insurgent casualties. Not only does 
this policy contradict leaders’ beliefs that the public will not tolerate casualties, it is in 
direct opposition to a history of public relations failure of reporting the number of 
casualties in the Vietnam War. Boettcher and Cobb (2006) propose that this policy is 
done in a desperate attempt to give some quantifiable measure of success of the military 
conflict and/or put U.S. casualties in the context of higher insurgent casualties, thus 
making U.S. losses appear less dramatic. Thus, when decision makers cannot avoid 
casualties they seek to frame them in as positive a light as possible.  
Both the banning of photos and casualty ratio policies clearly demonstrate that 
leaders are highly concerned with responses to casualties. What is not clear from the 
above policies is how casualties actually affect the public. Are casualties simply a 
measure of the cost of the conflict or do decision makers avoid the presentation of 
casualties in order to avoid negative emotional reactions by the public as in the Vietnam 
era?  
This chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section addresses the 
role of the casualties in international relations literature while the second section 
examines the affect of negative emotions in the political psychology literature. The 
remainder of the first section is dedicated to exploring the literature on the role of 
casualties in international relations. The first sub-section presents a broad overview of 
the literature in international relations. The second sub-section examines the effects of a 
pattern of casualty accumulation on the public. The third sub-section focuses on the use 
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of casualties as a cost in international relations. The fourth sub-section briefly explores 
the effects of terrorism on public reactions drawn from the political psychology 
literature. The final section examines the context in which the casualties occur to 
determine the role it plays in public reactions to casualties. In addition, this section 
explores the role of identity of the casualties in conjunction with the context of the 
casualties. Finally, this section concludes by identifying and defining several important 
concepts used throughout the remainder of this work.  
 
An Overview of Casualties in International Relations 
Casualties as a major consequence of international interaction play an important 
role in the international relations literature. Studies frequently examine the relationships 
between international conflicts and casualties. Indeed, many of these studies use 
casualties as a proxy measure for the level of conflict. The Correlates of War Project1 
and its attendant data sets are the primary examples of the type of work that uses 
casualties in this way.  Projects range from studies of interstate war, intrastate war, and 
alliances, to the impact of intergovernmental organizations and culture. Thus, these 
studies have focused on broader international interactions among and within nations 
rather than the specific impact of casualties on a given country’s public.  
Despite this general focus on larger international impacts, three basic lines of 
casualty research focus on public reactions. The first line of research focuses on what 
factors affect the sensitivity of the public to casualties. Thus, casualty sensitivity is the 
                                                 
1 For more information about these studies or to view the data available from this and related projects, go 
to http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
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dependent variable. Casualty sensitivity is then used to determine the level of support for 
the use of force. The second set of research treats casualties as an independent variable. 
In this line, researchers examine the pattern of casualty accumulation on the public’s 
support for the use of force. The final stream of research treats casualties as a cost of a 
given international conflict. The first set of literature offers insight into how the impact 
of casualties is altered by other factors. It does not address the central questions of this 
work nor how casualties directly affect public reactions and preferences. Therefore, after 
a brief discussion of this set of literature I will focus on changes in the variables that are 
related to the effects of the casualties. A more extensive review of these streams of 
literature is in the following sub-sections of this chapter.  
The first stream of research examines the relationship between factors that affect 
sensitivity to casualties, including the underlying or central principle or objective for 
which the conflict has been undertaken. In this stream of research, this central principle 
or objective is identified as the “principle policy objective (PPO)” (Jentleson 1992; 
Jentleson and Britton 1998; Larson 1996; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2006). Alternatively 
put, the objectives are specific factors (e.g., policy objective, elite support, etc.) that will 
affect the sensitivity of the public to casualties as a function of the utility (benefits minus 
cost) of the conflict. For example, Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) 
propose that the level of support for a conflict depends on the underlying objective of the 
policy. Those policies that focus on using force to stop aggressive actions against a 
specific country or its allies will achieve the most support. In this category, the public is 
willing to support high levels of casualties. Alternatively, if the primary objective of the 
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use of force is humanitarian or involves regime change, the public will be less likely to 
tolerate casualties. Other factors may also affect sensitivity of casualties. These factors 
include domestic elite support of the conflict (Larson 1996), how elites shape public 
perceptions of the conflict (Zaller 1992; Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996; Berinsky 2005), 
the involvement of other nations in support of the nation’s actions (Kull, Destler, and 
Ramsey 1997), and whether or not the public thinks the use of force will achieve its 
goals (Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Kull and Ramsey 2001). Though this research does not 
examine the direct effect of casualties on public reactions, it does indicate that sensitivity 
to casualties may be related to the context in which they occur. The following sections 
will explore more fully the second and third streams of research.  
 
The Effect of Patterns of Casualty Accumulation 
As discussed above, there are several streams of research on the impact of 
casualties in international relations. One major stream of research is the examination of 
the patterns of casualty accumulations on the public’s level of support for conflict and/or 
support for different policy responses during conflicts. These studies explicitly explore 
the direct effects that casualties have in conflict scenarios. These studies have focused on 
the effects of patterns of casualty accumulations during different periods of the conflict. 
Early work in the field focused on the initial phase of a conflict, in which early casualties 
are recognized but the public focuses on showing solidarity with their leaders. This 
phenomenon is known as the “rally around the flag affect” (Verba et. al. 1967; Waltz 
1967; Mueller 1973). In this early phase, casualties do not present a problem for elites 
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involved in a conflict. However, scholars noted that this rallying affect is not permanent, 
and they focused on two separate phases of conflict and the role that casualties play in 
each. During the initial phase of a conflict, the public generally reflects high levels of 
support for the conflict. Following this period, however, support for a conflict is based 
on the pattern of casualty accumulation. Specifically, Mueller (1973; 1994), Gartner and 
Segura (1998, 2000), and Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening (1997) argue and find support 
for the idea that casualties do not always affect the public’s support for foreign policies 
in the same way. For instance, Mueller (1973) suggests that during earlier phases of the 
conflict, small numbers of casualties adversely affect the public’s opinion of and support 
for continuing the conflict. As the conflict continues and the number of casualties 
mounts, it takes more and more casualties to effect the public’s opinion of the conflict.2 
Essentially, the public becomes habituated to casualties. For instance, it seems that now 
the nightly news rarely gives a detailed account of all those who died during a day or 
week as they used to do at the beginning of the second Gulf War. Only when the number 
of dead from one or several incidents is high or an important official is killed, will the 
media report the circumstances of how individuals were killed. Alternatively, Gartner 
and Segura (1998) hypothesize that initially the public will “rally around the flag” during 
a conflict but the costs of war, including casualties, begins to depress support for the 
conflict.3 In addition, they propose that the pattern of casualty accumulation throughout 
                                                 
2 Mueller tests this idea by examining the casualties in the Vietnam and Korean Wars. A later study 
(Mueller 2006) comparing Vietnam, Korea, and the Second Gulf War indicates that this pattern of 
responses to casualties is also apparent in the Second Gulf War. Gelpi (2006) believes Mueller overstates 
the importance of the number of casualties in this war.  
3 The authors use the Vietnam and Korean Wars as examples to test this idea.  
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the length of the conflict determines the level of support for the conflict. If most of the 
casualties in a conflict happen early in the conflict and the rate of casualties remains the 
same or decreases, then the total number of casualties (cumulative) will be the best 
predictor of the decreasing support for the conflict. On the other hand, if the casualties 
are spread out over the course of the conflict, then the rate of increase or decrease in 
casualties (marginal) predicts the level of support for the conflict. The implication is that 
casualties do not always have the same effect. 
In addition to the above debate concerning the effect that patterns of casualty 
accumulation has on policy preferences, recent studies suggest that specific contexts in 
which the casualties occur also affects the impact of those casualties. Specifically, 
Mueller (2004; 2006) explores the overreactions of the U.S public and leadership to 
terrorist attacks. Mueller compares the number of those who die in extremely rare 
accidents, such as being struck by lightning, to the probability of American citizens 
being killed or injured because of a terrorist attack. Excluding the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, an American citizen is more likely to die from these rare or unusual 
types of accidents than from a terrorist attack. According to Mueller (2004; 2006), 
despite the relatively low level of cost (in terms of human lives), the response to these 
acts of terror is often swift, high-priced, and extensive. In Israel, the response to terrorist 
attacks is often raids and/or bombings of targets within the occupied territories as well as 
the construction of a massive and expensive wall to separate themselves from the 
Palestinians. In the United States, the September 11 attacks resulted directly in one war 
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(i.e., Afghanistan) and another indirectly (Second Gulf War). In both examples, millions 
if not billions of dollars have been spent on security to counter these threats. 
One implication of the above studies is that there are several ways that casualties 
can have an impact. In particular, these studies imply that in addition to the gradual 
accumulation of casualties throughout the course of a conflict, individual incidents in 
which casualties occur can have independent or separate effects in international 
relations. The distinction between marginal and cumulative casualties encapsulates this 
idea by focusing on the impact of variations or deviations in the rate of casualties. The 
suggestion here is that a particular event during a war or conflict can, by itself, affect the 
public’s reactions to and support of a conflict. The fact that the effect of casualty events 
can be mediated by patterns of casualty accumulation, as the above studies of war 
reveals, implies that the context in which casualties occur also matters. This idea is 
further supported by Mueller’s (2004) finding that casualties resulting from terrorism 
have a greater impact then might be predicted by models based on war and militarized 
dispute casualties. These prior studies highlight the nature of the questions posed by the 
present researcher: What are the effects of casualties within the context of a larger 
conflict and independent of a larger conflict? In addition, what are the effects of 
casualties within the context of terrorism and within the context of war? 
 
Casualties as a Measure of the Cost of an International Conflict 
The above discussion reveals that there are several possible ways that casualties 
can have an effect on international relations. The literature thus far has shown us that it 
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is important to explore the role of casualties because casualties in different contexts and 
times have unique effects. Another important reason for examining this impact is that 
casualties are commonly used as a representation of national cost as well as a measure of 
the success or failure of the current foreign policy during times of international conflict, 
militarized disputes, and terrorism. For instance, Bennett and Stam’s examinations of 
democratic involvement in war employ casualties as a measure of the cost of conflict 
and war (Bennet and Stam 1996, 1998; Stam 1996). They theorize that the higher the 
anticipated costs (i.e., casualties), the less likely democracies are to be involved in a 
conflict (e.g., they choose not to be involved in conflicts that are expected to be 
extremely costly), and the less likely they are to remain in the conflicts once they 
become involved. The implication of this approach is that if the cost becomes and/or is 
anticipated to be too high, then disengagement from the conflict will occur. In a related 
treatment of casualties as a cost, Nincic and Nincic (1995) hypothesize that the public 
views casualties as a consumer views something about to be purchased. In this case, 
casualties are used as a measure of the intensity of the conflict. The calculation of the 
public is that the higher the intensity of the conflict, the higher the cost (casualties), and 
therefore, the lower the benefits and the lower the likelihood of success. Alternatively, 
the government views costs (i.e., casualties) up to a certain point as an investment that 
will eventually lead to a payoff or benefit. If public opposition becomes too high, then 
the cost of continuing a conflict will outweigh the benefits of continuing the conflict. 
The implication is that casualties are perceived at least in part by leaders through the lens 
of public responses to them. In addition, while the public is “...inclined to compare 
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present costs with currently apparent benefits, and to establish a ledger accordingly” 
(Nincic and Nincic 1995, p. 416), the government as an investor in foreign policy views 
cost in terms of potential future benefits. These benefits may be the stated aim of the 
military action or other benefits such as increased prestige or continuing international 
credibility.  
One consequence of the use of casualties as a cost is that how casualties are 
translated (i.e., perceived, aggregated, and interpreted) into costs will affect the 
likelihood of continuation of the conflict. If each casualty does not equal every other 
casualty, then the costs of conflict are difficult to calculate. In addition, if decision 
makers and the public use casualties as part of their cost/benefit analysis, then examining 
the effects of different levels/numbers of casualties is necessary in order to determine 
how close these two sets of calculations are to one another. In addition, it is possible that 
the current calculation of the cost is influenced by perceptions of potential future 
(anticipated) casualties. Finally, the context or background in which the casualties 
occurred, including but not limited to war versus terrorism may influence the way in 
which costs are interpreted. Casualties in a war as discussed earlier may be more easily 
accepted as part of the cost necessary to achieve some national goal while victims of 
terrorism appear much more unpalatable to the public.  
From the above discussions, we see that it is unclear, for multiple reasons, what 
the exact calculation of the cost of casualties is. We are left with the question: do the 
context, identity, number of casualties, and other characteristics of casualties have 
differing consequences for decision-making and policy formation? By examining the 
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effects of casualties, some light may be shed into the “black box” of casualties allowing 
for a few of these questions to be answered.  
 
Terrorism and Public Responses 
In recent years, research in political psychology has begun to examine how the 
public reacts to terrorism. Many of these studies have revolved around the idea that 
terrorism may cause increased perceptions of anxiety and/or threat (Huddy et. al. 2005). 
These studies have shown that in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
individuals who responded with an increase in anxiety perceive greater risks, which in 
turn reduces the propensity of individuals to prefer taking military action against the 
terrorists. Alternatively, an increased perception of threat results in increasing 
belligerence and willingness to use military force. These findings are in line with more 
general research on the consequences of anxiety (Lerner et. al. 2003; Lerner and Keltner 
2000, 2001; Raghunathan and Pham 1999) and external threat (Hermann, Tetlock, 
Visser 1999; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998). Other studies showed that 
following these attacks Americans believed that there is an increased likelihood of future 
attacks (Huddy et. al. 2002). Huddy et al. 2002 examined the role of threat to the 
individuals versus threat to the group from terrorism. The suggestion here is that 
terrorism offers a personal direct threat to the individual in a way that other national 
threats such as war do not pose for the average individual. In Huddy et al.’s words “By 
design, there is something personally disturbing, immediate, vivid, and frightening about 
the threat of terrorism” (2002, p. 287). Thus, terrorism presents a unique threat to 
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individuals in the public (Greenberg, et. al. 1992; Jacobson and Bar-Tal, 1995). 
Responses to a variety of public opinion polls seem to support the feel of unique threat. 
A study by Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos (2002) found that there were distinct differences 
between support for a variety of policies before and after the September 11 attacks, 
including increased perception of vulnerability to terrorist attacks. These findings do 
indeed indicate that the effect of terrorism on the public is dissimilar to other national 
threats such as war. What is not clear is the specific role casualties play in these 
reactions. Mueller’s studies (2004; 2006) indicate that there is an ‘overreaction’ to 
terrorism. These studies indicate that the threat induced by terrorism is different from 
other national threats. The following sub-section more closely examines these 
differences and defines these contexts.  
 
The Impact of the Context of the Casualties 
The previous sub-section suggested the importance of context in the 
interpretation of casualties. The present study examines the distinction between 
militarized disputes and terrorism. Defining either terrorism or war is not an easy task 
because of the complex nature of these concepts. Terrorism in particular is difficult to 
define because it is a ‘disputed concept’. It has been defined in a variety ways according 
to who was defining it (i.e., scholars, governments, and terrorists) (Crenshaw 2000; 
Schmid 1992). However, most definitions of terrorism focus on the use of the threat of 
violence to obtain some goal (political, religious, or ideological). In essence, terrorists 
want to cause terror or fear in order to motivate their audience into doing what they 
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want. The main idea is that the violence or the threat of violence, usually against non-
combatants, causes the audience (the public) to demand that decision makers change 
their policies or introduce a new policy option (Enders and Sandler 1999; Hoffman 
1994; Mickolus 1982; Schmid and Jongman 1988). The hope of the terrorists is that 
decision makers may give in to the threats to stop the violence and fear. 
In this study, the major difficulty in using definitions of conflicts from 
mainstream international relations literature is that they use the number of casualties in a 
conflict as the definition. 4 Thus, using these definitions would make the number of 
casualties both the dependent and independent variables. However, some scholars have 
distinguished between terrorism and militarized disputes along dimensions other than the 
use of casualties. Specifically, Crenshaw (2000) posits that an important distinction 
between terrorism and other types of conflict (e.g. guerilla wars, civil wars, and 
interstate disputes) is the “territorial dimension” or territorial claims or demands, which 
is not present in terrorism. According to this conception of terrorism, claims or demands 
for territory identify the conflict as some form of inter or intrastate conflict (militarized 
disputes) being carried out by other means. Another distinction between terrorism and 
interstate conflicts is the idea that militarized disputes are carried out by groups with 
organized and trained forces (military forces or armies) (Cioffi-Revilla 2000). These 
elements can be combined to create definitions of terrorism and militarized disputes. 
Here terrorism is defined as violence carried out primarily against noncombatants to 
                                                 
4 For instance, Singer’s (1980) The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models presents early 
results of the Correlates of War project, which is the primary source of this type of conflict definition. For 
an additional list of example of studies that use this kind of measure, see the Correlates of War website: 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
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instill fear in the target audience to achieve some political, ideological, or religious goal. 
Alternatively, militarized disputes are defined as an organized conflict between or 
among states. The acquisition of or protection of territory is seen as an important 
motivating factor in militarized disputes. However, this distinction omits another salient 
instance of international violence, which is insurgency. While often insurgency is 
referred to by the target's nation as part of terrorism, it is of importance to identify its 
special characteristics.  
For the purposes of this work, it is necessary to clarify the differences between 
contexts, specifically militarized actions (disputes), insurgency, and terrorism, in 
interpretations of casualties. The difference in these three contexts addresses the 
following aspects: the initiator or the actor, the intended target, and the objective of the 
action. Table 1 explicitly identifies these differences. The definitions in Table 1 will 
allow the differentiation between the contexts of casualties.5  
Distinguishing between the effects of different casualty contexts is particularly 
relevant since the September 11 attacks. In the aftermath of the destruction of the World 
Trade Center in New York and severe damage to the Pentagon on that day, the concept 
of terrorism has been interwoven with the concept of war (militarized disputes). This 
new “War on Terrorism,” which led to military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, has 
made it more important than ever to determine what role casualties play in determining 
                                                 
5 The experimental section, however, will merge the terrorism and insurgency contexts. This is done 
because many governments label insurgent groups as terrorists, making it difficult, in an experimental 
setting, to distinguish meaningfully between these contexts.  
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reactions to international casualties. Does it matter if the casualties occurred as the result 
of terrorism? Does it matter that the casualties were the result of militarized disputes?  
 
 
 
Table 1: Definitions of Contexts of International Violence 
 
 Actor Primary Human Targets Objective 
Militarized 
dispute 
Members of a nation’s 
security forces who are 
executing that nation’s 
orders 
Mainly members of the 
enemy’s security forces – 
but at times paramilitary 
forces. Civilians are 
rarely targeted and may 
be considered as collateral 
damage 
 
Military victory – which can 
be expressed as capturing 
territorial assets, destroying 
military and economic 
might of the enemy 
Terrorism Members of groups in 
political, social, or 
religious opposition to 
the regime (whether it is 
national or foreign – 
occupying regime). 
Mainly civilians of the 
enemy (or of nations 
affiliated with the 
enemy). Yet, targets may 
include members of the 
security forces of the 
enemy. 
 
Generate fear that will draw 
attention and eventual 
conformity to their political 
objectives. 
Insurgency Members of groups in 
political opposition to 
the regime (whether it is 
national or foreign –
regime). 
Mainly, official members 
of the regime – military 
civilian workers, political 
leaders. 
Political change due to 
costs. 
 
 
 
Section Conclusion 
This section has examined the role of casualties within the international relations 
literature. What is illustrated in the chapter is that casualties do not always have the same 
effect on the public. Additionally, this study linked different impacts of casualties with 
differences in the context in which the casualties occurred. In order to clarify these links, 
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definitions of each context are offered including terrorism, militarized disputes, and 
insurgency.  
One of the important elements not discussed in this section is the potential impact 
of emotions on responses to casualties in international conflict events. More specifically, 
one of the primary elements of the contexts of terrorism and insurgency is the imposition 
of terror or fear on the audience. In essence, terrorist believe that by invoking emotion 
they will achieve their social, religious, or political goals. If emotions have an impact in 
the context of terrorism, it is possible that they will have an impact in other contexts. 
The following section explores the interactions of casualties and contexts with emotions.  
 
Casualties and Emotions 
“The death of one man is a tragedy. The death of millions is a statistic.” Joseph Stalin 
 
Introduction 
Stalin’s quote reveals that there are two ideas underlying the impact of casualties. 
The first idea is that that there is an emotional element to casualties. That is, some 
casualties evoke an emotional response that has an impact on responses to events 
associated with casualties. The second idea is that casualties may not all have the same 
impact. The use of casualties in international relations as a measure of cost or level of 
conflict implies that casualties in a given conflict have the same impact. The above quote 
then illustrates that not all casualties have the same impact on individuals. The question 
at the center of this work is when do casualties move from being a “tragedy” or an 
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emotional event, to being a “statistic” or calculation of the cost of a conflict? This 
section of the chapter seeks to examine the role of emotions in the impact of casualties in 
international conflict events. The first sub-section examines the role of emotions in 
political science. The second sub-section considers the Valence Model of emotions 
versus examining the contribution of specific emotions.  
 
Why Should We Examine Emotions in International Relations? 
Emotions play an important role within international relations. However, there 
are not many studies on the actual effects of emotions in international relations. In the 
early development of political philosophy, emotions--specifically fear--are the main 
motivating forces for wars (Thucydides [431-404 BC] 1998). Later, philosophers viewed 
the fear of a “war of all against all” (Hobbes [1651] 2003), or chaos, as the reason that 
individuals have accepted the concept of a ruler and permit limits to be placed on their 
freedom. More recent realist theoretical traditions, according to Crawford (2000), accept 
fear as an underlying reason for international behavior. However, this tradition in 
international relations does not directly address or explore how these emotions interact 
with the needs and actions of international actors (Crawford 2000). Nuclear deterrence 
theory is one example of literature within international relations that specifically 
assumes that fear plays an underlying role in influencing choice. For example, Blight 
(1990) examines the adaptive role of fear on decision makers during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  
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Despite this tacit recognition of the influence of emotions in the literature, very 
few if any studies have explored the actual impact of emotions on international relations. 
Instead, studies have focused on the logic and reasoning underlying international 
interactions. The rational choice (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and 
Lalman 1990, 1992) and “cold” cognition (Janis and Mann 1977) approaches are 
examples of approaches which have until recently dominated the study of international 
relations. These types of approaches have treated decision makers as if they make 
decisions without emotions. An example of this type of approach was Bennett and 
Stam’s treatment of casualties as costs, as previously discussed (Bennett and Stam 1996, 
1998; Stam 1996). Alternatively, some scholars within the rational choice approach have 
searched for ways of explaining incidents or events that did not fit within what would be 
considered a rational or “cold” cognitive calculation (Janis and Mann 1977). Most 
notable of these attempts to introduce human frailty back into the calculator are Simon’s 
(1993; 1995) “bounded rationality” model and Jervis’s (1980) cognitive discussion of 
misperception. Neta Crawford (2000) attempted to bring emotions back in by 
formulating a model for others to build off and test. In spite of these attempts, emotions 
have for the most part been relegated to the categorization of irrationality.  
It was not until recent work in American politics by Marcus and Mackuen (1993) 
that the idea that emotions may not be just irrationality began to gain some acceptance in 
the wider field of political science. Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen’s Affective 
Intelligence Model (2000; see also Marcus 2000) and Marcus et al. (1995) explore the 
effect different affective or emotional states have on the process of reaching a decision. 
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This model posits that negative emotions such as anxiety and apathy activate cognitive 
processing. Essentially these scholars demonstrate that negative emotions alert a 
decision maker that something is wrong and that it may be time to reevaluate the current 
surrounding. Rather than leading to worse or short-circuited decision-making, these 
negative emotions lead to more information processing and therefore “better” decision-
making. 
 
Why Study Negative Emotions Rather Than Umbrella Emotions? 
In previous sections (on casualties), I discussed the “overreaction” of individuals 
to terrorism as compared to reaction to militarized disputes. Both of these types of events 
may evoke negative emotions, yet the literature indicates that terrorism has a different 
impact. How then might literature on emotions in choice and judgment explain the 
differing impacts? Given that both types of events have negative emotional impacts, it 
seems likely that the emotional effects are complex. In this section, I will examine the 
role of emotion in the political psychology literature as well as the role of specific 
negative emotions.  
Just as emotions are emerging in political science as an important concept, the 
way we think about emotions is also undergoing a shift as well. The predominant model 
of emotions has been the idea of the valence of the emotions. Specifically, emotions 
have been split into two groups, positive and negative emotions. Each category contains 
a variety of emotions and these emotions are expected to act in a similar fashion on 
judgment and choice (Clore, Schwarz, and Conway 1994; Forgas 1995; Schwarz 1990; 
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Russell 1983, 1989). Advances in neurosciences, however, allowed for greater mapping 
and understanding of how different portions of the brain interact and produce thought 
and emotions (Carver 2004; Gray 1987). Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen’s (2000: see 
also Marcus 2000) and Marcus and Mackuen’s (1993) reintroduction of emotions into 
political science tapped into this research. What emerged in their work is that the 
formation of emotions is more complex than previously had been considered. Indeed, 
rather than positive and negative emotions emerging from a simple “approach avoidance 
system,” emotions are the result of multiple interacting sections of the brain. 
Specifically, Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen’s (2000) and Marcus and Mackuen (1993) 
propose that the emotions are generated in the brain by two interconnected processes. 
These two processes, the disposition and surveillance systems, are based in the 
neurological structures of the human brain, specifically in the limbic system. The 
surveillance system within the limbic system, also called the Behavioral Inhibition 
System (BIS) (Marcus et. al. 1995), monitors the environment surrounding the 
individual for new, unique, or threatening occurrences to the decision maker. When any 
of these are detected, the decision maker feels greater anxiety and directs greater 
attention to the current situation. The disposition system, also called Behavioral 
Approach System (BAS), monitors current task performance against previously learned 
behaviors for task failure or mistakes. The level of success of the current task determines 
how enthusiastic or gloomy an individual feels about the current situation. The more 
enthusiastic an individual is, the more likely that person is to continue what he or she is 
currently doing. These two systems combine to determine when and how much attention 
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is given to a situation or task before the conscious mind ever receives the incoming 
information about the situation or environment.  
Research by scholars in psychology supports Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen 
(1993) in their findings that not all negative emotions have the same effect (Bower 1991; 
Eysenck 1992; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 
1993, Lazerus 1991; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Lerner et al. 2003; Ortony, Clore, and 
Collins 1988; Roseman 1984; Scherer 1988; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Weiner, Graham 
and Chandler 1982). This evolution in how scholars think about emotions and their role 
in judgment has caused political scientists, and international relation scholars 
specifically, to take a closer look at the role of negative emotions. Several studies have 
explored various subjects including: the effects of negative emotions on information 
processing (Geva and Skorick 2003; Geva, Redd, and Mosher 2004; Geva and Mosher 
2005a, Geva and Mosher 2005b; Redd, Geva, Mosher 2004), the perceptions of threats 
of terrorism (Lerner et al. 2003), the role of casualties in terrorism on policy preferences 
(Mosher 2004; Mueller 2004), and casualties and the public’s tolerance of pain in order 
to achieve their foreign policy aims (Bragg and Geva 2004).  
From the above discussion, we can see that emotions are more than positive and 
negative. In addition, different negative or positive emotions are evoked by different 
interacting processes in the brain. Thus, different emotions have fundamentally different 
impacts. These findings seem to indicate that not all emotions (specifically negative 
emotions) are “created” equal. If emotions do not all have the same impact on the 
decision process, then this is likely to affect the decision outcome. Indeed a difference in 
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the type of negative emotion experienced by an individual might explain the difference 
in reactions to terrorism and war discussed earlier. Given the probability that different 
negative emotions have different impacts on international outcomes, this work seeks to 
examine emotions and the role they play in international relations. However, rather than 
examining rationality/irrationality, this work examines “reasoning” or the effects of 
emotions on decision-making required by foreign policy choices (Crawford 2000). More 
specifically, this work will combine the study of casualties with the possible impact of 
different types of negative emotions on foreign policy choice. 
 
Specific Negative Emotions 
The current literature in political science and social psychology indicates that 
specific negative emotions have different effects on information processing, judgments, 
and decisions. The question is what the literature tells us about the effects of negative 
emotions. This section will explore some of these effects. This section will also analyze 
some potential causes and consequences of these emotions identified in both fields. 
More specifically, this section seeks to answer three questions.  
1. What are these negative emotions?  
2. What effects do these emotions have on responses to casualty events? 
3. What triggers these negative emotions? 
Much of the research concerning the effects of specific negative emotion began 
with Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) work on the dimensions that result in specific 
positive and negative emotions. The authors combined the work of many scholars on 
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which dimensions best describe the elements that evoke specific emotions. The specific 
dimensions/elements they examined include pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, 
attentional activity, self other responsibility/control, perceived obstacle, and situational 
control. Many other scholars have added to and refined these elements or dimensions to 
include personal relevance, agency/control, and uncertainty (Keltner, Elsworth, and 
Edwards 1993; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). In this perspective, if the underlying 
causes of emotions differ then, the negative emotion experienced by an individual also 
differs. The three main elements or dimensions and what each entails are described in 
the following paragraphs.  
Control. Control can be defined as “the degree to which events seem to be 
brought about by individual agency vs. situational agency” (Lerner and Keltner 2000). 
There are two types of control, human or situational control. Human/Agency Control 
implies that the individual experiencing the emotion believes he or she is in control of or 
responsible for the situation or that some other group or “agent” is in control of or 
responsible for the event or situation invoking the emotions. Who is viewed as 
responsible for an incident determines which negative emotion is evoked. For instance, 
if an individual feels that he or she is responsible for a negative event, then he or she is 
likely to feel guilt (Keltner, Elsworth, and Edwards 1993). Situational Control implies 
that external forces such as fate or luck are responsible for the event or situation 
invoking the emotions (Keltner, Elsworth, and Edwards 1993; Lerner and Keltner 2000; 
Smith and Ellsworth 1985).  
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Certainty. Certainty can be defined as “the degree to which future events seem 
predictable and comprehensible vs. unpredictable and incomprehensible” (Lerner and 
Keltner 2000, p. 479). The dimension asks does the individual understand the situation 
and what is likely to happen in the future (Keltner, Elsworth, and Edwards 1993; Lerner 
and Keltner 2000; Smith and Ellsworth 1985).  
Perceived Obstacle/Personal Relevance. Perceived Obstacle/Personal Relevance 
can be defined as “the perception of something standing in the way, even if the goal was 
previously unconscious” (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007,4 ). This is often referred 
to as personal relevance because the event is directly or indirectly related to the 
individual or their goals (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007).  
Within the context of these key elements, the study of discrete or specific 
negative emotions has focused on four emotions: anger, fear, anxiety, and 
sadness/depression. Each of these emotions varies in how each of the above 
elements/dimensions affects them. Therefore, the following section will establish “how” 
these emotions are triggered. In addition, the effects of these emotions once they have 
been triggered will be examined, based on studies to date. It should be noted some 
emotions have received more scholarly attention than others have and thus will have 
more detail.  
 
Anger 
How is anger triggered? Anger is triggered by the frustration of personally 
relevant goals in which a human agent is seen as responsible for the event and certainty 
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about the negative event is high. In particular, the central causes of anger are a certainty 
that a negative event will prevent individuals from achieving their goals. Therefore, 
events that cause anger are personally relevant to the individual (Carver 2004; Huddy, 
Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Lazerus 1991; Stein, Trabasso, and Liwag 2000). In 
addition, individuals view the frustration of their goals as caused by a specific person or 
representative who is considered “unjust or illegitimate” by these individuals (Clore and 
Centerbar 2004; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Keltner, Elsworth, and Edwards 
1993; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988; Shaver et al. 1987; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; 
Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano 1999). In essence, anger is more likely when there is 
someone to blame and possibly to take action against.  
 What effects does anger have? Once anger is evoked by the above causes, it has 
several important effects on individuals. The main effect is that angry individuals use a 
simplified or heuristic decision-making process (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer 
1994). Essentially, decision makers take shortcuts and are biased in the way they process 
incoming information. Specifically, angry individuals are predisposed to believe 
negative information in both current situations as well as in events that shortly follow. 
Several researchers found similar biases in studies of negative emotions during 
international crisis events (Geva, Mosher, and Redd 2004; Geva Redd, and Mosher 
2004; Redd, Geva, and Mosher 2004). Secondly, angry individuals are more likely to be 
optimistic in their assessment of risk in a given situation (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 
2007; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). This is true even after the initial cause of the 
emotion is no longer relevant to the current situation (Lerner and Keltner 2001). Thus, 
 
34 
we might expect more aggressive or risky behavior in angry individuals because they are 
more likely to believe these risky behaviors will be successful. Mosher (2004) found 
support for of this effect in international relations conflict events. This study found that 
angry individuals were more likely to support aggressive foreign policies than non-
aggressive foreign policies.  
 
Fear 
How is fear triggered? The three elements that trigger fear are threat, situational 
control, and severe uncertainty. Fear is triggered by incidents resulting from a threat 
beyond the control of the individual (i.e., situational control) with severe uncertainty 
about the outcome (Bower 1991; Eysenck 1992; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; 
Lazerus 1991; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988; Roseman 
1984; Scherer 1988; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Weiner, Graham, and Chandler 1982). 
The first element of fear is threat or indication that something undesirable is going to 
happen. We might think of this threat as similar to a “perceived obstacle” or a frustration 
of personal goals. However, with fear when the word ‘threat’ is used we are often 
referring to something more basic. Specifically, common forms of threats that cause fear 
are physical threats to the individual or loved ones. Thus, these events or threats are 
personally directed. For instance, Mosher and Geva (2006b) show that in terrorist attacks 
individuals expressed the greatest level of fear of attacks in their hometowns as opposed 
to in other locations.  
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The second element that causes fear is the type of control individuals have over 
the current situation. In the case of fear, the control element is characterized by 
situational control or a lack of personal control of the ongoing situation. There is no a 
specific human agent whom the individual perceives as responsible for the event; 
instead, the threat or negative consequences are the result of a given situation. For 
example, most damage caused by a natural disaster such as a hurricane is beyond the 
control of any individual. The third element or dimension of fear is the severe 
uncertainty of outcomes (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). The individual has no or very little 
idea about what is ultimately going to happen in the current situation.  
 What are the effects of fear? Once fear is triggered by the above elements or 
dimensions, there are several basic effects. The classic effect of fear on individuals is to 
either avoid or prevent what the individual fears from occurring. Therefore, fearful 
individuals try to avoid future threats by preparing for future incidents (Huddy, Feldman, 
and Cassese 2007, p. 3). This also means individuals are more likely to assess a situation 
as risky and to make a choice that avoids risk or is a ‘sure thing’ rather than making a 
choice that involves uncertainty and risk (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). 
 
Sadness 
How is sadness triggered? Sadness is the result of events that are not personally 
relevant, represent extreme situational control, and have mild uncertainty (Ellsworth and 
Smith 1988; Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 1993; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Thus, 
sadness, unlike fear and anger, is a reaction to something that is not of vital importance 
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physically or in terms of goals to the individual. In addition, the individual views the 
situation as beyond any human ability to control or effect. Examples of these types of 
events, often termed “acts of God,” could range from a tree falling on your neighbor’s 
car to the tsunami that hit Indonesia in December of 2004. To the average American, 
such events are not personally relevant and are beyond his or her control. Finally, 
although the individual may have some idea about the event, it is not entirely clear what 
happened or what will happen. Thus while there was widespread carnage in Indonesia 
because of the tsunami, the outcome and effects of that event are unlikely to be ever 
known.  
What are the effects of sadness? Of all the negative emotions, once triggered 
sadness has the least biasing effect on judgment and choice task. Saddened individuals 
process information in a fairly unbiased, detailed, and systematic manner (Bodenhausen, 
Sheppard, and Kramer 1994; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Sinclair 1988). 
Saddened individuals are willing to undertake “a more thoughtful cost benefit 
analysis…” (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer 1994, p. 48). Schaller and Cialdini 
(1990) make a similar observation. This is in marked contrast to fearful and angry 
individuals, but is consistent with the idea that saddened or depressed people are seeking 
to relieve their symptoms or solve the problem (Schwartz 1990). In addition, studies of 
international crisis events also indicate that individuals who express greater levels of 
sadness than anger are more likely to choose more pacifistic policy options (Mosher 
2004). Finally, experimental results demonstrate that when sadness is experimentally 
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triggered, it is more likely than the other negative emotions to have the same effect (i.e. 
no effect) as a neutral emotional condition.  
 
Anxiety 
Although anxiety is treated in this study as a distinct emotion, some scholars use 
anxiety and fear as interchangeable concepts (Huddy et. al. 2005). Because of this 
disagreement in the literature, the use of the concept of anxiety in the remainder of this 
work will be cautious.  
 How is anxiety triggered? Anxiety plays a unique role in the negative emotions 
arena. In particular, anxiety is the result of a negative event or threat in that is personally 
relevant to the individual (Bower 1991; Eysenck 1992; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 
2007; Lazerus 1991; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988; 
Roseman 1984; Scherer 1988; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Weiner, Graham, and 
Chandler 1982). Secondly, the individual has little control over the given situation. 
Anxiety arises from an external personal threat and little situational control (Bower 
1991; Eysenck 1992; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007). 
 What are the effects of anxiety? Anxiety results in “heightened sensitivity and 
attention to threat, overestimation of threat, and more careful information processing” 
(Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007, p. 4). Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen (2000) and 
Marcus and Mackuen (1993) posit that anxiety serves as monitoring emotion that alerts 
individuals to that there is a unique or threatening event happening. Unlike those who 
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are angry, those anxious individuals are less willing to take risks (Huddy, Feldman, and 
Cassese 2007; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001).  
 
Section Conclusion 
This section examined the political psychology literature on the impact of 
negative emotions. Specifically, it focused on the discrete effects of individual negative 
emotions. The literature reveals that sadness, anger, fear, and anxiety each has unique 
effects on behavior, information processing, and decision making. Chapter III presents a 
model of how I expect these unique emotional effects to interact with the characteristics 
of casualty events (literature reviewed in section one) to produce foreign policy 
preferences.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE MODEL: CASUALTIES AND EMOTIONS 
 
Introduction  
Worldwide terrorist attacks and the wars that resulted from these events have 
increasingly brought the consequences of these events, casualties, to the public’s 
attention since September 11, 2001. Whether it is the destruction of the Twin Towers in 
New York, the burning of the Pentagon in Washington, or pictures of flag draped coffins 
returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, few people dispute the impact these images have 
had. Specifically, these images and the heart-rending stories that accompany them have 
an emotional impact. Indeed these attacks seem to fit the definition of “tragedy” 
discussed in the last chapter. Yet, as the last chapter also demonstrates, the number of 
casualties can act as a cognitive measure, or as a “statistic,” of the costs of a conflict. 
Whether they are considered as “statistics” or “tragedies,” these casualties have 
important impacts on the public. Furthermore, the political decision makers (elites) pay 
attention to the reactions of their constituency. Indeed elites have been shown to react 
dramatically to counter expected negative public responses (e.g., protests, falling support 
for leaders, government change) (Kull and Ramsey 2001). Thus, I seek to determine how 
individual members of the public respond to these events. More specifically, this chapter 
presents a model of how I expect negative emotions and cognitive calculations of these 
types of casualty events (CE) to affect the public’s formation of foreign policy 
 
40 
preferences. This chapter also presents several hypotheses that will be tested in the 
following chapters.  
 
The Model 
In the model below, I propose that different casualty characteristics evoke 
different emotions that may indirectly influence different foreign policy preferences. The 
role of casualties is viewed here as more than an ingredient in a simple calculation of the 
costs of the conflict. Instead, casualty characteristics are expected to interact with the 
cognitive and emotional decision-making mechanisms, producing distinct effects on 
policy preferences (see Figure 1 below). When casualty characteristics affect mainly the 
cognitive mechanism, I label them as part of the Direct Effects. Indirect Effects occur 
when emotional mechanisms (specifically negative emotions) are activated, and in some 
cases overshadow (bias) the cognitive mechanism. The dominance of a particular 
mechanism affects the perceptions of the event and consequently the public’s foreign 
policy preferences. I will briefly review the more general effects of the model before 
detailing the specific relationships of the casualty characteristics with each mechanism.  
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Figure 1: Model of the Effects of Casualties Events 
Context 
 
 
 
Cognitive 
Mechanism
Emotion 
Mechanism
 
Foreign Policy 
Preference 
Formation 
Casualty Event 
 
 
 
When Direct Effects dominate, characteristics of the casualty events have 
specific effects on the cognitive or cost/benefit calculations of responses to the event. In 
essence, responses to these casualty events are driven primarily by calculations of how 
effective6 the available policy options are likely to be. Thus, if a particular casualty 
characteristic has mainly a direct effect, then individuals examine the options (in this 
study, the use of force, negotiation/diplomacy, and do nothing/withdrawal) and 
determine which policy options will be the most effective in resolving the crisis. The less 
effective a policy is expected to be, the lower the overall preference for that policy 
should be. 
Other characteristics of a CE may evoke primarily negative emotional responses. 
Specifically, I expect that different casualty characteristics will evoke different negative 
emotions. Each negative emotion in turn alters interpretations of the event, and 
consequently, what policy responses are preferred. In essence, by altering the perception  
                                                 
6 The most effective policy response implies ensuring success/victory in war and stopping attacks in 
terrorism.  
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of the event these characteristics alter the cost/benefit analysis by changing the weight of 
parts of the information. Furthermore, in some cases the emotionally affected 
interpretation may remove a policy option from consideration even before the 
cost/benefit analysis occurs. Whether or not preliminary elimination of options or 
differential weighting of information occurs is dependent in this model on the specific 
negative emotion that dominates an individual’s response to the CE. Essentially, while 
several negative emotions may occur (or be reported), the one that most colors an 
individual’s response determines how the cognitive and emotional mechanisms will 
interact. In the literature on emotions reviewed in the previous chapter, three negative 
emotions were related to behavioral responses: sadness, anger, and fear. Because of this 
focus in the literature, I will concentrate on the effects of these three emotions on foreign 
policy preferences. The specific impacts of the casualty characteristics are addressed in 
the following sections. 
 
The Direct and Indirect Effects of Casualty Characteristics 
The general model depicted in Figure 1 above implies that different casualty 
characteristics alter responses to casualty events. The question is what characteristics of 
casualties are most likely to alter responses to these events. The literature in Chapter II 
emphasizes three characteristics of casualty events that alter the impact of the event on 
policy preferences of the public. These include the context, identity, and the number of 
casualties. In this section, I will examine the specific effects of these casualty 
characteristics on the cognitive and emotional mechanisms. Specifically, I will examine 
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which characteristics I expect to have a greater direct impact and which characteristics I 
expect to have a more pronounced indirect impact through the emotions they evoke. 
 
Direct Effects 
As discussed previously, when a casualty event occurs, the characteristics of that 
event alters its interpretation and the policy preferences that individuals form. In much 
of the literature on casualties, the primary effects scholars focused on are cognitive 
calculations of the cost/benefits of the conflict (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Nincic 
and Nincic 1995; Stam 1996). Although much of this literature focused on the number of 
casualties, I expect that the context and the identity of the casualties also have an impact 
on the cognitive mechanism. Below I will describe how each of these characteristics in 
this model affects these calculations, individually and together. 
 
Context 
In Chapter II, I examined the literature on casualties and noted that one of the 
most important factors in determining the impact of a casualty event is the context of 
that event. In fact, some scholars attributed the difference in reaction to casualties 
primarily to the context of the event, particularly if it is a change in context from war to 
terrorism. In essence, the context is king. The question here is what effect does the 
context of the casualty event [CE] have on the cognitive mechanism? Assuming that the 
calculations of costs/benefits are altered by the context of the event, the question then 
becomes how they are affected by the context of the event.  
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I propose that the context of the casualty event affects these calculations by 
setting expectations for the other casualty characteristics and the likelihood of the 
success or failure of different policies. The context gives us information about who the 
target of these event usually are, how severe (in terms of numbers) the event will be, and 
potentially how likely an individual is to be affected by the event. In essence, individuals 
are likely to be aware that terrorism and war have different consequences. For instance, a 
terrorist attack may be an isolated incident or part of a string of other sporadic attacks, 
but in war generally there will be more casualty events. Individuals are more familiar 
with wars because there have been more wars, while terrorism is relatively rare and has 
only recently emerged as a worldwide phenomenon. Thus, even the non-expert public 
has some personal knowledge of, and expectations about, how to address war as a 
context. Even experts argue about how terrorism is defined, what causes it, and how to 
respond to it. Individuals are therefore less likely to have personal knowledge or 
expectations of how terrorism can be dealt with successfully. Given this personal 
knowledge base, these contexts [war and terrorism] lead individuals to expect those who 
are killed in war to be soldiers, while civilians are expected to be targets of terrorism.7 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that governments have specifically targeted civilians during war. In essence 
governments have also used terror as a tactic.  For instance, the Allied forces bombed Dresden, Germany 
in World War II, killing tens of thousands. This attack was seen by some as an attack on a cultural center 
of Germany, fleeing refugees, and wounded soldiers rather than primarily focusing on the weapons 
factories in the area (Addison and Crang 2006). Alternatively, the Blitz on Britain by Nazi Germany early 
in World War II is a more explicit example of governments intentionally targeting civilians. This attack, 
which focused heavily on London, was a sustained effort to demoralize the public and weaken the country 
for invasion. In essence, governments have also used terror as a tactic. Despite these instances, generally 
civilians are not the intended targets of governments in wars. In recognition of this the 1949 Geneva 
Convention recognized the importance of protecting civilians during wars. Thus, here I treat terrorism and 
war as distinct.   
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The context therefore tells individuals what they should expect from an event and allows 
them to see if the other characteristics of the event match these expectations.  
War. It may be easier for individuals to calculate the most effective responses to 
casualty events during war than to do so for similar events during terrorist attacks. This 
may be because there are more instances of casualty events in war, and therefore, more 
opportunity for individuals to observe the consequences of these events and to calculate 
which responses are most effective. Indeed, individuals may build expectations about 
how governments behave in response to attacks in war.8 Therefore, during war it is 
probable that individuals will have the information to calculate what the best response to 
casualty events. In addition, in war individuals may realize that there are advantages to 
perusing policy responses other than the use of force. For example, when attacked, 
individuals will expect their leaders to defend the country (use force). However, 
individuals may also support negotiation with an adversary if the opponent has the 
advantage or the central issue in the conflict is not of high salience to them. In addition, 
previous experience with neighboring countries and familiarity with how similar 
conflicts have turned out in the past gives individuals a basis from which to judge what 
may work in the current conflict. This is not the case in terrorism. In war, there may be 
many intangibles to calculate but there are many examples of what works and what does 
not work in specific instances. In terrorism, there are fewer examples as to whether the 
                                                 
8 I expect that governments/decision makers will use different criteria than the public on foreign policy 
preferences since they may have different information and goals than the public. Because of this 
distinction here when I refer to “individual responses” above I am referring to the public/citizens not 
government decision makers.  
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use of force is actually an effective policy. Thus, war offers a clearer case for assessing 
the utilities of different policies than terrorism. 
Terrorism. The context of terrorism offers hurdles that war does not to how 
individuals calculate the utilities of different responses to these events. I will offer 
several reasons why this is the case and then offer more detailed discussions of each 
reason. First, terrorist attacks are rare and appear to occur at random. Secondly, it is not 
always clear that any policy response to terrorism can be actually expected to ‘stop’ 
terrorism. Indeed, research on terrorism and more ‘common sense’ approaches to 
addressing terrorism result in seemingly opposing policy prescriptions. Thirdly, 
terrorism seems to cause an emotional ‘overreaction’ to CEs that alters casualty 
calculations (addressed in the Indirect Effect section). Each of these issues complicates 
attempts to respond to terrorism even for experts, let alone the less informed public.  
As stated above, terrorist attacks are rare and make calculating the best response 
to these events difficult.9 This is especially true in the United States. Although the 
attacks on September 11 were vivid and caused substantial damage, the average 
American is more likely to be struck by lightning than be killed by terrorists (Mueller 
2004). In addition, even when these attacks do occur, they rarely kill a large number of 
people especially in comparison to the number of those that can be and are killed in the 
context of war. With little experience with these types of attacks, it is difficult for an 
individual to gauge how grave the current casualty event is over time. In addition, 
                                                 
9 This work focuses primarily on the American public’s responses to terror events. It is possible that states 
or cultures with more experience with terrorism (e.g. Israel, Great Brittan/Northern Ireland, or Sri Lanka) 
may have different responses. Chapter 7 in part explores this but future work should explore this impact.  
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terrorists seemingly attack at random10, which makes it difficult for the public to 
determine the correct policy to prevent future attacks. 11 
To complicate the calculation of responses to terrorism even further, many 
experts in the field of terrorism and counterterrorism have difficulty agreeing on the 
definition of terrorism (Crenshaw 2007). For instance, they disagree on whether to limit 
acts of terror in their studies to: (1) domestic or international, (2) political, secular, or 
religious motivations, or (3) suicide or regular terrorism, etc. This means that the cases 
they include in their studies are different and the statistics they present to the public do 
not always coincide with one another. If scholars cannot agree on the ‘facts,’ it is even 
more difficult for individuals to build factual foundations for expectations of future 
casualty events caused by terrorism. Without this basis, it is therefore difficult to 
calculate what the actual costs and benefits of each policy may be.  
The second reason that the public may find difficulties in calculating foreign 
policy preferences in the context of terrorism is that ‘common sense’ approaches to 
terrorism and what some studies (Pape 2003, 2005) show as effective in ‘stopping’ 
terrorism lead to conflicting policy proscriptions. The ‘common sense’ approach in 
response to a terrorist attack is that you should not negotiate with terrorists. The idea 
behind this approach is that negotiating with terrorists encourages other groups to take 
similar actions. By negotiating with terrorists, you reward their bad behavior. Thus, for 
                                                 
10 Sandler (2003) points out that the apparent randomness of these attacks is the result of terrorists 
switching from sites of attacks, which are currently heavily guarded, to more vulnerable sites. Therefore 
though these attacks seem random to the public and possibly the government they are not.  
11 There are nations in which terrorist attacks are more common. However, the studies in this work 
examine primarily U.S. public responses. A case study of Israel is also included that will help explore this 
factor. It may also be that culture or familiarity with terrorist attacks may be important casualty 
characteristics, which need to be further explored.  
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those who hold this belief, the costs of negotiating with terrorists are far greater than any 
concessions that might emerge from the negotiations. They believe that in addition to 
these concessions, they will face more terrorist attacks from other groups trying to reap 
the same rewards as the first group. For those who take this approach, the only 
appropriate response to terrorism is punishment. Some studies (Friedland and Merari 
1985; Huddy et. al. 2005) support this idea by showing that when terrorist attacks occur, 
people want to make the terrorist pay for the damage they have inflicted. Specifically, 
these studies show that in response to terrorism, attitudes harden, support for 
counterterrorism measures increases (Friedland and Merari 1985), perceptions of threat 
increase, and support for military actions increases (Huddy et. al. 2005). Hardening 
attitudes and this perspective combine to make negotiation unpalatable and costly, 
leaving only the use of force and withdrawal/do nothing as potential alternatives. The 
use of force allows for inflicting costs on terrorists, while doing nothing at least does not 
encourage terrorists.  
In contrast to the ‘common sense’ approach, studies on terrorism indicate that the 
use of force may in fact increase the costs of terrorism (Pape 2003, 2005).12 Crackdowns 
on terrorists groups are expensive and do not necessarily stop terrorism. In some cases, 
these actions further entrench support for these groups and/or further radicalize the 
groups and their more moderate supporters. Ultimately, Pape’s studies indicate that not 
negotiating with terrorists’ leaves only continued violence and retreat as options for 
                                                 
12 Martha Crenshaw (2007) offers a summary of this and other studies that both agree and disagree with 
this finding. Primarily, scholars’ disagreements revolve around case selections and definitional issues, 
further highlighting the difficulties mentioned earlier.  
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terrorists. With fewer options available, the costs of continuing the violence may be the 
only acceptable option left to these groups. If this is the case, then a cycle of terrorist 
attacks and retaliation by governments is likely to occur. Ultimately, societies using only 
force against terrorists may end up paying an extremely high cost. These costs may be 
out of proportion to the costs of negotiations with terrorists, especially if their demands 
are limited to less central issues to nations. Indeed these studies (Pape 2003, 2005) 
indicate that in many cases, when faced with entrenched terrorist groups, many nations 
end up negotiating and/or acceding to at least some of the terrorists’ demands. This is the 
case even if they start from a non-negotiation stance. 
One example given in this research is the PLO and the eventual creation of the 
Palestinian Authority. An alternative example might be the hijacking by Palestinian and 
German terrorists of an Air France Airbus flight from Athens that carried over one 
hundred Israelis.13 The hijackers eventually forced the pilots to land in Uganda. Given 
the unfriendly relationship of Uganda with Israel and the lack of readily available 
military options, the Israelis’ were forced to open negotiations with the terrorists. 
Eventually Israel launched a raid that freed the hostages. These examples illustrate that 
international terrorist events occur in complex environments and may force nations to 
negotiate with the terrorists.  
From this discussion, it is easy to see why the common sense approach can be 
more appealing, but in terms of actual costs, it may not be an effective approach. 
Furthermore, the debate covered in the news media (Bass 2005) surrounding Israel's 
                                                 
13 For a more in depth discussion of this incident, see Stevenson and Dan (1976).  
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2005 Unilateral Disengagement Plan of withdrawal from the Gaza Strip indicates that 
some of the Israeli public has begun to believe the cycles of attacks and retaliation may 
result in too high a cost. Thus, while the public may not be aware of the scholarly work 
that indicates that not negotiating with terrorists is detrimental, this debate indicates that 
some of the public believes this to be the case.  
In addition, recent examples lend support to the above studies, indicating that it 
may necessary in some cases to negotiate with terrorists. Individuals are thus faced with 
conflicting impulses and their corresponding costs. The first impulse is to ensure that 
terrorists pay for their attacks and make certain they are not encouraged to commit 
similar acts. The second impulse is to negotiate with the terrorists and potentially pay 
lower costs in terms of money and lives. When stated in this fashion the calculation of 
policy preferences seems simple: negotiation leads to lower costs. However, negotiation 
does not guarantee that the terrorism will be “stopped.” Some studies (Pape 2003, 2005) 
indicate that while many countries end up negotiating, these nations will not necessarily 
like the outcome or find the demands of the terrorists acceptable. In addition, this 
calculation of cost does not take into account the impact of negative emotions like anger 
and fear on these calculations (discussed in the next section). Given these impulses and 
the potential impact of negative emotions, the policy options/choice set and 
consequences of these policy options are clearer and more easily defined in war than 
during acts of terrorism. Therefore, it is more difficult to calculate the costs and benefits 
in dealing with terrorism than it is in war.  
 
51 
As discussed above, I expect that the context of the casualty events to alter 
expectations about the effectiveness of different policy responses. Essentially, in the 
context of war, the calculations of costs and the effectiveness of each policy are more 
straightforward than in the context of terrorism. Given these effects, I also expect that 
differences in the context of these casualty events may also alter the impact of the 
identity and number of casualties. Below I will explore these potential interactions as 
well as the independent effects of both of these variables. 
 
Identity 
The identity of casualties plays an important role in determining the effects a 
casualty event has on responses to that event. However, the real impact of a casualty 
event is difficult to decipher without taking the context of the event into account. This is 
because the context in which the casualties occur also determines who is likely to be the 
target of the attack. Thus, without the context of the event, it is difficult to calculate the 
direct effects of the identity of the casualties. The fact that civilians are killed in terrorist 
events is important, but may become more important if they occurred during war and 
thus are unexpected. Therefore, what can we expect the responses to different casualty 
identities in terrorism versus war to be? 
There are two primary purposes of terrorism14. The first purpose is to draw 
attention to a cause. The second purpose is to show that the terrorists will do whatever 
they have to in order to achieve their goals. How do terrorist achieve these goals? 
                                                 
14 For examples of discussions of the purposes/goals of terrorism, see Enders and Sandler (2002, 2005). 
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Terrorists realize that democratic elites have little incentive to meet the demands of 
small portions of the populations. Therefore, they target civilians in the hope that 
civilians will be unwilling to accept the costs of not giving the terrorists what they want. 
Thus, civilians become both the targets of the attack (the message) and the intended 
audience of the message. In essence, terrorists target civilians to get them to react. They 
want the public to react and put pressure on the government to meet the terrorists’ 
demands. Targeting soldiers may not achieve the same purpose; therefore, they are 
generally not the expected victims.  
Alternatively, in war the primary targets of each nation in a conflict are their 
opponent’s soldiers and their defenses. This is not to say that civilians are not killed or 
targeted, but they are not generally considered a ‘legitimate’ target. To achieve the 
nation’s goals, you must win victories against the opposing military and, therefore, the 
focus of expectations is on dead soldiers. In addition, the purpose of the conflict is to 
achieve military objectives and not necessarily to get the remaining soldiers to alter their 
government’s policies. On the other hand, terrorism’s goal is to force an audience to 
protest the conflict or change their votes in an election, although this may also happen 
because of war. In war, the soldiers’ deaths are the cost of the conflict. Specifically, the 
loss of soldiers diminishes the capability of a nation to achieve its national goals. 
However, this cost is expected and often accounted for in advance by decision makers 
(Bennett and Stam 1996). When civilians are killed in the course of a war, they are 
considered collateral damage, which must be included in the cost of the conflict. In 
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contrast to soldiers’ deaths, however, civilian deaths are not necessarily an expected cost 
and therefore may accrue a greater cost or have more weight than the deaths of soldiers. 
Thus, we can see that there are specific identities of casualties expected in war 
versus terrorism. In terrorism, we expect more civilian casualties than military 
casualties. In war, soldiers are the typical casualty. I therefore expect that alterations in 
the identity of the casualties will alter the costs of the conflict. In essence, the fact that 
the costs of the conflict differ from expectations will increase the sensitivity of 
individuals to utilities of the conflict and, ultimately, will alter preferences for different 
policy responses. More specifically, I expect that: 
 
Proposition 1a: The identity of the casualty affects the impact of the casualty-
event on foreign policy preferences.  
 
Proposition 1b: This effect is qualified by an interaction of identity and context. 
When the casualties are different from what is expected in a given context this 
will alter costs of the conflict and therefore foreign policy preferences.  
 
Number of Casualties 
There has been some research (Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, 
and Wilkening 1997; Mueller 1973; 1994) on the independent effects of the number of 
casualties on responses to casualty events. These studies indicate that the number of 
casualties in an event has an impact on foreign policy preferences. Specifically, as the 
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number of casualties increases, the higher the cost of the conflict and the more likely 
preferences are to lean toward removing the state from the costs of the conflict (i.e., 
withdrawal). In addition, the number of previous or accumulated casualties may affect 
responses to current casualties by demonstrating how the current event compares to 
previous events. For instance, if there are more current casualties than previous 
casualties, this indicates the situation is getting worse and costs of the conflict are 
increasing. Therefore, the number of casualties helps individuals determine not only the 
current costs of the conflict, but also potential future costs. Individuals may therefore 
alter their policy response.  
Though the effect of the number of casualties is distinct from the context of the 
event, it also seems possible that there will be an interactive effect. As do the identities 
of the casualties, the context of the event adds more information about the costs of the 
conflict. The information added by the context of the event to the number of casualties 
revolves around how rare these events are in particular contexts. In essence, casualty 
events in war occur in regular, distinguishable patterns. These war casualty events also 
occur more frequently than do casualty events associated with terrorism. Thus, more is 
known about what to expect from these types of events and the number of casualties can 
be used more easily as a measure of the costs of the conflict. In addition, these types of 
events have been studied in a way casualties in terrorism have not. These studies 
(Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening 1997; Mueller 1973, 
1994;) support the basic idea that the higher the number of casualties, the lower the 
support the use of force. Despite these studies, there is little work on the relationship 
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between the single casualty event and previous casualty accumulation. Given this gap, 
one of the purposes of the following chapters is to examine this relationship more 
closely within the contexts of war and terrorism, as well as to examine the role of this 
interaction in general. Specifically, this work asks if the change in context of the event 
alters the effects of the number of current casualties and previous casualties.  
In contrast to war, casualty events in terrorism are rare and thus it is more 
difficult to establish the pattern of casualty accumulation. This makes these events more 
jarring and less predictable, which likely increases the salience of the number of 
casualties. In war, there may be a reported casualty event every few days, which in a 
way allows individuals to become habituated to these attacks. When an event occurs, 
unless the number of people killed is wildly different from previous attacks, it will 
receive less attention. With terrorism, there are few previous opportunities to become 
familiar with this type of attack. Therefore, it seems likely that the number of casualties 
will weigh more heavily than they might otherwise under similar circumstances. In 
addition to these factors, few studies have examined the impact of numbers of casualties 
killed in terrorist attacks, so there are few sources from which to draw information about 
the impact of numbers of casualties. Nevertheless, given that the intent of terrorism is to 
increase the salience of the casualties, it seems possible that casualty numbers from 
terrorist attacks have a greater impact on foreign policy preferences than casualty 
numbers from war. Specifically, if terrorists are successful in increasing the salience of 
the number of casualties and thus the costs, then increases in the number of casualties 
should result in a greater propensity to support nonbelligerent foreign policies.  
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Indirect Effects 
As discussed above, the emotional mechanism can have distinct effects on the 
calculation of costs and benefits preformed by the cognitive mechanism. In the cognitive 
mechanism, individuals attempt to weigh and measure the consequences of different 
policies in response to the current casualty event. Depending on the specific emotion that 
dominates an individual’s response, the emotional mechanism can enhance and/or alter 
these calculations. Of specific interest in this study are the roles of sadness, anger, and 
fear on responses to these events. Based on the literature discussed in the previous 
chapter, these emotions have distinct effects on an individual’s behaviors and policy 
preferences.  
When dominant, anger is likely to alter how the situation is perceived and thus 
how the individual responds to the event. Calculations of the costs and benefits of a 
specific policy response are minimal. Specifically, individuals may consider little 
additional information before responding to a crisis or they may lend more weight to 
information that favors certain types of responses. In addition, anger has a tendency to 
increase the sense in individuals that some illegitimate actor has done something to them 
or something for which they care. They are therefore generally unwilling to consider not 
responding to the event and are less willing to consider more pacifistic policy responses. 
As the literature has shown, angry individuals tend toward aggressive behavioral 
responses (Bodenhausen, Shepard, and Kramer 1994). In essence, anger eliminates some 
policy options and sets the decision threshold (or point at which an individual will 
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choose that option over the remaining options) for non-aggressive responses higher than 
they might otherwise be. Thus, I expect: 
 
Proposition 2: When anger is the dominant emotion individuals will be more 
likely to prefer aggressive or belligerent policy options. 
 
Sadness, when dominant, is likely to enhance a more systematic analysis of 
information and, importantly for this study, a willingness to be restrained in the 
individuals’ policy responses. Fundamentally, sad individuals will be less likely to seek 
revenge than are angry individuals, who may rely on such a policy even if it will not 
solve the conflict. This occurs because the people saddened by the situation do not find 
the consequences of the casualty event personally relevant to them. In essence, it 
happened to someone else in another location and the individuals personally do not have 
something to protect. They may also consider in their calculations that the perpetrators 
had a legitimate reason for the action they took or the victims placed themselves in 
danger. This adds some weight to the benefits of negotiation and withdrawal. 
Alternatively, angry individuals feel that they or something they care about has been 
attacked by someone who has no right or grounds to do so. Therefore, they want to 
punish the perpetrators while saddened individuals do not. Saddened individuals merely 
want the casualty events to stop if possible. Of the three emotions, sadness is more likely 
to cause more attention to be paid to the calculations of the costs and benefits of the 
situation. Sadness is also the least likely to result in biased information processing. Put 
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differently, even though sadness is a distinct negative emotion, it will result in the same 
outcome as if no negative emotion were evoked. It will have a non-emotional impact 
resulting in reliance on the cognitive mechanism. Thus, I propose that: 
 
Proposition 3: When sadness is the dominant emotion individuals will be more 
likely to choose a policy option that will be most effective in responding to the 
situation.  
 
Fear is the result of the perception of some personal threat. Individuals feel that 
something about the situation is endangering them, their friends and family, or 
something they cherish. Individuals often believe that there is little or nothing they can 
do to stop the threat. In response to these events, individuals seek to prevent or avoid 
whatever is seen as the cause of the threat. Like anger, individuals are more likely to 
consider little additional information before responding to a crisis or they may lend more 
weight to information that favors certain types of responses. In addition, it may be more 
likely that if there are calculations of the costs and benefits, that the costs of belligerent 
policies will weigh more heavily than any benefits. In essence, fearful individuals want 
fewer risks and to withdrawal from the situation. Therefore, they are more likely to 
eliminate risky policy options from their choice set than non-fearful individuals are. 
Therefore, I expect: 
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Proposition 4: When fear is the dominant emotion individuals will be more likely 
to support policies that withdraw from the situation and less likely to support 
belligerent policies.  
 
In addition to these behavior effects of specific emotions, I expect that these 
emotions are associated with different casualty characteristics. Specifically, I expect that 
different characteristics of casualty events evoke different emotions and therefore 
different policy preferences. As with the cognitive mechanism, the characteristics of 
interest here are the context, the identity, and the number of casualties.  
 
Context 
In this model, the context in which the casualty event occurs is pivotal to 
understanding how individuals respond to these events. As discussed above, the context 
plays an important role in calculations of the costs of the casualty event. I propose that 
the context of the casualty event plays an even more important role in determining 
whether emotion dominates, and which emotion dominates the emotional mechanism. In 
effect, altering the context of the casualty event will fundamentally alter the emotion that 
dominates reactions and policy preferences. This idea is a primary driver behind 
Mueller’s (2004, 2007) proposition that there is an overreaction to terrorist attacks in 
comparison to attacks in the context of the war. More specifically, while fear, anger, and 
sadness are central emotions to deaths in both terrorism and war, each context evokes 
different dominant emotions. This occurs because the underlying premise of terrorism is 
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to evoke strong emotional response, and fear in particular. Thus, rather than target places 
to achieve strategic goals, terrorism targets people. In war, the intent is to achieve certain 
military objects, which may include fear. However, evoking these strong negative 
emotions is not the central driving purpose of war as it is in terrorism.15 Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to expect that contexts of war and terrorism evoke different emotional 
responses. Indeed, it seems likely that: 
 
Proposition 5: The overall impact of each negative emotion should be amplified 
in the context of terrorism and depressed in the context of war.  
 
The question is how these emotional responses differ and what effects do they have on 
policy preference formation. 
War. Several factors determine what negative emotion dominates during war. 
The first factor most likely to affect the emotional response is the distance of the event 
from the individual. Specifically, as long as the war is at a distance from those 
responding to an event, individuals are unlikely to feel they are endangered by the war. 
When a war is taking place at a distance individuals are therefore unlikely to feel fear. 
The second set of factors that I expect to affect emotional responses is the identity and 
number of casualties. In general, given the distance factor and the repetitious nature of 
                                                 
15 Inflicting fear or terror has been used as a tactic by governments (e.g., London Bombings in WWII or 
Mutually Assured Destruction in nuclear deterrence). Responses to individual instances or casualty events 
in war in which this tactic is employed may be altered. However, I would argue that the targets and 
audience of war remain fundamentally different (decision makers rather than the public). To confirm this, 
it will be necessary to examine both different contexts with different tactics and target audiences. In this 
study, my focus is on the more general effects of the contexts of war and terrorism on public reaction 
rather than differentiating the impacts of different tactics in war on the public and decision makers.  
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casualty events in a war, I expect that sadness will be the dominant emotion expressed 
during war. If, however, the war hits closer to home and/or the number of casualties 
demonstrate a change in the status quo of the war, anger may emerge as the dominant 
emotion. I also expect that the identity of the casualties will affect the dominance of 
anger. In the context of war, civilian casualties are both unexpected and ‘illegitimate’ 
targets of attack. Thus, it seems plausible that individuals are more likely to be angry 
when civilians are killed than when soldiers are killed. Given, however, that I generally 
expect sadness to dominate responses to casualties’ events in war, I expect that policy 
preference formation will be based on a careful evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
the different policy options available.  
Terrorism. Overall, the intent of terrorism is to create an emotional ‘overreaction’ 
to these types of casualty events so that individuals will force their government to accede 
to the demands of the terrorists. This idea is supported by the findings in the literature 
that terrorist attacks seem to evoke a greater sense of threat than war (Huddy 2003). 
Thus, in the context of terrorism, I expect to see anger and fear as the dominant 
emotions, rather than sadness. Specifically, when anger dominates we might expect a 
greater preference for belligerent policies, while dominant fear is more likely to result in 
greater preferences for withdrawal from the conflict.  
In addition to this more general effect, I expect, as with war, there are a number 
of factors that will affect emotional responses to terrorism. However, because the entire 
purpose of terrorism is to evoke or increase the negative emotions that individuals 
experience, I expect that the interaction of these variables with terrorism will have a 
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different effect than in war. First, I expect that the distance of the individual from the 
event may modify this ‘overreaction’ to terrorism, although not to the extent it does in 
war. Specifically, between fear and anger, fear is most likely of these two emotions to be 
diminished by distance in both terrorism and war because distance offers a greater 
margin of safety. Individuals might believe that because something happened far away 
from them, they will not be targeted for any future attacks. However, as September 11 
demonstrated, an attack thousands of miles away can still spread fear throughout a 
nation. Getting the public to fear further attacks is, after all, the intent of terrorism. If 
fear of future terrorist attacks dominates, regardless of distance, the careful calculations 
of the cognitive mechanism will be overwhelmed by the need to find a policy that 
removes the danger. As I expect fear to occur more often in terrorism, I expect that:  
 
Proposition 6: There will be greater levels of fear in the context of terrorism than 
war.  
 
In terms of anger, I expect that the distance of the casualty event will have little 
effect on anger. Instead of altering levels of anger, I expect that the distance from the 
casualty event may alter whether fear or anger is the dominant emotion. This in turn will 
alter which policy individuals prefer. Anger plays a role in terrorism because it is 
perpetrated by illegitimate actors on the lives of the public or individuals to whom they 
can relate. This increased sense of illegitimate threat can only be overwhelmed by fear, 
which pushes individuals to flee the conflict. Furthermore, I believe that this anger 
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response lies at the heart of the contradiction between the long-standing policy of not 
negotiating with terrorists and the apparent failure of the use of force to stop terrorism. 
Rather than calculate what the best response to the crisis is, individuals are angered by 
these attacks and seek revenge. Put differently, instead of attempting to achieve the 
optimal solution to the crisis, these individuals want to inflict similar pain or costs on the 
terrorists. To do this, individuals will discount information that indicates that negotiation 
or withdrawal is a better option. They will focus instead on information that supports 
their desire to use force. The cognitive mechanism thus is overwhelmed or biased by 
support for the belligerent or punitive policies. Thus, anger resulting from terrorist 
attacks can lead to fundamentally different foreign policy preferences than we might 
expect based on cognitive interpretations. 
 
Identity 
In the cognitive mechanism, the effect of the identities of the casualties happens 
primarily in conjunction with the context of the casualty event. The casualty event sets 
expectations about who was most likely to be killed. When the casualty event identities 
are of the unexpected group, this alters the calculations of the costs of the conflict. In the 
emotional mechanism, the identities of the casualties may emphasize or decrease the 
effects of the context. They may also have a separate effect on emotional responses to 
casualty events. This independent effect centers on the meaning or role of each identity. 
Specifically, soldiers are put at risk by the nature of their jobs. They train for the 
possibility that they will be injured or killed in the line of duty as a normal course of 
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events. If there is an ongoing conflict, we generally expect that soldiers will be killed 
during the course of that conflict. Therefore, when soldiers are killed, it is not 
necessarily a ‘shock’ but a normal expense of national security. For this reason, it seems 
plausible that the dominant emotional response to the death of soldiers will be sadness 
rather than anger or fear.  
Alternatively, civilians are by definition ‘noncombatants’ and thus ‘illegitimate’ 
and unexpected targets of attack. The ‘shock’ of civilians being killed results in higher 
levels of all three negative emotions. I expect, however, that sadness will not be the 
dominant emotion when civilians are killed. Instead, anger and fear are likely to be the 
dominant responses to casualty events. Fear is likely to be higher when civilians are the 
targets because the public can envision themselves and their family members as victims 
of future attacks. In essence, the death of civilians hits closer to home for most 
individuals than do the deaths of soldiers. Anger is also likely to be higher for the deaths 
of civilians as opposed to soldiers because they are not considered legitimate targets of 
attack.  
Finally, although identity has an independent emotional impact, I expect that the 
dominance of fear or anger depend partially on the context in which these emotions 
occur. Specifically, when the identity interacts with the context, the propensities of that 
context are increased or decreased. Thus, if we think about civilians killed during 
terrorist attacks, both factors cause anger. This in turn may cause anger to be the 
dominant emotional response and push an individual toward belligerent policies and 
away from other policies. Alternatively, in the case of war civilian casualties may cause 
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both anger and sadness. Whichever of these emotions dominates will then determine 
how individuals calculate their responses.  
 
Number of Casualties 
Unlike the context and the identity of the casualties, the effects of the number of 
casualties on emotional responses are unclear. There are studies (Gartner and Segura 
1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening 1997; Mueller 1994, 1973) in the context of 
war that indicate that an increasing number of casualties can lead to policy change, but 
these studies do not address the emotional impacts on responses to these events. In the 
case of terrorism, studies emphasize the nature of the emotional impact but do not 
necessarily address the impacts of the number of casualties (Mueller 2004; 2006). 
Instead, these studies indicate that there is an ‘overreaction’ to terrorism in comparison 
to a similar number of deaths in war. Thus, though we might expect the number of 
casualties to have an emotional impact it is unclear what that effect might be. I explore 
this gap in the literature in empirical studies discussed in the following chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined how different casualty characteristics interact with the 
cognitive and emotional mechanisms to produce different foreign policy preferences in 
individuals. I proposed that the context of the casualty events is dominant. It determines 
whether the cognitive or the emotional mechanism dominates responses to these events. 
Specifically, I posited that because of greater familiarity with and understanding of the 
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policy consequences of war that the cognitive mechanism is more likely to dominate an 
individual’s foreign policy preference formation in that context. Alternatively, in the 
context of terrorism, because of a lack of historical experience with terrorism and a 
quagmire of potential consequences for different policy responses, individuals will rely 
more heavily on the emotional mechanism. In addition, I examined how the emotional 
mechanism and specific negative emotions are affected by different casualty 
characteristics and how they in turn affect foreign policy preference formation. Table 2 
briefly outlines the implications of the model I have just presented.  
As discussed above, this chapter offered a model of how casualty events affect 
emotional responses, cognitive responses, and foreign policy preference formation. In 
particular, it addressed the role of the context, identity, and number of casualties both on 
direct calculations of what policies would be the most effective and how these casualties 
are affected by emotional responses. This chapter also introduced several hypotheses 
that will be explored in the following chapters. Specifically, chapters IV-VI will 
experimentally test the internal validity of the model. Chapter VII will examine how 
well this model applies to actual casualty events in Israel. Finally, chapter XIII will draw 
conclusions about the success of the model and further avenues of research.  
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Table 2: Model Implications 
 
Characteristics Dominant Mechanism Choice Implications Policy Preference 
Implications 
Context Terror Emotion: Anger and 
Fear 
Eliminates Options 
and Biased 
Information 
Processing 
Anger: Belligerent 
Policy Preference. May 
Eliminate Passive or 
Do Nothing Option 
Fear: Preference for 
Withdrawal. Eliminate 
Risky Options. 
 War Cognitive: Sadness 
May Dominate. 
Rational Cost/Benefit 
Analysis. Sadness 
Will Not Alter 
Analysis.  
Policy With the 
Highest Utility is 
Chosen. 
Identity 
And 
Context 
Civilian Terror Emotion: Anger and 
Fear. Proximity Will 
Increase Fear. 
Eliminates Options 
and Biased 
Information 
Processing 
Anger: Belligerent 
Policy Preference. May 
Eliminate Passive or 
Do Nothing Option 
Fear: Preference for 
Withdrawal. Eliminate 
Risky Options.  
War Mixed 
Cognitive: Sadness 
May Dominate. 
Emotion: Fear 
Dependent on distance 
Cognitive: Rational 
Cost/Benefit 
Analysis. Sadness 
Will Not Alter 
Analysis. 
Cognitive: Policy With 
the Highest Utility is 
Chosen. 
Emotion: Preference 
for Withdrawal. 
Eliminate Risky 
Options. 
Military Terror Emotion: Anger and 
Fear. ID May Diminish 
Impact of Anger and 
Fear leading to 
dominant Sadness 
Eliminates options 
and bias information 
processing 
Anger: Belligerent 
Policy Preference. May 
Eliminate Passive or 
Do Nothing Option 
Fear: Preference for 
Withdrawal. Eliminate 
Risky Options. 
War Cognitive: Sadness may 
dominate 
Rational Cost/Benefit 
Analysis. Sadness 
Will Not Alter 
Analysis.  
Policy With the 
Highest Utility is 
Chosen. 
Number of Casualties Cognitive: Sadness may 
dominate 
Rational Cost/Benefit 
Analysis. Sadness 
Will Not Alter 
Analysis.  
Policy With the 
Highest Utility is 
Chosen. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT I 
 
Recent events such as the Second Gulf War and the terrorist attacks in London 
increased the importance of understanding how casualties (death) affect the public’s 
response to these events. Numerous studies have examined the effects of casualties on 
the public in wars and conflict (Gartner 1998; Gartner and Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, 
Segura, and Wilkening 1997; Mueller 1973) as well as in terrorist attacks (Mosher 2004; 
Mueller 2004; Pape 2003). Few studies, however, attempt to compare the impact of 
casualties from both international conflict (e.g., war, militarized disputes, etc.) and 
terrorism. 
The primary question raised in this work is whether all casualties are equivalent. 
Does the public respond to all casualties in the same way? This work as a whole and this 
chapter specifically attempts to address these questions by examining the effects of 
casualties and the emotions they trigger in different international conflicts. In this 
chapter, I utilize an experimental design to examine the impact of casualties on policy 
preference formation (i.e., the use of force, negotiations, and doing nothing). 
Specifically, I examine the effects of casualties within a single incident rather than the 
accumulation of casualties along the span of the conflict.16 First, it explores the potential 
impact of the context of the casualty event (war versus terrorism) – as well as the 
identity of the casualties, (i.e., military versus civilian casualties) as factors that mediate 
                                                 
16 As discussed in previous chapters, studies of the impacts of casualties have only examined their impact 
within an accumulation of casualties over the course of a conflict. 
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such effects. Second, it explores the different impacts that emotions have on the decision 
outcome, given the findings that the effects of specific negative emotions indicate that 
not all emotions (specifically negative emotions) are equal, and that not all emotions 
have the same impact on the decision process (see Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; 
Keltner, Elsworth, and Edwards 1993; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Smith and 
Ellsworth 1985). These findings suggest the need to “unpack” negative emotions in 
order to determine their effects on international crises. Indeed, a difference in the type of 
negative emotion experienced by an individual might explain the difference in reactions 
to terrorism and war discussed earlier. For example, I expect that when sadness is the 
dominant emotional reaction we may observe less support for the use of force policy as a 
reaction to a casualty event than when anger and hate are the dominant emotions. Given 
this expectation, this study will explore more closely the distinctions between different 
negative emotions (sadness and anger) and their effects on endorsement of foreign 
policies. 
 
The Model: Impact of Casualties on Foreign Policy Responses 
Given the literature on casualties and emotions, I posit that casualty events will 
have two types of effects based on the characteristics of the casualty events. In this 
model, as Figure 2 below depicts, the casualty event will have both direct and indirect 
effects on an individual’s foreign policy preferences. 
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Direct Effect
Casualty Event Policy Responses 
Indirect Effect
Emotion 
1. Anger 
2. Sadness 
3. Fear 
Figure 2: The Indirect Effect of Emotions on Policy Responses. 
 
 
 
 
Specifically, the context and the characteristics of the casualty event are expected 
to influence cognitive calculations of individuals’ foreign policy preferences directly. In 
addition, the characteristics of the casualty event also have an indirect effect on foreign 
policy preferences via the emotions the casualty event evokes. The particular emotion 
that dominates the individual’s reaction to the event will affect how aggressively the 
individual wants to respond to the perpetrators. Below I present hypotheses that are 
derived both from the literature presented in previous chapters and from the above 
conceptual model. 
 
Hypotheses 
Context 
Consistent with Mueller’s (2004) discussion of terrorism, I assume that the 
context of the casualty event directly affects the public’s policy preferences. The context 
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has a direct effect on the policy responses. The context may suggest how well the policy 
responses may work because individuals have no information about how well previous 
efforts have worked. In essence, the previous context sets expectations about what 
individuals may expect in a given casualty event. For instance, military intervention is 
not always effective at inhibiting terrorist attacks as can be seen in Israel and the second 
Gulf War. Alternatively, in a military conflict the use of force is the primary means of 
resolving the crisis. Thus, based on pure costs/benefits calculations17 and with the 
exception of September 11, we might expect more uses of force in war than in terrorism. 
I also expect the context of the event has an indirect effect on policy preferences as 
indicated my Mueller’s discussion of an emotional “overreaction” to the casualty event 
(2004). Therefore:  
 
H4-1: Altering the context of the casualty event changes the effect of the casualty 
events on policy preferences.  
 
However, it seems plausible that measures of effectiveness and emotional responses may 
produce opposite reactions and preferences in individuals. For instance Mueller’s (2004) 
discussion of the an “overreaction” or emotional reaction to September 11 that resulted 
in two wars, makes it plausible that a casualty event within the context of terrorism will 
lead to a greater preference for an aggressive foreign policy (i.e., the use of force) as 
compared to the context of war. However, if the context of the event acts more as a 
                                                 
17 There may be some difference in these calculations if we consider the “common sense approach” 
discussed in Chapter III.  
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cognitive response (i.e., a measure of the effectiveness of the policy responses), then we 
might expect the reverse to be true. If we examine recent history uses of force in 
response to terrorism have had limited effectiveness. Given this history if responses are 
based on more cognitive assessments then we might expect less support for the use of 
force. Regardless of whether or not the context causes an emotional response or act as a 
measure of policy effectiveness, militarized disputes and terrorism are expected to have 
fundamentally different impacts on both emotions and foreign policy preferences.18  
Casualty Characteristics 
The characteristics of the casualty events analyzed here include the number of 
casualties and the identity of the casualties. Previous studies that examined casualties as 
part of an accumulation found that as the number of casualties or their rate of 
accumulation increased, negative public responses to the conflict also increased (e.g., 
support for leadership/ conflict). This study focuses solely on single casualty events and 
differs from accumulation studies. In a single incident without casualties’ accumulation 
information, I anticipate finding that as the number of casualties increase, the support for 
aggressive policy responses should also increase. This could be a function of 
individuals’ desire for retaliation or a reflection of the rally around the flag affect found 
in casualty accumulations. Therefore: 
 
H4-2: The higher the number of casualties, the greater the support for the use of 
force. 
                                                 
18 For a more complete discussion of this effect, see Chapter III. 
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However, the number of casualties could be a reflection of the cost of the conflict as 
expected in accumulation studies. We might therefore expect the opposite of the 
hypothesis to be true and support for the use of force to go down while support for 
negotiation and withdrawal go up. Effectively, an increase in the number of casualties 
could increase the perceived cost of the conflict and thus decrease support for the use of 
force. In addition, the number of casualties may alter emotional responses and therefore 
policy preferences; however, there has been no work in the literature to support this. 
Thus, the results should give us a better idea what role casualties play in policy 
preference formation.  
The second casualty characteristic considered here is the identity of the 
casualties. The identity of the casualties may also indicate the cost of the conflict. 
Specifically, civilian casualties may have a greater impact on individual’s policy 
preference than military casualties because of the inherent danger of the military. We 
expect that some soldiers will die in a conflict, but we do not necessarily expect civilians 
to die and if civilians die, the ‘cost’ may be higher than expected. Therefore: 
 
H4-3: The identities of the casualties affect the impact of the casualty event on 
foreign policy preferences. This effect may be qualified by an interaction of 
identity and context.  
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This interaction is based on the following premises. Generally, civilians are the 
targets in terrorism and soldiers are the most likely casualties in war. Thus, the context 
of the event tells us who is the most likely target and thus, what the costs of the current 
event are likely to be. Deviations from this pattern may cause a stronger effect on policy 
preferences because the cost is different from what is expected. While civilians are killed 
in military interventions, they are not generally considered an acceptable cost of the 
conflict. Thus, in the case of war I expect:  
 
H4-3a: Civilian casualties will have a greater impact on emotional responses and 
policy preferences than will military casualties in the context of war. 
 
In the context of terrorism, civilians are the targets/costs of the context. Viewed 
in this way, soldiers become the less acceptable cost and therefore I expect: 
 
H4-3b: Military casualties will have a greater impact on emotional responses and 
policy preferences than will civilian casualties in the context of terrorism. 
 
Casualties and Emotions 
In addition to these direct effects, context and casualty characteristics have 
indirect effects on foreign policy preferences through the emotional reaction of the 
individual to the casualty event. The particular negative emotion that dominates 
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reactions to the event will determine the most likely foreign policy response of the 
individual to the incident.  
Assumption: The dominant emotion that the casualty event evokes affects 
individual’s preference for foreign policy responses. Therefore,  
 
H4-4: When anger is the dominant emotion, it will lead to more support for the 
use of force than sadness.  
 
Previously I discussed deviations from expectations resulting in ‘greater impacts’ 
on responses to casualty events. This implies in part that different emotions will be 
evoked depending on when casualty characteristics deviate from expectations. These 
deviations alert us that something is wrong. This in turn evokes different emotions and 
thus different policy preferences. In cases where the ‘wrong’ people are killed, I expect 
anger to be the dominant response. Alternatively, when we get what we expect, sadness 
is likely to dominate. Finally, when those killed are similar to the individual responding 
to the event, then fear will affect and sometimes dominate responses to the event. 
Therefore, I propose that: 
 
H4-5: Deviations from expectations result in a greater likelihood of anger being 
the dominating emotion. Hence, deviations from the expected identity that are 
similar to the individual are more likely to cause anger to dominate emotional 
responses.  
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The Experiment 
Participants  
One hundred thirty (130) undergraduate students took part in this experiment. 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of twelve experimental conditions. 
Experimental Design and the Treatments 
This experiment used a 2x3x2 between groups factorial design to evaluate the 
effects of casualties (Table 3). The factors are: (a) the context of the casualty event 
(terrorism / war), (b) the number of casualties (3, 23, or 53)19, and (c) the identity of the 
casualties (i.e. civilian / military). The main measures are the expressed emotions to the 
incident and the level of endorsement of the use of force, negotiation, and doing nothing 
against the perpetrators.  
 
 
Table 3: Experimental Design for Experiment I 
  Number of Casualties
  Low (3)
Medium 
(23)
High 
(53)
 Context War Terrorism War Terrorism War Terrorism
 
Identity of 
Casualties 
Civilian 
 
      
Military 
 
      
 
 
 
All participants receive an introduction to a hypothetical international scenario 
concerning unrest in the nation of Errata. The introductory scenario begins with the same 
                                                 
19 The “number of casualties” represents incidents of low, medium, and high casualties.  
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basic descriptive information on Errata. This fictitious nation is depicted as a tropical 
island rich in strategic natural resources (uranium and diamonds), yet plagued with inter-
tribal disputes. In recent years, a fundamental group, Tima, has been responsible for 
major political and social unrest. This group promotes fanatical anti-western/ anti-
American themes amongst its adherents. The full scenario is shown below. 
 
Errata is a small independent nation in the Zeta Ocean with a 
population of seven million people. Errata is a mountainous island nation 
with a dense tropical forest. Errata’s culture is based on a hierarchical and 
paternal tribal system. Through conquest and alliances, each of the major 
tribes has gained power at one time or another. Until the last couple of 
decades, intertribal disputes have quickly toppled most of the ruling 
alliances in Errata. The discovery of rich natural resources, diamonds, and 
uranium in the country has alleviated tension enough that a somewhat 
stable government was established. In fact, until recently, Errata has been 
experiencing widespread prosperity and was well on its way to becoming 
one of the wealthiest nations in the region.  
 Four years ago, an attempted coup by the leader of a 
fundamentalist group called Tima almost toppled the Errata government 
and the group has caused continuing unrest. Since then, the Tima gained 
increasing support against the central government. The Tima religion is a 
mix of traditional tribal pagan symbols of birth, death, earth, and sun with 
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heavy mysticism. Tima requires the total dedication of oneself to and a 
willingness to make personal sacrifices for the Timatu or “the way.” Tima 
blames all misfortunes in the third world including Errata on deprivations 
that resulted from Western colonization and American imperialism. Thus, 
Tima promotes a fanatical anti-western theme amongst its adherents. 
 
Each scenario concludes with information specific to the conflict context 
assigned to the participants (i.e. terrorism or war). It should be noted that though I have 
used the phrase war as conceptual shorthand, the scenario does not meet the commonly 
accepted definition for war of one thousand battle deaths. Therefore, in the following 
sections I will refer to ‘war’ as either a military intervention or a military dispute. These 
texts provide cues that highlight elements associated with terrorism or a militarized 
dispute (e.g., military intervention on the island). 
 
Terrorism Context 
The groups associated with the Tima include multiple international terrorist 
organizations from different parts of the world. Because the Tima have a large base of 
support within the rural population, they have access to the natural resources of Errata. 
Therefore, the funding available for this group and others like them is in the hundreds of 
millions. In addition to the funding of terrorist groups, the Tima activities within Errata 
threaten to destabilize the intertribal balance. Additionally, anti-Tima paramilitary 
groups and affiliated extremist clans operate beyond the control of the unstable central 
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government in order to counteract the Tima threat. The combined unrest caused by Tima 
and their opponents threatens to spill over into U.S. installations in that region. The 
unrest caused the U.S. State Department to issue an advisory several days ago urging all 
U.S. citizens to leave the island nation as soon as possible.  
 
War Context 
Within the last two months, the Tima were finally able to take control of the 
island. Over 80% of the island is in their hands, although some anti-Tima and 
government forces have been able to hold on to small sections of the island. The central 
government was forced to flee to the neighboring island of Asu. As result of the danger 
to the uranium mines and the danger to U.S. installations on neighboring islands, the 
United States was forced to send forces to intervene. Three days after Tima took over 
the capital city of Tamatu U.S. forces landed in Errata and were able to bolster the 
remaining anti-Tima forces in the nation. In the last several weeks, the country has 
degenerated into a state of constant conflict. American and allied forces in the country 
have been involved in several skirmishes in an attempt to help protect civilians caught in 
the fighting while attempting to evacuate U.S. citizens in the area. In addition, the 
United States recently deployed additional troops to the area to ensure the safety of the 
troops already on the ground. 
When participants completed reading the scenario and one of the two contexts 
they were exposed to a “news update.” This “news update” contained the manipulations 
of the other two independent variables (number and identity of casualties).  
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News Update20 
The Tima organization has claimed responsibility for the rocket that 
brought down military/civilian flight 7756 from Tamatu, the capital city 
of Errata. At 3:17 pm, witnesses reported an explosion in the air over 
Tamatu as the plane took off from Errata International Airport. The plane 
crashed, killing the crew and (3, 23, or 53) American soldiers/civilians. 
The names of the dead will not be released until their families have been 
notified. These are the first American casualties in the region. 
 
Measurement of the Dependent Variables 
Participants rated their approval/disapproval of the “use of force,” “negotiation,” 
and “doing nothing” policy options in the current situation, on an eleven point scale (0 to 
10). In addition, the participants answered a series of questions concerning their 
emotional reactions to the incident. Specifically, the participants rated on an eleven-point 
scale (0 to 10) the level of anger, hate, sadness, and fear they had experienced while 
reading the “news update.” 
 
Results 
 The general findings of this study are supportive of the model and hypothesis 
suggesting that the context in which the casualties occur (terrorism or war) matters, and 
that within the terrorism context the identity of the casualties matters. However, counter 
                                                 
20 The bold text indicates the variations in the independent variables.  
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to hypothesis H4-2, the number of casualties had no effect in this study. Furthermore, in 
line with a previous study (Mosher 2004), anger is the negative emotion associated with 
support of the use of force, while other emotions such as fear and sadness have no 
relationship to the endorsement of that policy.  
 
Effects of the Experimental Treatments on the Endorsement of the Use of Force 
 On average (and across experimental conditions), the participants in this study 
lean towards the endorsement of the use of force option with a mean 6.33 on a 0-10 
scale. The 2x3x2 ANOVA yields no significant main effects of the independent 
variables (context, number of casualties, and casualty identity) on the endorsement of the 
use force.  
However, the ANOVA analysis yields a significant interaction between the 
context of the incident and the identity of the casualties on the endorsement of the use of 
force [F(1,115) = 5.41, p<. 02]. In the context of terrorism, the participants are more 
likely to support the use of force when soldiers die (M = 6.97) than when civilians die 
(M = 5.58).21 This pattern reverses in the context of war. In this case, there is more 
support for the use of force when civilians are the casualties (M = 6.66) than when those 
killed are soldiers (M = 5.86).22 Figure 3 depicts this interaction. While the lack of main 
affects offers no support for the model and hypotheses, this interaction does. Specifically 
the above interaction supports hypotheses H4-1, H4-3, H4-3a, and H4-3b. 
 
                                                 
21 The simple effect for this finding is F (1,60) = 3.83, p<.05 
22 It should be noted that this specific contrast is not statistically significant. 
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Figure 3: The Impact of Identity and the Context of Casualty Events on Support 
for the Use of Force. 
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Effects of the Experimental Treatments on the Endorsement of Negotiations 
A 2x2x3 ANOVA of the effects of the independent variables on support for 
negotiations revealed one significant main effect and one significant interaction. The 
significant main effect is related to the context of the casualty event [F(1,90) = 4.57, 
p<.03]. Support for negotiation is higher in terrorism (M = 6.88) as compared to war (M 
= 5.84). In addition, there is also a significant interaction with the identity and the 
number of casualties [F(2,90) = 5.41, p<.006]. Figure 4 below shows that with military 
casualties, there is a linear increase in support for negotiations when casualties increase. 
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Alternatively, support for negotiation is highest at the lowest levels of civilian casualties. 
An increase in the number of casualties drops support for negotiations and remains low 
regardless of the increase in the casualties.  
 
 
Figure 4: The Interaction of the Identity and the Number of Casualties on the 
Support for Negotiation. 
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Effects of the Experimental Treatments on Doing Nothing 
 The 2x2x3 ANOVA of the effects of the independent variables on support for 
doing nothing revealed one significant main effect [F(1,89) = 3.70, p<.05] and no 
significant interactions. Support for doing nothing is higher in terrorism (M = 4.84) than 
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in war (M = 3.70). This may reflect a feeling of less ‘hope’ that military interventions 
and negotiations will be effective in the context of terrorism.  
 
Effects of Experimental Factors on the Three Policies as Repeated Measures 
In order to explore the difference in relative preferences of the three policies, I 
preformed a repeated measures 2x2x3x(3) ANOVA. First, this measure reveals that there 
are significant differences in the preferences for the three policies [F(2,222) = 26.32, 
p<.0001]. More specifically, this ANOVA reveals that across experimental conditions, 
the participants in this study lean towards the endorsement of a diplomatic option with a 
mean of 6.68 and the use of force with a mean of 6.35 (on a 0-10 scale), in contrast with 
do nothing in response to the conflict with a mean of 4.22. Hence, the decision makers 
want something to be done about the situation. However, there is not a strong 
differentiation between the two policies of using diplomacy or using force.  
Secondly, the identity of the casualties had a significant interaction with policy 
preferences [F(2,222) = 3.14, p<.04]. From the graph of the interactions (see Figure 5 
below) we can see that most of the difference in the identity of the casualties occurs in 
support for doing nothing, while support for negotiation and the use of force are similar 
across identity. We can see from this difference that individuals want to take action 
when the casualties are military, but wish to avoid causing further problems or potential 
casualties in the case of civilian casualties.  
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Figure 5: The Impact of the Identity of Casualties on Support for the Three 
Policies. 
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Lastly, there was an interaction of the context and the identity of the casualties 
with policy preferences [F(2,222) = 2.85, p<.05] (See Figure 6 below). In general, we 
can see that participants wanted to do something rather than take no action or 
withdrawal, with exception of civilians in terrorism. It is not clear, however, which of 
the two remaining policies the participants prefer. Therefore, in the case of military 
casualties the context of the event seems to have little effect on support for different 
policies. Unlike military casualties, in the case of civilian casualties support for the 
policies are affected by the context of the casualty event. When the casualties occur in 
war, the effects on support for foreign policies are similar to military casualties. 
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However, when the context of the civilian casualties is terrorism, the participants where 
less optimistic about the success of “doing something.” This can be seen in the 
decreasing support for the use of force and a nearly two-point increase in support for 
doing something.  
 
 
Figure 6: The Impact of the Identity and Context of Casualties on Support for the 
Three Policies. 
Interaction of Policy, Context, Idenity
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Civilian Civilian Military Military
Terror War Terror War
S
u
p
p
o
rt
 f
o
r 
th
e
 P
o
li
cy
Use of Force Diplomacy Do nothing
 
 
 
 
These findings suggest that the respondents in this experiment are not that 
confident that military actions are very effective in curtailing terrorist attacks against 
civilians. It is plausible that this sentiment reflects public opinion about the continuous 
terrorist/insurgent attacks in Iraq, despite the military’s efforts. These findings support 
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hypotheses H4-1, H4-3, H4-3a, and H3b, as well as the idea that the identity and context 
of the casualty event matters in policy preferences of the public.  
 
Effects of the Experimental Factors on Emotions 
In much of the previous literature, the study of emotions focused on positive and 
negative emotions as general categories23. Thus, this section will examine emotions as a 
general category. In the first analysis, I generated a ‘negative emotional index’ that 
averaged the four scores on the self-reported emotive scales in this study. The ANOVA 
yielded one significant main effect [F(1,112) = 4.54, p<04]. There is a higher level of 
expressed negative emotions in the context of terrorism than in war, which is in line with 
Mueller’s (2004) hypothesis of an emotional “overreaction” to terrorism. Neither 
identity nor the number of casualties had a similar effect. This indicates that the context 
of casualties has an important influence on public emotional reaction to these incidents.  
However, as claimed in the conceptual model, it is anticipated that individuals 
who face a casualty event may experience different levels of negative emotions. The 
findings shown in Table 4 illustrate that across all experimental conditions, the casualty 
event evoked a higher level of sadness (M = 7.18) than anger (M = 6.33), hate (M = 
4.89), and fear (M = 3.82), [F(3,336) = 62.29, p<.0001].  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Valence Model; see Cacioppo, Gardner, and Berntson (1999), Marcus (2003), Watson and Clark 
(1992a, 1992b), Watson and Tellegan (1985), and Watson et al. (1999). 
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Table 4: Means Table Experimental Factors on Emotions 
   Emotion 
   Anger  Sadness Fear Hate 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Context Terrorism 6.6 7.6 3.9 5.4 War 5.9 6.6 3.7 4.2 
Identity Civilian 6.4 7.5 4.4 4.8 Military 6.1 6.8 3.2 4.9 
Number of 
Casualties 
3 5.9 7 3.9 4.5 
23 6.2 6.7 3.4 4.4 
53 6.8 7.8 4.1 5.6 
Mean  6.3 7.2 3.8 4.9 
 
 
 
The following analyses examine the effect of the independent variables (context, 
number of casualties, and casualty identity) on these emotions.  
 
Context (Terrorism/War) 
Casting the casualty event within the context of terrorism has an impact on the 
level of hate and sadness expressed by the participants. Specifically, terrorism made 
participants feel more hate (M = 5.46) than when the event is part of a military 
intervention (M = 4.27) [F (1,112) = 4.81, p<. 03]. The terrorism frame also led the 
participants to report more sadness (M = 7.68) as compared to the context of war (M = 
6.65) [F (1,112) = 5.12, p<. 05]. A similar effect occurs in the case of anger. The context 
had no significant effect on fear. 
 
Identity (Civilian/Soldier)  
The only significant effect of identity on the emotive scales is on fear. Exposure 
to civilian casualties triggers more fear (M = 4.41) than when casualties are soldiers (M 
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= 3.26), [F (1,114) = 5.07, p<. 05]. Fear is the ‘weakest’ emotive response to the event. 
Because the participants are not exposed to an event that represents specific danger to 
themselves or their loved ones, the fact that they as the target are civilians increases 
participants’ affinity and, hence, vicarious fear.  
 
Number of Casualties (3, 23, 53) 
None of the emotive scales is significantly affected by the change in the number 
of casualties as manipulated in this experiment. However, there is a significant effect of 
the number of casualties on sadness. Participants are sadder at the highest level of 
casualties (53, M = 7.85) than at the lower levels (23, M = 6.7and 3, M = 7.0), [F(2,112) 
= 2.49, p<. 08].  
 
The Link of Emotions and the Use of Force 
It is posited that among different negative emotions participants may experience 
because of the exposure to the scenario, anger is the emotion that is most closely related 
to the endorsement of the use of force. Bivariate correlation (across experimental 
conditions) of the four emotive scales and the participant’s support of the use of force 
confirmed this notion. The correlation of anger and the use of force is .22 (p< .02). There 
is a similar significant correlation between hate and the use of force, .21 (p< .02).24 
Neither fear nor sadness correlates with the use of force.  
                                                 
24 It should be noted that there is a relatively high and significant correlation between hate and anger (.62, 
p< .0001). 
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As discussed, sadness and anger are the dominant emotions in this study. Of the 
four emotions expressed, participants rate these emotions the highest. Based on the 
previous literature, I expect these negative emotions to have different impacts on foreign 
policy preference. To examine these differential effects a new variable is coded. The 
new ‘dominant emotion’ variable is coded as a “1” if the participants expressed greater 
levels of anger over sadness and “0” if the participants expressed greater levels of 
sadness over anger. The analysis reveals that those who are predominantly angry are 
more supportive of the use of force (M = 6.97) than those who are predominantly sad (M 
= 6.03), [F(1,124) = 2.97, p<. 05]. This finding and the above correlation between the 
use of force and anger offer firm support for hypothesis H4-4.  
 
Indirect Effect of Casualties: Casualties Characteristics Effects on Emotions 
From the above results, we can see that the biggest effect of the casualty 
characteristics on emotions was of the context of the casualty event. Indeed, the context 
of the event seems to explain the major movement in the indirect effects described in the 
model. The identity of the casualty also seems to have an effect on the emotions of the 
participants, although this effect is weaker. This was especially true when identity 
interacts with context. The primary emotion evoked by identity is fear. Alternatively, the 
number of casualties had a minimal effect on the emotions. This is in line with studies 
that demonstrate that the number of casualties have a weaker effect on individuals 
(Boettcher and Cobb 2006) than had been implied by the studies of Mueller (1973, 2004) 
and Gartner and Segura (1998). This study implies that the effect of casualty numbers is 
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uninterruptable because of its interactions with other characteristics of the conflict. Thus, 
the indirect effects of the model are driven primarily by the context of the casualty event 
followed by the identity of the casualties. The number of casualties by itself, however, 
has little or no effect of the emotions.  
 
Conclusion 
This study sought to understand the effects of casualties within a single event on 
the public’s endorsement of different policies. Specifically, I explored the context 
(war/terrorism) and identity of the casualties and their impact on the support for the use 
of force and other foreign policies. Finally, this study examined the potential effects of 
different negative emotions on the propensity to support the use of force.  
The findings of this study suggest, as expected in hypothesis H4-1, that the 
context in which the casualties occur matters in terms of policy choice. In addition, the 
results also demonstrate that the context by itself had an impact on the emotions of the 
participants. Not only does the context alter the level of specific emotions (hate, sadness, 
and anger), it also altered the level of all negative emotions. This supports Mueller’s 
(2004) proposition that there is an “overreaction” to terrorism casualties. Indeed, the 
results show that individuals are sadder, more hateful, and angrier in the case of 
terrorism than they are in war. However, this result was caused by the context of the 
event, not the number of casualties.  
One explanation for this difference is expectations. Specifically, it is clear in the 
context of militarized disputes that there are ongoing hostilities. The public expects that 
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when there is war there are going to be casualties. Over time, the public becomes used to 
these casualties. Alternatively, despite preparation for and attempts to prevent terrorist 
attacks, terrorism is an unexpected event. Very few individuals go through a day with 
the idea that “today there will be a terrorist attack.” Therefore, when these attacks occur 
there is a greater level of “shock” and, therefore, a greater reaction.  
In addition, and in line with hypotheses H4-3, H4-3a, and H4-3b, the results 
suggest that the context of the casualty event interacts with the identity of the casualties. 
Specifically, the context seems to set expectations about the identity of the casualties 
(terrorism/civilians versus war/soldiers). The findings indicate that though all 
participants prefer to take some actions instead of not responding, deviations from the 
expected identity prompt a greater propensity to support the use of force. Civilian 
casualties within the context of terrorism, however, result in similar levels of support for 
the endorsement of the use of force and doing nothing. The participants seem to view the 
use of force as unlikely to be effective at stopping the terrorist attacks. This is a plausible 
explanation given the ongoing Iraq war, in which the use of force is not preventing 
insurgent attacks. Moreover, the participants may expect the use of force to escalate 
attacks on civilians.  
Counter to the expectations of hypothesis H4-2, this study found that the number 
of casualties has no effect on emotional responses. There are several possible 
explanations. First, this finding is the result of the limited range of casualties (3, 23, and 
53). Given that the intent of this work is to establish a baseline effect of casualties, these 
results could indicate that the number of casualties needs to be larger and vary more 
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widely to have an effect. This would indicate that individuals are insensitive to small 
variations in the numbers of casualties. Second, this result could reflect a habituation of 
the public to casualties in the ongoing conflict in Iraq. Although this study used the 
hypothetical state “Errata,” the participants’ exposure to the war in Iraq may have 
decreased their sensitivity to the casualties in this study. Third, the examination of 
“casualty events” outside the framework of an accumulation of casualties removes 
information on the importance of an event. Examining this casualty event in comparison 
with other casualty events may give the individual cues about how “bad” the event is. 
Imagine, for instance, if yesterday 53 people died and today three people died. Would 
this alter the response to the event? It seems plausible that previous attack serve as a 
baseline for each incident and without this baseline, an event loses some of it meaning. 
However, given the effect of identity and context, this effect would only be related to the 
number of casualties. Thus, this result and the possible explanations for it require further 
examination in the next studies.  
The final set of results explores the relationship between different negative 
emotions and their effects on the endorsement of the use of force in response to the 
casualty event. Of the four negative emotions, sadness and anger were the dominant 
emotions. In addition, although sadness and anger are both negative emotions, as 
expected in hypothesis H4-4, only anger correlates with the endorsement of use of force. 
These findings support the idea that different negative emotions have different impacts. 
This replicates similar findings in a previous study (Mosher 2004) conducted on 
emotions in the context of terrorism and adds emotions in the context of war to this 
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study. Furthermore, the results show that sadness is greater in the context of terrorism 
and fear is greater when civilians are the casualties. It is probable that these interacting 
emotions lead to uncertainty about the best course of action. These findings indicate the 
need for more study into the emotional impact of casualties and the interactive effects of 
different negative emotions.  
 This study set out to examine the basic effects of casualties in international 
relations. Until this study, the literature on casualties was limited to examination of their 
effects in the context of an accumulation of casualties. This study adds to this literature 
by examining casualties in a single event. This focus on a single event makes it possible 
to examine and compare casualties in terrorism and war. In addition, this study examines 
the role of emotion in terrorism and war on the formation of foreign policy preferences. 
Ultimately, the results reveal that the context of the casualty event, the identity of the 
casualties, and the dominant emotion determine the impact an event has on foreign 
policy preferences. With events like the train bombings in Madrid and London, as well 
as the ongoing conflict in Iraq, there is a need to understand not only the underlying 
causes of these events but also the impact these casualty events have on the public. 
While much work remains, this study serves as a solid first step in establishing the 
impact of casualty events in different international conflict settings. The following study 
will expand on the effects revealed here and seek to replicate the findings on context and 
identity and determine if the number of casualties plays as large a role in casualty event 
effects as the previous literature indicates.  
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CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT II 
 
Introduction 
In the first experiment, I examined the role of contexts (war and terrorism) and 
particulars of a single casualty event on emotions and policy preferences. The results 
lend support to my model of direct and indirect effects of casualties. Specifically, the 
results confirmed that the context (war and terrorism) and identities of the casualties 
effect policy preferences. In particular, Experiment I found support for differing effects 
of discrete emotions on policy preference formation, although the results suggest little or 
no effect from the number of casualties on policy preferences.  
Explanations of this last finding could be the result of too narrow a range in 
numbers of casualties (3, 23, and 53). Alternatively, the finding could be caused by the 
exposure of participants to casualties in the second Iraq war. Another possibility is that a 
previous accumulation of casualties “adds” important information about the status of the 
ongoing conflict. In essence, without knowledge of previous casualties individuals have 
no way to determine whether the current casualty event indicates a worsening or 
improving situation. Given the vast array of casualty literature that focuses on the 
accumulation of casualties, I will examine the idea that the previous accumulation of 
casualties “adds” important information, which may alter interpretations and reactions to 
the event. Hence, I test what effect, if any, casualty accumulations have on the direct and 
indirect effects posited in my model in Chapter III. Thus, this experiment contributes to 
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the existing literature not only by examining the characteristics of a specific casualty 
event, but also by attempting to establish what effect previous casualties have on 
responses to these events. In particular, this study expands my investigation of the 
context of war and terrorism to include an examination of how much has already been 
suffered (i.e. previous casualties). 
 
The Role of Previous Casualties 
This experiment serves as a conceptual replication of the previous experiment. 
Thus, many of the hypotheses concerning the context and identity of casualties are 
carried over from Experiment I. The findings of Experiment I offered some new insights. 
First, I offer some additions to the hypotheses of that experiment. Second, I offer some 
new hypotheses on the effects of previous casualties on responses to casualty events.  
 
Identity 
The identities of the casualties had specific impacts on the policy preferences for 
the use of force, negotiation, and do nothing/withdrawal. These effects are modified by 
the context in which they occur. In terrorism, when civilians are the targets, the 
participants were less willing to support belligerent actions and more likely to want to 
reduce risk. The reverse seems to be the case when the casualties are military personnel. 
Specifically, in the context of war the pattern is the opposite. These findings indicate that 
anticipated casualties in a context matter, and this alters responses to casualty events. 
Thus, I add the following hypotheses: 
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H4-1a: Civilian casualties will decrease preferences for the use of force and 
increase preferences of withdrawal from the conflict event in war.  
 
H4-1b: Military casualties will increase support for the use of force in terrorism 
and decrease preferences of withdrawal from the conflict event in war.  
 
Previous Casualties 
From Experiment I, we see that the number of casualties has little or no effect on 
policy preferences. Yet, this may be an artifact of a lack of information on previous 
casualties. The literature on casualties has focused on the accumulation of casualties, 
which equals the previous casualties rather than just current casualties (Gartner and 
Segura 1998, 2000; Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening 1997; Mueller 1973). Some of these 
studies (Kull and Ramsey 2001) have found that democratic elites and the public use the 
number of previous casualties as a benchmark of how the public and the government 
react to these events. It is possible that in order for the current number of casualties to be 
meaningful, individuals need something to compare with the current number of 
casualties. Thus, without the previous number of casualties, the current number of 
casualties may be too ambiguous for non-experts to use. This also implies that while the 
number of casualties may have an emotional component, it primarily serves as a 
cognitive signal used to evaluate the current event. The number of previous casualties 
provides information about the situation in which the casualty event occurred. This 
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element then determines whether the situation is improving, getting worse, or remaining 
the same. I expect that individuals respond to current casualties through the lens of 
previous casualties. The previous number of casualties is a benchmark of the seriousness 
of the situation; depending on these assessments, policy responses are altered. If there 
are no previous casualties, then the situation is worsening. If the number of current 
casualties is the same as the previous casualties, then the situation is bad but not worse. 
Lastly, if the previous number of casualties is larger than the current number of 
casualties, then the situation is improving. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
 
H4-2a: The number of previous casualties will affect policy responses to casualty 
events independent of what these casualties ‘tell’ us about the current situation. 
Specifically, worsening situations increase costs and, therefore, may decrease 
support for the use of force. 
 
Thus, if the situation is improving, the individual may be unwilling to use more force. 
This effect will likely be altered by the context of the casualty events. It is even possible 
that this interpretation of casualty events will only apply to wars. This is because 
casualties in war occur frequently and in a pattern. Individuals can develop expectations 
about what is likely to happen in the near future and can calculate what the cost and 
benefits are going to be. This is a straightforward cognitive calculation.  
For a number of reasons, terrorism does not allow for the same straightforward 
cognitive calculations. First, the point of terrorism is to strike without warning and cause 
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terrorism and fear. The intent of evoking this emotional response is to alter which costs 
are acceptable and which are not. Second, in order to evoke these responses, terrorist 
attacks occur semi-randomly and are not conducive to the formation of expectations or 
knowing what will happen. While cognitive analysis may work for war, for terrorism it 
may give less information about the situation or trend in casualties. This is supported by 
Mueller’s (2004) study discussed earlier. If this is the case, the effect of previous 
casualties in terrorism may have a lesser effect on policy preferences and a greater effect 
on emotional responses. Thus, I expect: 
 
H4-2b: In war, previous casualties will act as additional information and thus 
have a greater effect on policy responses than emotional responses. 
 
H4-2c: In terrorism, previous casualties will have a greater effect on emotional 
responses than on policy responses. Specifically, the previous casualties as a 
benchmark will exacerbate or diminish the effects of the other characteristics of 
terrorism.  
 
Method of Experiment II 
In Experiment II, I further explore the role of casualty events on people’s foreign 
policy preferences. Because Experiment II is a conceptual replication of the first 
experiment, there are a number of similarities between the two experiments. 
Specifically, Experiment II replicates the introduction, crisis scenarios, and measures 
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used in Experiment I. Experiment I, however, examined the effects of casualty events by 
themselves and outside of the context of the accumulation of previous casualties. The 
present experiment seeks to understand the role of previous casualties on responses to 
casualty events. For this reason, Experiment II differs from Experiment I in several 
features. First, unlike the previous experiment, the current number of casualties is held 
constant to enable the examination of the role of previous casualties. Second, a 
description of the number of casualties experienced in the previous two weeks is added. 
Thus, the following lines are inserted into the “News Update” which describes the 
number of previous casualties in the previous two weeks. 
 
No previous casualties: 
This incident marks the first American casualties in the last two weeks.  
Previous casualties: 
This incident brings the total number of American civilians killed in the region in 
the last two weeks to (10 and 25). 
 
The previous casualty number thus lets participants know if the situation is worsening, 
the same, or getting better. In addition, this experiment adds a picture of the downed 
airplane to the “News Update.” This adds vividness of the casualty event and may 
increase the impact of the event in line with what people might see in a report of a real 
casualty event on the news. Figure 7 below is an example of these changes. 
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Figure 7: Example of News Update. 
 
Five American Civilians Killed in Rocket Attack. 
The Tima organization has claimed responsibility for the rocket that brought down 
commercial flight 7756 from Uttala, the capital city of the Errata’s neighboring island, 
Asu. At 3:17 pm, witnesses reported an explosion in the air over Uttala as the plane took 
off from Asu International Airport. The plane crashed, killing the crew and five American 
civilians. The names of the dead will not be released until their families have been 
notified. This incident marks the first American casualties in the region in two weeks 
 
Participants 
One hundred thirty three (133) undergraduate students took part in this 
experiment. The participants were randomly assigned to one of twelve experimental 
conditions. 
 
Experimental Design and the Treatments 
This experiment used a 2x3x2 between groups factorial design to evaluate the 
effects of casualties. The factors are: (a) the context of the casualty event 
(terrorism/war), (b) the background of the casualties is changed (i.e., previous casualties 
0/5/20), and (c) the identity of the casualties (i.e. civilian/military). The main measures 
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are the expressed emotions to the incident and the level of endorsement of the use of 
force, diplomacy, and withdrawal as a reaction to the event. See Table 5 for a 
representation of the experimental design. 
 
 
Table 5: Experimental Design of Experiment II 
  Casualty Accumulation Range 
  5 of 0 5 of 5 5 of 20 
Terrorism Civilian     
Military     
War Civilian    
Military     
 
 
 
Results 
The results of this experiment again demonstrate support for the effects of 
casualty characteristics and emotions on foreign policy preference formation. In 
particular, there is support for the hypothesis that previous casualty accumulations add 
information to basic casualty events. Specifically, previous casualties seem to act as a 
benchmark that alerts the individual to the status of the conflict (i.e., improving, getting 
worse, or about the same). Furthermore, the participants wanted to negotiate and use 
force based on the context of the casualty event. In terrorism, participants preferred the 
use of diplomacy. In war- related casualties, the participants overwhelmingly preferred 
the use of force.  
In terms of the effect of emotions, the results were generally supportive of the 
hypotheses. First, while sadness is associated with passive policies such as withdrawal 
from the conflict, anger is not. Second, although each emotion measured is related to the 
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others they have distinct effects. For example, in the case of civilian casualties in 
terrorism anger dominated, while in all other identity and context conditions sadness is 
the dominant response. 
 
Endorsement of the Use of Force 
A 2x3x2 ANOVA yields two significant effects of context and previous 
casualties on preferences for the use of force. Specifically, there was a greater preference 
for the use of force in the context of war (M = 6.84) as opposed to the context of 
terrorism (M = 5.49) [F(1, 133) = 2.72, p<.10]. The effect of previous casualties, 
however, is more complicated. The highest support for the use of force was in the case 
of five previous casualties (M = 7.39) as compared to no previous casualties (M = 5.56) 
and twenty previous casualties (M = 5.37), [F(2,133) = 2.84, p<.06] (see Figure 8 
below). Thus, it appears that when the current casualty event doubles the previous 
casualties, respondents were more willing to take forceful action. They are less willing to 
take forceful action when casualties are decreasing or there are no previous casualties. 
Five previous casualties, which imply a doubling of the number of casualties, imply a 
worsening situation. Alternatively, twenty previous casualties may imply that the five 
casualties is an “improvement” and the participants responded accordingly. Lastly, with 
no previous casualties there is uncertainty as to the state of the crisis. Without knowing 
the status of the crisis, the participants reacted somewhere between an escalations and an 
improvement. Figure 8 below depicts these relationships. 
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Figure 8: The Effect of Casualty History on Support for the Use of Force. 
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Endorsement of the Negotiation 
A 2x3x2 ANOVA yields one significant main effect and one significant 
interaction. First, the context of the casualty event had a significant effect on the 
preferences of the participants support for the use of diplomatic means of solving the 
crisis [F(1,132) = 3.61, p<.05]. Specifically, participants are more supportive of the 
diplomatic efforts when the context of the crisis is terrorism (M = 6.55) as opposed to 
war (M = 5.74). This pattern of support is the opposite of the pattern I found in support 
for the use of force. Hence, if the context is war then participants prefer to use force and 
less negotiation while they prefer to negotiate and use less force when facing terrorism. 
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Second, there is a significant interaction of the identity of the casualties and previous 
casualties on support for diplomatic solutions to the crisis [F(2,132) = 2.51, p<.08]. 
These results show that there is a similar pattern as the effect of the use of force. In 
particular, when casualties are doubled the effects are an inverted U but only in the case 
of civilian casualties. 
For military casualties, support for diplomacy reflects a U-shape. Figure 9 below 
shows that patterns of support for diplomatic solution reversed depending on the identity 
of the casualties. Specifically, the support for diplomatic efforts is highest for civilians 
(M = 6.84) when there are five previous casualties. The participants are least supportive 
of diplomatic efforts for civilian casualties when the previous casualties indicate a 
declining rate of casualties (i.e., twenty previous casualties) (M = 5.57). Alternatively, 
the highest level of support for diplomatic efforts when the casualties are military 
occurred when there are twenty previous casualties (M = 6.73). Indeed, the participants 
are the least supportive of diplomatic efforts when military casualties are doubled (i.e., 
five previous casualties) (M = 5.90). 
These results indicate that if the situation is deteriorating in the context of 
terrorism, the participants believe that increased diplomacy will work. Given the 
participants exposure to the second Iraq war, these results may reflect a belief that 
further use of force may be ineffective. Alternatively, in military casualties in war the 
participants want to negotiate when the situation is improving. This could indicate that 
soldiers are expected to die in war and thus negotiations will be delayed, or that 
individuals in war want to negotiate only from a position of strength.  
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Figure 9: The Effect of Previous Casualties and the Identity of Casualties on 
Support for Diplomacy. 
Interaction of identity and Accumulation
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
zero five twenty
Prevous Casualties
Civilian Military
 
  
 
107 
Endorsement of the Withdrawal 
A 2x3x2 ANOVA yields no significant main effects and one significant 
interaction for support for the immediate withdrawal from the crisis. There is a 
significant interaction of the identity of the casualties and the number of previous 
casualties on preferences for withdrawal [F(2,132) = 3.59, p<.03]. This interaction is the 
same pattern of support for withdrawal as found in support for diplomatic solutions. It 
seems that when the situation is getting worse, a doubling of the number of previous 
civilian casualties, then the participants want out of the conflict more than when the 
worsening is reflected in military casualties. Lastly, when there are no previous 
casualties then the identity of the casualties does not matter for this particular policy. See 
Figure 10 below for a depiction of these relationships.  
 
Figure 10: The Effect of Previous Casualties and the Identity of Casualties on 
Support for Withdrawal. 
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Effects of Experimental Factors on the Three Policies as a Repeated Measures 
In order to explore the difference in relative preferences of the three policies I 
performed a repeated measures 2x3x2x(3) ANOVA. First, this measure reveals that there 
are significant differences in the preferences for the three policies [F(2,254) = 3.79, 
p<.02]. Specifically, this ANOVA reveals that across experimental conditions, the 
participants in this study lean toward the endorsement of the use of force option with a 
mean of 6.47 on a 0-10 scale and diplomatic negotiation with a mean of 6.45, in contrast 
with withdrawal from the conflict with a mean of 5.51. Hence, the decision makers want 
something to be done about the situation, although they do not necessarily differentiate 
in their preferences between the use of force or diplomacy. Second, the context of the 
casualty event had a significant interaction with policy preferences [F(2,254) = 3.14, 
p<.04]. As the figure below reveals that within the context of terrorism the preferred 
policy is diplomacy (M = 6.77) followed almost in a tie by the use of force (M = 5.87) 
and withdrawal from the crisis (M = 5.81). Alternatively, the use of force (M = 7.15) is 
the clear front choice in the context of war as opposed to diplomacy (M = 6.09) and 
withdrawal from the crisis (M = 5.18). The type of context in which the casualty event 
occurs does matter. Figure 11 below depicts these relationships. 
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Figure 11: The Effect of the Context on Policy Support. 
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Doing Something versus Doing Nothing 
Given that preferences for the use of force and diplomacy means are so close to 
one another (M = 6.47 and M = 6.45) and so much higher than the preference for 
withdrawal from the crisis, it is possible that participants simply prefer to take some 
action rather than take no action. To analyze this possibility I coded a dichotomous 
variable “1” if the participant preferred to either use force or diplomacy over withdrawal 
and “0” for everything else. The only significant result is an interaction between the 
context of the event and the identity of the casualty [F(1,133) = 3.306,p<.07]. As Figure 
12 below indicates, there is in general a preference for doing something with the mean at 
.92 on a 0 to 1 scale. However, from the chart we can see that support for doing 
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something is at one hundred percent in the case of civilians in terrorism and soldiers in 
war. Support for doing something drops slightly when soldiers are killed in terrorism and 
civilians in war. Thus, when those killed are not of the expected identity the participants 
are less sure of what they want to do even at the basic level of doing something versus 
doing nothing. This is in line with the findings in Experiment I that casualties differing 
from expected identities altering policy preferences. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The Impact of the Context of the Casualty Events and the Identity of the 
Casualties on Support for Taking Some Action in Response. 
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Greater Force, Diplomacy, or Withdrawal 
Given that the participants overwhelmingly wanted to take some action, it is 
important to consider which actions they prefer to take and how the independent 
variables affect these preferences. For both diplomacy and the use of force, I created a 
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dichotomous variable with “1” indicating that the level of support for a particular policy 
was greater than the other two policies. Thus, for the greater diplomacy variable, a “1” is 
coded if the participant expressed greater support for the use of diplomacy than the use 
of force and withdrawal from the crisis. Alternatively, for greater force a “1” is coded if 
the participant expressed greater support for the use of force than the use of diplomacy 
and withdrawal from the crisis.  
 Greater Force. The results show that there was a significant main effect of the 
context [F(1,131) = 2.65, p<.10]. Support for the use of force was greatest in the context 
of war (M = .43) as compared to terrorism (M = .29), which replicates findings of 
context and the use of force presented above. There was also a significant interaction of 
the context, identity, and previous casualties [F(2,131) = 4.79, p<.009]. An examination 
of Figure 13 reveals distinct effects between war-related and terrorism casualties. In the 
context of war, support for greater force is higher for military casualties than for civilian 
casualties. The exception to this occurs when the previous casualties indicate that the 
situation is improving, in which case the support for greater force reverses. In the 
context of terrorism, support for greater force is highest when the casualties are civilians 
rather than military. Again, this pattern reverses when the previous casualties indicate 
that the situation is improving. Thus, expected identity plays an important role, but this 
effect is altered by the status of the current situation, as indicated by previous casualties.  
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Figure 13: The Impact of Context, Current and Previous Casualties on a Greater 
Preference for the Use of Force. 
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Greater Diplomacy. The results show that there were three significant main 
effects. The first significant main effect is in the context [F(1,132) = 4.25, p<.04]. These 
results show that the greatest support for diplomacy over all other policies occurs in 
terrorism (M = .55) as compared to war (M = .36). This may imply that neither the use 
of force nor withdrawal is seen as likely to stop or hinder terrorism. The second 
significant main effect is the identity of the casualties [F(1,32) = 3.72, p<.05]. In this 
case, support for diplomacy was highest when the casualties are military (M = .55) as 
compared to civilians (M = .39). The final significant main effect is of previous 
casualties [F(2, 132) = 2.72, p<.06]. The results show that support for diplomacy was 
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highest when there where twenty casualties (M = .55) followed by zero (M = .48) and 
five (M = .35). This indicates that when the situation is getting better or when the 
casualties are the first set of casualties that participants see diplomacy as having the 
greatest probability of success. Alternatively, when casualties stay the same the 
participants may have a “wait and see” mentality.  
In addition to the above significant main effects, there is a significant interaction. 
The interaction is between the identity and previous casualties [F(2,132) = 2.52, p<.08]. 
Figure 14 demonstrates that when the casualties are military and the situation is bad, 
support for greater diplomacy is low. When the situation is worsening or improving, 
support for greater diplomacy is high. Alternatively, support for greater diplomacy is 
low for civilians when the situation is worsening or bad and rises when the situation is 
improving. The changing response here is primarily in the worsening situation; military 
casualties result in a wish for more diplomacy over any other option and civilian 
casualties result in lower support for greater diplomacy.  
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Figure 14: The Impact of Identity of Casualties and Previous Casualties on a 
Greater Preference for Diplomacy. 
Interaction Identity and Accumulation
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Effects of the Experimental Factors on Emotions 
To examine the effects of the casualty event characteristics on emotions I ran a 
repeated measures ANOVA. The results reveal a significant difference between the 
measure of the emotions for sadness, anger, and fear [F(2, 264) = 51.71, p<.0001]. These 
results reveal that the participants expressed greater levels of sadness (M = 6.53) 
followed by anger (M = 5.7) and fear (M = 3.95). As in the previous experiment, this 
indicates that sadness is the dominant emotion in this experiment. However, these 
numbers are still very close even though they are statistically different from one another. 
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This finding is important because of the passive implications of sadness for information 
processing and choice. There is also a significant interaction of the context of the event 
and the identity of the casualties on the repeated measure of the emotions [F(2, 264) = 
3.27, p<.03]. This finding is important because of the implications for the effects of 
specific emotions. Specifically, the significant interaction described earlier on different 
emotions holds across all conditions except in the case of terrorism and civilians. The 
results indicate that the level of anger is lowered to the level of sadness.  
 
The Role of Emotions 
Given the role of emotion in the model, it is important to determine if emotion 
played a role in the policy preferences. As a first analysis of emotions (i.e., sadness, 
anger, and fear), I determined the correlation of the policy options with each emotion. 
There are two significant emotion and policy correlations. First, sadness and withdrawal 
were positively correlated (r = .164). Second, anger and withdrawal are negatively 
correlated (r = -.142). These findings are in line with expectations of the role of these 
specific negative emotions. These effects are depicted in Table 6 below. 
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Table 6: Correlations of Policies and Emotions 
 Use of Force Diplomacy Withdrawal 
Anger .037 .058 -.149** 
Sad .054 .077 .161* 
Fear -.126 .033 .111 
* Significant at .05 level; ** Significant at the .10 level 
 
 
 
To ensure that these emotions were indeed distinct emotions, I determined how 
closely these emotions correlate with one another. As expected sadness, anger, and fear 
are all significantly correlated, although the correlation is not so high that we can say 
they are measuring the same thing. Specifically, sadness and anger were correlated at  
r = .42, while sadness and fear were correlated at r = .55, and anger and fear was 
correlated at r = .35. 
 
Conclusion 
This experiment set out to explore further the relationship between casualty 
characteristics, negative emotions, and policy preference formation. Unlike the previous 
experiment, this study examined variations in previous casualties as a benchmark for 
current casualties, in addition to the context of the conflict event and the identity of the 
casualties. The effects of emotions were also consistent with the hypotheses and the 
results of the previous experiment. Again, anger and sadness were the dominant 
emotions. Each emotion was stronger in specific contexts and identities. For instance, 
sadness dominated war and military casualties while anger dominated terrorism and 
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civilian casualties. This demonstrated two ideas. First, different elements cause different 
emotions. Second, different emotions are related to different policy preferences and/or 
choices. This study replicates many of the findings of the previous experiment and once 
more supported the idea that war-related casualties have a fundamentally different 
impact than casualties resulting from acts of terrorism (H1). In essence, there are 
significantly different effects based on the context of the casualty event. Indeed the 
results demonstrate that individuals prefer the use of force more in war-related incidents 
than in terrorism. Individuals prefer negotiation more in terrorism than in war-related 
incidents. Although this is supportive of H1, it does not support Mueller’s (2004) idea 
that an “overreaction” leads to the use of force. Finally, it seems again that the 
participants prefer to takes some action rather than no action in both terrorism and war.  
Similar to the previous experiment, the identity of the casualties plays an 
important role in reactions to casualty events. Again, identity interacted with the context 
of the event. For instance, terrorism and civilian casualties played an important role in 
determining whether sadness or anger dominated the decision-making process. There is 
also support for H3c and H3d because the general effects of the identities of the 
casualties alter support for certain policies. Specifically, military casualties decrease 
support for the negotiation while civilian casualties increase support for negotiation. In 
addition, the results demonstrate that support for diplomacy and the use of force over 
withdrawal is dependent on the identities of the casualties and the context of the event. 
However, given the extremely high level of support for these policies, regardless of the 
context and identity, the results are not conclusive. Finally, unlike the previous 
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experiment, the number of previous casualties had a significant impact. In particular, the 
results demonstrated that previous casualties by themselves and in interaction with the 
identity and context of the casualties altered responses to casualty events. I will discuss 
this further in Chapter VI. 
This experiment also demonstrated that previous casualties do have a significant 
impact on the responses to the casualty event. In fact, the number of previous casualties 
altered many of the observed effects of the contexts and identity, as predicted by H2a-d. 
From the effects, it is clear that previous casualties act as a “benchmark” of the status of 
the current conflict. It serves to alert individuals that something is getting worse, staying 
the same, or better. In one case where casualties are bad (doubled) individuals’ support 
for the use of force is higher than when it is an improving or worsening situation. Thus, 
previous casualties altered support for different foreign policies. In addition, previous 
casualties also affected emotional responses to the casualty event. Therefore, although 
the current number of casualties had no effect in the previous experiment, it may be the 
result of a lack of information. The question is how do different levels of current 
casualties affect the context of different levels of previous casualties. Chapter VI will 
explore this idea.  
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CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENT III 
 
Introduction 
In Experiments I and II, I examined the role of different characteristics of a 
casualty event and specific negative emotions it triggers regarding support for policy 
preferences. Experiment I examined the role of identity, the number of casualties in the 
current event, and the context of the casualties. Experiment II examined the role of 
identity, the number of casualties before the current event, and context of the casualties. 
In both experiments, the identities of the casualties and the context of the casualty event 
played a crucial role in determining both support for specific foreign policies and the 
emotions evoked by these events. In particular, the role of the expected identity in the 
different contexts proved pivotal in determining the effect of the causalities on policy 
preferences and specific emotions evoked. 
Despite the importance of the identity of casualties and the context of the 
casualties, the number of casualties had no impact in Experiment I. This led to the 
question of why this was the case. Was this result an artifact of the experiment or was 
there some information missing that made these numbers more or less relevant? It 
seemed possible that the Experiment I gave no base rate with which to compare the 
numbers. In essence, there was no way for a non-expert to judge how severe the situation 
was. In order to determine whether this is the case, Experiment II held the number of 
current casualties constant while introducing the number of previous casualties. This 
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provided a framework to evaluate the sensitivity associated with the “current” number of 
casualties. The results of Experiment II demonstrate that the introduction of previous 
casualties has important consequences for policy preferences. Specifically, these results 
show that variations in the base rates alter expectations and individuals’ emotional and 
policy responses. Thus, it seems previous casualties set a benchmark by which 
individuals set expectations. However, altering the number of previous casualties or the 
current number of casualties alone capture only part of the role that numbers of 
casualties play in response to casualty events.  
In this experiment, I seek to examine casualties as they vary across the number of 
current and previous casualties. I do this by setting casualties at both low and high levels 
as well as offering variations in the current event’s number of casualties. With 
alterations in both current and previous casualties, the participants will have information 
regarding the status of the current situation. “New” casualties let individuals know how 
bad the current situation is while “Old” casualties tell individuals whether the situation is 
deteriorating, escalating, or improving.  
 
Hypotheses 
In Experiment I, I found little or no effect of the number of casualties on policy 
or emotional responses. In that experiment there was no reference to previous casualties 
to act as a benchmark for the seriousness of the current crisis. The importance of these 
benchmarks was demonstrated in Experiment II. This experiment examines the role of 
both current and previous casualties. The question is what are the effects? In this work, 
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previous casualties will be zero or a large number (in this case, 50). The current number 
of casualties is either large (190) or small (in this case, 5). If I compare casualty 
combinations with no previous casualties and get no effect, as in Experiment I, it would 
suggest that the actual current number of casualties matters only in comparison to the 
previous casualties.  
 
H6-1: Current casualties have no effect without previous casualties.  
 
Alternatively, if there is an effect then the number of current casualty numbers matters. 
This suggests that the number spread of current casualties in Experiment I was too small. 
Thus: 
 
H6-2: In order for the current number of casualties to have an effect, there must 
be a large separation of the numbers.  
 
If there is an effect when there are previous casualties, it implies that improving 
or deterioration of the situation adds information to the current situation. The previous 
casualties or history helps explain the current crisis. Given the lack of results for the 
impact of casualty numbers in a given event, as in Experiment II, I propose here that the 
impact of casualty numbers is related to the number of previous casualties. As previous 
casualties set expectations about how many casualties we can expect in the current 
event, I propose the following alterations to the hypothesis on the number or casualties 
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as described in Experiments I and II. Specifically, if the current casualties are fewer than 
the previous casualties, there will be a sense that the situation is improving and 
therefore: 
 
H6-3: If the current casualties are less than or equal to the previous casualties, 
there will be greater sadness and passive actions are more likely. 
 
H6-4: If the current casualties are greater than the previous casualties are, then 
there will be greater anger and aggressive actions are more likely. 
 
Because this work addresses the role of both current and previous casualties there will be 
some effects of these casualties based on the identities of the casualties. In essence, 
soldiers are more likely to be killed by the very nature of their job while civilians are not 
and indeed are not considered legitimate targets. Thus, I propose some additions to the 
hypothesis on the number or casualties presented in Experiment I.  
 
H6-5: When the number of civilian casualties exceeds expectations set by 
previous casualties the greater the support for negotiation and/or withdrawal 
from a conflict.  
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Methods and Research Design 
As discussed above, the results of Experiment II indicate that there is a 
relationship between reactions to casualty events and previous casualties. This 
experiment explores the relationship of previous casualties by manipulating both the 
number of previous casualties and the current number casualties. This experiment is 
similar to the previous studies. The primary difference is in the “News Update,” which 
describes the number of casualties in the current event and the previous two weeks. The 
number of casualties in a specific incident is altered to either 190 or 5. These numbers of 
current casualties are chosen because they are widely different from one another. This 
will help ensure a potential lack of results of current casualties because they do not have 
an effect and not that the range of numbers was too small. In addition, previous 
casualties are changed to either 0 or 50. These numbers will help us create clear 
categories of deteriorating or improving situations discussed above. This allows for the 
expansion of our understanding of the role of casualties at the same time as it replicates 
the some of the conditions of previous experiments. The Figure 15 is an example of 
these changes. 
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Figure 15: Example of Breaking News.25 
 190 American Soldiers Killed in Rocket Attack 
The Tima organization has claimed responsibility for the rocket that brought 
down military flight 7756 from Uttala, the capital city of the Errata’s neighboring 
island, Asu. At 3:17 pm, witnesses reported an explosion in the air over Uttala as the 
plane took off from Asu International Airport. The plane crashed, killing 190 
American soldiers. The names of the dead will not be released until their families have 
been notified. This incident raises the total number of Americans killed in the last two 
weeks from 50 to 240. 
 
Participants 
One hundred forty (140) undergraduate students took part in this experiment. The 
participants were randomly assigned to one of sixteen experimental conditions.  
 
Experimental Design and the Treatments 
This experiment uses a 2x2x2x2 between groups factorial design to evaluate the 
effects of casualties event. The factors are: (a) the context of the casualty event 
(terrorism / war), (b) the number of casualties in this event (5 /190), (c) the number of 
previous casualties (0 /50), and (d) the identities of the casualties (i.e. civilian / military). 
                                                 
25 The numbers of casualties listed in this news update change depending on the experimental condition. 
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The main measures are the expressed emotions to the incident and the level of 
endorsement of three policies: the use of force, diplomacy, and withdrawal from the 
crisis. See Table 7 below for a representation experimental design.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Experiment Design for Experiment III 
  Casualty Accumulation Range 
  Zero Fifty 
  5 190 5 190 
Terrorism Civilian      
Military      
War Civilian      
Military      
 
 
 
Results 
Like the previous experiments, this experiment supports my hypotheses about the 
relationship between casualty characteristics and policy preferences. The exception to 
this is that there is no effect on the characteristics of the casualty event on support for the 
use of force. This study also shows that both current and previous casualties affect 
support for different foreign policies. Both types of casualties had individual and 
interactive effects on policy responses. Although previous casualties are used as a 
benchmark of the seriousness of the current event, the current casualties also offer 
important information. Finally, the current and previous casualties also interacted with 
the context of the event and the identities of the casualties.  
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The results of this experiment also reveal the expected effects of emotions. In 
particular, the emotion expressed at the highest levels is sadness. Combined with the low 
correlation of sadness and the use of force, this helps explain why there were no effects 
of the variables on the propensity to support the use of force. As in the previous studies, 
without anger as the dominant motivator, support for the use of force is diminished. 
Each of the emotions (sadness, anger, and fear) examined here relate to specific 
variables. In particular, sadness and anger are related to all the independent variables. 
Fear; however, was only related to the context of the crisis. 
 
Effects of Experimental Factors on the Three Policies as a Repeated Measures 
As in Experiment II, I performed a repeated measures ANOVA in order to 
explore the difference in relative preferences for the three policies. This revealed one 
significant main effect and two nearly significant interactions. The significant main 
effect is of the repeated measures for the policy [F(2,280) = 16.87, p<.0001]. This result 
demonstrates that each of the policy measures is capturing something different with 
negotiation dominating. However, the primary difference between these policy 
preferences is between the active policies, the use of force (M = 6.27) and negotiation 
(M = 6.55), and withdrawal (M = 4.99). Participants overwhelmingly prefer to take 
action rather than withdraw from the crisis across experimental conditions. For a graphic 
depiction of this, see Figure 16 below.  
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Figure 16: Levels of Support for Different Foreign Policies in Response to the 
Casualty Event. 
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Endorsement of the Use of Force 
A 2x2x2x2 ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions of the 
independent variables on support for the use of force. This result is inconsistent with the 
findings of the previous experiments. Specifically, Experiment II demonstrated that all 
the variables either have a significant main or interactive effect of on preferences for the 
use of force. The difference between this experiment and Experiment II is that sadness is 
the dominant emotion in this experiment. This led to a less aggressive policy preference.  
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Endorsement of the Diplomacy 
A 2x2x2x2 ANOVA reveals one significant main effect and one nearly 
significant interaction of the independent variables on support for diplomacy. First, there 
is a significant main effect of casualties from the current crisis event [F(1, 140) = 3.06, 
p<.08]. Participants who are exposed to 190 current casualties express greater levels of 
support for diplomacy (M = 6.93) than those who are exposed to only 5 current 
casualties (M = 6.27). In addition, there is a nearly significant three-way interaction of 
identity, current casualties, and previous casualties [F(1, 140) = 3.03, p<.08] (See Figure 
17 below). The results show that when the casualties are soldiers, the highest levels of 
support for diplomacy were when the current and previous casualties are at their highest 
levels. Thus, when the situation is at its worst, individuals want to use diplomacy to 
solve the crisis. Essentially, they are trying to find a way to resolve the conflict before 
any further casualties occur. Alternatively, when it appears that the trend of casualties is 
reversing or getting better (i.e., 5 current casualties and 50 previous casualties) support 
for the use of diplomatic means to solve the crisis goes down.  
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Figure 17: The Impact of Past and Present Casualties on Support for Diplomacy. 
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When the casualties are civilians, however, the effects of the casualties on 
diplomacy are more complex. In the case of civilians, the highest support for diplomacy 
occurs when the increase of casualties is at the highest level. Unlike military casualties, 
the lowest support for diplomacy does not occur when there is an improvement but 
rather when the event is the first event and has the fewest casualties (i.e., 5). In this case 
the participants may be taking a “wait and see” approach to the crisis.  
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Endorsement of Withdrawal 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect and one nearly significant 
interaction. The results demonstrate that the context of the crisis affects support for 
withdrawal from the crisis [F(1,140) = 3.67, p<.05]. Specifically, the participants were 
more supportive of withdrawal from the conflict when the context of the crisis is 
terrorism (M = 5.43) than when the context is war (M = 4.54). Thus, it seems that 
individuals do not want revenge for terrorist attacks; they want to avoid further 
casualties. In addition, there is a nearly significant interaction of identity and current 
casualties [F(1,140) = 2.59, p<.10]. An examination of Figure 18 reveals that there is 
more support for the withdrawal of troops when there is an increase of casualties for 
civilians; however, this pattern is reversed if the casualties are military.  
 
 
Figure 18: The Impact of the Identity of Casualties and Current Casualties on 
Support for the Withdrawal from the Crisis. 
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Greater Force, Diplomacy, or Withdrawal 
As with Experiment II, the participants overwhelmingly wanted to take some 
action. It is therefore important to consider which actions they prefer to take and how the 
independent variables affect these preferences. For both diplomacy and the use of force, 
I created a dichotomous variable identical to the same used in Experiment II.26 
 Greater Force. There are no significant effects of greater force in this experiment. 
This result is consistent with results presented previously in this study. These results, 
however, are different from Experiment II in which there is a significant main effect of 
the context and interactive effect of the identity, context, and previous casualties. 
 Greater Diplomacy. There is one significant interaction of the identity and 
current number of casualties [F(1,140) = 4.21, p<.04]. As Figure 19 below reveals, when 
the casualties are civilians, support for diplomacy is highest when the number of current 
casualties is highest. The reverse is true for military casualties. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 For both diplomacy and the use of force, I created a dichotomous variable with 1 indicating that the 
level of support for a particular policy was greater than both of the other two policies. Thus, for the 
“greater diplomacy” variable a one is coded if the participant expressed greater support for the use of 
diplomacy than the use of force and withdrawal from the crisis. Alternatively, for “greater force” a one is 
coded if the participant expressed greater support for the use of force than the use of diplomacy and 
withdrawal from the crisis. 
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Figure 19: The Impact of the Identity and the Current Number of Casualties on 
Greater Support for Diplomacy Compared to Other Policies. 
Interaction of identity and Current Casualties
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The Role of Emotions 
As in Experiment II, the role of emotion in the model is important, thus, it is 
necessary to determine if emotion played a role in the policy preferences. As a first 
analysis of emotions (i.e., sadness, anger, and fear), I determined the correlation of the 
policy options with each emotion. The results indicate that anger and the use of force are 
correlated (r = .418, p<.0001). This is an important replication of the findings of both 
previous experiments. In addition, sadness and to a lesser degree the use of force are also 
correlated (r = .159, p<.04). Fear, alternatively, is correlated to withdrawal from the 
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crisis (r = .266, p<.001). For the most part, these findings fit with the idea that anger is 
conducive to aggressive foreign policy choices and fear is associated with withdrawal 
from a conflict.27 Table 8 shows all the correlations of the emotions as well as the 
policies. 
 
Table 8: Correlations of Policies and Emotions 
 Use of Force Diplomacy Withdrawal 
Anger .418* .061 .118 
Sad .159** -.028 .037 
Fear .09 -.09 .266* 
* Significant at .05 level; ** Significant at the .001 level 
 
 
 
Effects of the Experimental Factors on Emotions as a Repeated Measure 
To examine the effects of the casualty event characteristics on emotions, I ran a 
repeated measures ANOVA. As with Experiment II, the results reveal a significant 
difference between the measure of the emotions for sadness, anger, and fear [F(2,280) = 
82.23, p<.0001]. In line with Experiment II, participants expressed greater levels of 
sadness (M = 7.03) followed by anger (M = 6.38) and fear (M = 4.26). These results 
show that while sadness is the dominate emotion that is expressed, the levels of anger 
are similar. However, the level of fear expressed by the participants is much lower than 
either anger or sadness. 
                                                 
27 In addition, all three negative emotions were correlated significantly and positively with one another. 
Anger was correlated with sadness at r = .48. Anger and Fear were correlated at the r = .39. Sadness and 
fear were correlated at r = .49. Thus, although correlated none of these emotions were correlated so highly 
that we would say they measured or were the same emotions. 
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There are also two nearly significant interactions. The first nearly significant 
interaction is a three way interaction of the emotions, context of the casualty event, and 
previous casualties [F(2,280) = 2.48, p<.08]. Figure 20 depicts this interaction.  
 
 
Figure 20: The Impact of Casualties and Previous Casualties on Specific Emotions. 
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Figure 20 indicates that sadness is highest in both terrorism (M = 7.51) and war 
(M = 7.26) when there are no previous casualties and lowest in terrorism (M = 6.62) and 
war (M = 6.74) when there were 50 previous casualties. Thus, when the event represents 
a new occurrence there is greater sadness. The results also reveal that, as with sadness, 
the highest levels of anger in both terrorism (M = 6.66) and war (M = 6.58) occur when 
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there are no previous casualties. They are lowest in terrorism (M = 6.37) and war (M = 
5.84) when there were 50 previous casualties. This effect is more dramatic in the case of 
war. Lastly, Figure 20 shows that expressions of fear occurred in a different pattern than 
sadness and anger. Specifically, individuals experiencing terrorism events express higher 
levels of fear across past casualty conditions than when the event is within the context of 
war. When there is a terrorism event with no previous casualties, individuals had more 
fear (M = 5.38) than individuals with no previous casualties in a war (M = 3.71). 
Similarly, although with a smaller effect, when there is a terrorism event with 50 
previous casualties individuals expressed more fear (M = 4.12) as opposed to war (M = 
3.82). Therefore, the context does matter. Interestingly, the highest level of fear occurs 
when the terrorism event has no previous casualties. Thus, while fear is expressed at the 
lowest levels, it is at its highest level when the casualties are the first or “new” casualties 
in terrorism. This perhaps reflects an uncertainty as to the future occurrence of terrorism 
and thus, possible danger to the individual. In essence, new casualties may lead to more 
emotional responses in terrorism than when the casualties are “old” or already occurring 
casualties.  
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Effects of the Experimental Factors on Specific Emotions 
Given that each of these emotions has a significant and independent effect, I also 
examined the effect of the experimental factors on each of the emotions. Below I explore 
the significant and nearly significant effects by each emotion. 
Sadness. A 2x2x2x2 between factors ANOVA reveals a nearly significant and 
two significant interactions on sadness. There is a nearly significant interaction of the 
context of the casualty event and the identity of the casualty [F(1,140) = 2.86, p<.09]. 
Figure 21 shows sadness is highest with military casualties in terrorism (M = 7.2) and 
with civilian casualties in war (M = 7.08) and lowest with military casualties in war (M 
= 6.92) and civilian casualties in terrorism (M = 6.92). This seems to reflect expectations 
about the identity of the victims in each casualty context (i.e., soldiers die in war and 
civilians die in terrorism).  
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Figure 21: The Impact of Context and the Identity of the Casualties on the Level of 
Expressed Sadness. 
Interaction of Context and Identity
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There is also a significant interaction of the context of the casualty event, the 
identity of the casualty, and the number casualties in the current crisis event [F(1,140) = 
8.04, p<.005]. Figure 22 shows that for civilian casualties, sadness is at its highest in 
terrorism when the casualties are at low levels (5) rather than when they are at the 
highest levels (190). The opposite is true for civilians in war, with the highest sadness at 
the highest levels of casualties rather than the lowest. The difference between sadness 
levels is also wider in the context of war (M = 6.28 vs. M = 8.12) as compared to 
terrorism (M = 7.08 vs. M = 6.68). For military casualties, however, greater sadness is 
expressed at the highest levels of casualties in terrorism rather than the lowest. In the 
context of war, the pattern is again reversed with the lowest levels of casualties resulting 
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in the highest levels of sadness. Thus, it seems that military versus civilian casualties 
evoke opposing responses when it comes to sadness.  
 
 
 
Figure 22: The Impact of Context, Current Number of Casualties, and the Identity 
of the Casualties on the Level of Expressed Sadness. 
Interaction of Context, Identity, and Current Casualties
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The final significant interaction concerns the identities of the casualties, the 
number of casualties in the current crisis event, and the number of previous casualties 
[F(1,140) = 9.51, p<.002]. Figure 23 demonstrates that sadness levels differ by identity 
but also according to the status of the current situation based on both past and current 
casualty levels.  
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Figure 23: The Current and Previous Number of Casualties, and the Identity of the 
Casualties on the Level of Expressed Sadness. 
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0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Zero Fifty Zero Fifty
Five One Hundred and Ninty
Le
ve
l o
f S
ad
ne
ss
Civilian Military
 
 
 
 
Specifically, the highest levels of sadness are when the current situation is 
making an already bad situation worse. Put differently, sadness is highest at the highest 
levels of current and previous casualties. When there is little information to base 
responses to the casualties on (i.e., no previous casualties), sadness remains high 
regardless of high or low current casualties. In this case, participants know the situation 
is deteriorating but without knowledge of previous casualties, they do not know how 
badly. The lowest levels of sadness, as you might expect, comes when the casualty 
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situation indicates an improving situation (i.e., lowest current casualties, highest 
previous casualties).  
Alternatively, when the casualties are military personnel, responses seem 
dependent on current casualty levels. When the current situation is not so bad or at the 
lowest casualty levels, then sadness is similar across previous casualties (M = 6.95 vs. M 
= 7.2). However, when the current casualties are at their highest levels, then previous 
casualties become important as a benchmark of the status of the situation. Specifically, 
when there were previous casualties and a high number of current casualties, sadness is 
at a lower level than when this high number of current casualties marks the first 
casualties. Thus, when there are previous casualties, it is less saddening when there are 
more casualties than if this is the first casualty event. It may also be, however, that 
another emotion is dominating one of these categories.  
These results indicate that “new” casualties have an impact on levels of sadness 
in conjunction with the highest levels of casualties. Specifically, when the casualties are 
soldiers we see greater sadness with new casualties than with “old” casualties. 
Alternatively, with civilian casualties the biggest difference occurs between the “old” 
casualties than if the casualties are the first casualties.  
 Anger. There is a significant interaction of the context of the casualty event, the 
identity of the casualty, and the number of casualties in the current crisis event [F(1,141) 
= 6.47, p<.01]. Figure 24 indicates that when the casualties are soldiers, the context of 
the event affects anger responses to high and low casualty levels. Specifically, when 
casualties are low in terrorism there are lower levels of anger than when there are a high 
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number of soldiers killed. The reverse response to military casualties occurs in war with 
the lowest level of casualties resulting in higher levels of anger than the highest levels of 
casualties. For civilian casualties, the context is also important but the pattern of anger 
responses is opposite to what is seen in military casualties. Unlike military casualties, 
with civilian casualties, the lowest levels of casualties have the highest levels of anger in 
terrorism and higher levels of casualties in war result in higher levels of anger. These 
results demonstrate the important role of the context and identity in affecting emotions in 
the model and thus the response to these events. 
 
 
 
Figure 24: The Impact of Context, Current Number of Casualties, and the Identity 
of the Casualties on the Level of Expressed Anger. 
Interaction Context, identity, and Current Casualties
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Fear. There was only one significant main effect of the context of the crisis event 
on fear [F(1,141) = 4.32, p<.03]. Specifically, individuals within the context of terrorism 
(M = 4.68) were more afraid than individuals in the context of war (M = 3.76). This 
again points to the importance of casualty characteristics, in this case the context of the 
event, in affecting responses to the conflict events.  
 
Conclusion 
This study set out to replicate the findings of the first two studies and determine 
the relationships between past and present casualties on foreign policy preferences and 
emotions. The results again support the impacts of context and the identities of the 
casualties. This experiment added to these results by clarifying the role of both current 
and previous casualties. Finally, this study again demonstrated that specific emotions 
have distinct effects.  
In particular, this study and Experiment II show that the number of casualties 
matters. Specifically, the number of casualties has an effect but without knowledge of 
previous casualties, this effect diminishes or disappears. There are several interactive 
effects of casualties found in this experiment. Essentially, participants used previous 
casualties to interpret the current casualties. This effect, however, is often modified by 
the identities of the casualties. For example, when both current and previous casualties 
indicate that the situation is getting worse, individuals supported diplomacy. Although 
when the casualties indicate an improvement in the situation, the identities of the 
casualties are important in determining support for diplomacy.  
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The results of this study also demonstrated the effects of specific emotions on 
policy preferences. Again, anger was correlated with the use of force and fear was 
associated with withdrawal. Anger and sadness were basically equivalent in levels of 
expressed emotion, but there were distinct effects of each emotion. It appears that the 
effects of sadness were greater in this study then in Experiment II. Because it was 
established that sadness has no direct effect on the use of force, I am not surprised by 
this experiment’s findings. Indeed, most of the effects in this study were on diplomacy. 
Despite this, the specific effects of the identity, context, and casualty numbers on 
emotions are similar to the findings in the previous experiment. Thus, it seems that 
casualty numbers result in more cognitive responses and greater levels of sadness over 
anger and fear. This in turn resulted in the dominance of diplomacy rather than force, as 
we might expect if anger was dominant. 
Lastly, and critically to this study, the context of the casualties continues to have 
distinct effects both on the emotions and on policy preference formation. Changing the 
context of the crisis alters what effect the other casualty characteristics will have. This 
explains why scholars have found consistent effects of casualties across different wars. 
While this study illustrates that casualties in individual events are as vital to reactions as 
their accumulated effects, it also illustrates that the context of the casualties is just as 
important.  
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CHAPTER VII 
APPLICATIONS TO A REAL WORLD CASE 
 
Introduction 
Thus far, I have focused on examining the impacts of the characteristics of 
casualty events on emotional responses and foreign policy preferences in hypothetical 
experimental casualty events. These experiments have shown that the context of the 
casualty event and the identities of the casualties effect both emotional responses and 
policy preferences. The effect of the number of casualties was more complex. 
Specifically, the current number of casualties only had an effect when they were put in 
the context of previous casualties. Ultimately, these three studies lend support for the 
main propositions of my model. However, these events were hypothetical and tested 
responses of only of United States citizens. It is possible that these observed effects 
would only apply to this limited society with a particular history. The question therefore 
becomes do the findings from these experiments correspond to real world events? 
In order to answer this question I sought to take the model and apply it to civilian 
responses to a set of real world casualty events. By examining my model in this type of 
setting, I will be testing my model with multiple measures. This multi-method approach 
will offer support not only for the theoretical foundations of the model (chapters IV-VI) 
but also demonstrate that the model is applicable to range casualty events in and outside 
the United States (current chapter). This chapter therefore will add a unique element to 
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the literature on the role of the context, identity, and number of casualties on public 
responses to casualty events.  
To achieve this goal it is necessary to examine a set of casualty events that has 
examples of or variation in all the independent variables previously examined. 
Specifically, I looked for a case in which casualty events occur in the context of 
terrorism and war, has both military and civilian casualties, and has variations in the 
numbers of casualties killed. While finding variation in the number of casualties is 
straightforward, finding instances in which both the context of the event (terrorism/war) 
and the identities of the casualties (military/civilian) vary is more difficult. Indeed, many 
nations have experienced both terrorism and war, and the attendant variations in the 
identities of the casualties, but few have experienced them at the same time.  
One of the few nations that have experienced both terrorism and war 
simultaneously is Israel. Throughout its history, Israel has experienced both terrorist 
attacks and international conflict events at the same time. It thus offers a unique 
opportunity to examine how well my model corresponds with actual events and 
responses in Israel. I specifically examined events leading up to and during the 1969 
“War of Attrition.” This conflict revolved around territorial gains Israel made against 
Egypt during the Six Day War. During this period, many of Israel’s Arab neighbors as 
well as Palestinians within its borders conducted or supported a series of terrorist attacks 
against Israel. Studying this period in Israel therefore offers the necessary variation 
along my independent variables. However, because it occurred in a real world setting, 
measurements of individual public policy preferences were not available following each 
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event. Specifically, the experiments in the previous chapters allowed individuals to 
express preferences for different foreign policies and indicate emotional reactions. This 
required that I find an alternate dependent variable. I therefore created a new dependent 
variable of civilian/public responses to casualty events from newspapers of that era. 
Specifically, I examined civilians’ propensity to take action or respond to these events 
(discussed more fully in the section on Methodology). Briefly, I examined each casualty 
event to see if the public responded to these events. Public responses could range from 
writing letters to editors to violent retaliations against families of or groups associated 
with perpetrators. Thus, I was still able to examine civilian responses but in a different 
format. I expect that this change in dependent variable will lend support for my model 
by demonstrating that it applies across multiple measures.  
As discussed above this chapter addresses the role of casualties and their 
characteristics on civilian reactions to these events in a real world setting. I began by 
briefly reviewing the main points of the model and hypotheses as they apply to this real 
world case. Next, I reviewed the methodology and case selection process used in this 
study. Finally, I reviewed the results and formed conclusions about how well the 
theoretical model works.  
 
Model and Hypotheses  
In the model presented in Chapter III, there are two basic effects of casualty 
events: direct and indirect. Direct effects are driven by cognitive mechanisms and 
represent individuals’ calculations of the cost and benefits of different policy responses 
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to these events. The most effective alternative is the response that is preferred when the 
cognitive mechanism dominates. Alternatively, indirect effects are driven by the 
emotional mechanism and the specific negative emotion evoked by that event. These 
negative emotions can alter or bias calculations toward or away from different policies. 
In this chapter, I am interested in determining if the context, identity, and number of 
casualties in a real world case have effects similar to those demonstrated in the 
experiments. Thus, I pulled several hypotheses from the experiments and applied them 
to the case examined below.  
 
Context 
All three of the experiments demonstrated that the participants reacted differently 
to changes in casualty contexts. I therefore seek to find out if variations in the context of 
the casualty events in Israel affected responses to these events. In particular, I expected 
that the context would alter responses to the event, especially in the case of terrorism in 
comparison to war. I expect this because the experiments revealed that there are 
important differences in emotional responses and policy preferences in response to 
terrorism versus war. Given the experimental findings and changes in the dependent 
variables, this finding implies that a change in context of the casualty event should result 
in a change in the propensity of the public to respond to it. Given the more dramatic 
responses described in the literature (Chapter II) and in the experiments to terrorism 
versus war, I expect that: 
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H7-1: Terrorism is likely to increase the public’s propensity to respond to the 
event as compared to war. 
 
Identity 
As with the context of the casualty event, the identities of the casualties are also 
shown to alter the impact of the casualties on events in all three experiments. The 
experiments showed that the identities of the casualties had an effect on how 
aggressively individuals want to respond to these events. When the casualties are 
military personnel, then individuals wanted to use military force. Alternatively, when the 
casualties were civilians, individuals wanted to take more a diplomatic approach. If we 
apply these preferences to the propensity of individuals to respond to casualty events, 
then I expect that: 
 
H7-2a: When the casualties are military, the public will have a greater propensity 
to respond to the event than when the casualties are civilian.  
 
However, the experiments also showed that reactions to the identities of the casualties 
are altered by the context of the event. Specifically, when the identities of the casualties 
differ from what is expected in a given context, policy and emotional responses are 
dramatically different. I therefore expect that: 
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H7-2b: Changes away from the expected identities of the casualties in a given 
context (e.g., civilians in war and soldiers in terrorism) will result in a greater 
likelihood that the public will respond to the event.  
 
Number of Casualties 
The previous experiments showed that the number of casualties had mixed 
effects on responses to casualty events. Specifically, the Experiment I found no effect on 
responses to casualty events. Alternatively, the Experiments II and III showed that the 
effects of the number of casualties from the current events are altered by the number of 
previous casualties. In particular, when the number of previous experiments indicates 
that the current casualty event is worsening or improving, this alters preferences for 
different foreign policies. In this chapter, the events analyzed generally occur in a series 
of events. Indeed, many of the events captured in the study below occurred within hours 
or days of one another and consequently I expect that the civilians have a general 
understanding of previous casualties. Therefore, responses to casualty events in this 
study occur within the context of previous casualty accumulations. Given this setting, I 
expect the current number of casualties will affect the propensity of individuals to 
respond to these events. More specifically:  
 
H7-3: The higher the number of casualties, the greater the likelihood the public 
will respond to the event.  
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Methodology 
This section details how I compiled and analyzed the data used in this chapter. 
Generally, this study examined all casualty events in Israel in 1969, which marks the 
beginning of the period known as the “War of Attrition.” In order to accomplish this I 
collected data from daily news reports on casualty events in an Israeli newspaper, the 
Jerusalem Post. More specifically, I collected information about the context of the event 
(war/terrorism), the identities of the casualties (military/civilian), and the specific 
number of casualties that occurred during the event. Because this chapter is not based on 
experimental methodology, it was necessary to create a new dependent variable. I 
therefore examined public responses to each of these events rather than preferences for 
specific foreign policies. Given the nature of the data available (most often short news 
stories), I was only able to determine if there is a public or civilian response. Thus, my 
dependent variable is dichotomous and required that I analyze the casualty events using 
a logistic regression model. The following subsection will more closely detail the 
reasoning behind my decision to examine casualty events in Israel. The second 
subsection will more explicitly examine how I coded each of the dependent and 
independent variables.  
 
Case Selection 
In choosing the case to examine, I considered a number of factors. I needed a 
case that offered casualty events with variation along the independent variables. 
Specifically, I needed a case that offered a wide range of events that included terrorism 
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and militarized disputes as well as civilian and military casualties across both of these 
contexts. Israel is a nation that through its history has faced war and terrorism and the 
deaths of both civilians and soldiers. By examining Israel, I am able to hold factors such 
as culture constant and achieve the variations in casualty events needed. Specifically, I 
examined casualty events reported from January to December 1969. This period marks 
the beginning of the “War of Attrition” which lasted until the fall of 1970. The “War of 
Attrition” was a militarized dispute primarily between Israel and Egypt over territorial 
gains Israel made during the Six Day War. Though a cease-fire was declared in 1967 
following the Six Day War, hostilities continued throughout the intervening years. 
Hostilities ranged from artillery exchanges to clandestine assaults and bombing raids by 
both sides. This period also included terrorist attacks originating from multiple Middle 
Eastern countries. This conflict became an open and official conflict in March of 1969 
when Gamal Abdel Nasser (then President of Egypt) declared he would not abide by the 
cease-fire agreement. Given the different actors involved in these events, this case 
allows for variation across all the independent variables and is an ideal case with which 
to test my model.  
 
Coding 
In order to analyze the characteristics of the casualty events on public/civilian 
reactions I first had to gather the data. I collected information on each casualty event 
from the Jerusalem Post daily newspaper. This was the only long-running English 
newspaper in Israel during this period. It was also considered conservative in its 
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coverage and thus reactions covered in this paper are more restrained in their treatment 
of these events and their aftermath. To gather the data I needed, I examined each day’s 
paper for casualty events during the selected period. Specifically, the events studied 
focus only on the deaths of Israel’s citizens and residents. I also coded attacks leading to 
the deaths of visitors and tourists. The idea behind this decision is that citizens are more 
likely to care about their own citizens and welcome guests rather than ‘other’ groups or 
outsiders to the country (Mosher and Geva 2006a, 2006b).28 
Second, given that my interest in this study is to examine reactions to casualty 
events, the unit of analysis examined here was the casualty event. This means that if 
there was an attack but no one was killed by the attack itself, I did not include that 
particular event in the dataset. For example, consider two nearly identical rocket attacks. 
In one attack, a man is hit by shrapnel and killed while in the second the attack a man 
dies of a heart attack. In the first instance, I included the event in the data set but I did 
not include the second. This is because the first died as a direct result of the attack while 
in the second the man died of natural causes that were not necessarily related to the 
attack. 29 If events reported in the news included attack-related deaths of Israelis or their 
welcome guests, I further coded each event along the independent and dependent 
variables described below.  
Dependent Variables. As discussed previously the experiments examined the 
effects of the independent variables on foreign policy preferences. However, it was not 
                                                 
28 There are at least two events when foreign tourists or missionaries are specifically mentioned. More 
frequent are discussions of students or victims being recent immigrants to Israel.  
29 One incident closely matched this scenario and therefore was not included in this dataset.  
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possible in this study to examine the policy preferences of the Israeli public following 
each event. I therefore sought an alternative measure of responses to these casualty 
events. In examining news coverage of casualty events, it is possible to get some sense 
of the public’s responses to events from war and terrorism. These reports often explicitly 
discuss that a group of mourners/protestors/concerned citizens gathered in a specific 
place to discuss/protest/show support in response to these types of events. Therefore, I 
examined the casualty event reports during this period for indications of these types of 
public reactions. Specifically, I coded my dependent variable “Civilian Reactions” as a 
“1” if members of the public reacted to events in any way. This included giving 
speeches, issuing statements, writing letters to the Jerusalem Post, staging peaceful 
rallies and protests, attending funerals of the victims by massive numbers (in the 
hundreds or sometimes thousands), reacting with violence either during rallies and 
protests, or through other retaliatory attacks. These events are coded only if members of 
the public reacted, not if members of the governments reacted to these events. If there 
was no overt public/civilian response to casualty events then I coded this variable as “0.” 
Although it could have added depth to my analysis to examine each type of 
civilian reaction described above more explicitly, in this study I was not able to do so. 
For instance, it would be interesting to know if terrorism versus war casualties led to 
larger numbers of certain types of responses. This is due in part to the Israeli 
government’s standard security response to these types of events. Specifically, in most 
cases following an attack, especially terrorist attacks, the Israeli government locks down 
the area and/or areas where suspected terrorists/fighters or families of victims might 
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gather. Almost no opportunity for group civilian retaliation or protests where allowed 
during this period. Indeed, anyone remotely suspected of participations in these attacks 
was arrested within minutes of the attack. These government responses indicate that the 
government at least takes civilian responses seriously. However, this makes it difficult if 
not impossible to capture or analyze more nuanced civilian responses that might have 
occurred had the government not had these procedures in place.  
 Independent Variables. The independent variables coded here include “total 
killed,” the “context,” and “civilian” or identity of the victim. The first independent 
variable (Total Killed) gives the total number of all Israelis and welcome guests killed in 
an event. This includes those Israelis that subsequently died from their injuries. The 
second variable (Context) is coded according to whether or not the event occurred in the 
context of terrorism or militarized disputes as defined in Chapter I. Briefly, however, if 
non-military non-state actors initiated the attack, and then the context is coded as a “1” 
or as terrorism. If the casualty event was the result of military personnel of another state, 
it was coded as a “0.” 
The final independent variable captures the identities of the casualties. The basic 
distinction made here is between civilians and military casualties. In the case of 
civilians, I included any Israeli killed in or out30 of the country in a terrorist or 
militarized dispute as well as students and tourists in Israel. If the target of attack fit this 
                                                 
30 I included Israelis killed outside of Israel because they were often targeted outside of their nation and 
caused substantial reaction by the public and in the media and government.  
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description then I coded the identity of these casualties as civilians or as a “1.” If those 
killed were Israeli military or security personnel31 then I coded the casualties as a “0.” 
 
Results 
I ran three basic logistic regression models in this study to test my theoretical 
models. Model 1 tests the effects of these three independent variables by themselves. In 
essence, this model tests the idea that these variables have an effect on individual 
responses to casualty events. Model 2 again tests the effect of the three main 
independent variables as well as the interaction of the identity and the context of the 
event. This model thus tests the idea that the context of the casualty events sets 
expectations about the identity of the casualties. Lastly, Model 3 tests the effects of the 
independent variables and an interaction of all three independent variables. I did not 
include the two-way interactions to avoid multicolinearity with the three-way 
interactions.  
Table 9 demonstrates these models are supportive of my theoretical model. Both 
the number of casualties and the identities of the casualties alter the propensity of 
individuals to respond to casualty events. In addition, although there was no independent 
effect of the context, there was an interactive effect of the identity as well as the number 
of casualties with the context. This is consistent with my models’ hypotheses and the 
findings of the experiments in previous chapters. As my review of the results below will 
                                                 
31 I included security and police officials with military groups because the jobs are similarly dangerous. In 
addition, security personnel in Israel often face groups of armed individuals, in some cases terrorist and in 
others Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi (stationed on Jordanian boarders) border guards in much the same way 
the military personnel do.  
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show, however, there were some interesting differences in the effects of the independent 
variables in this study as compared to the experimental studies.  
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Logit Results of Effect of Variables on Public Reactions to Casualties 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Coefficient Std Error Marg. Effects Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Marg. 
Effects Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Marg. 
Effects 
Terrorism 0.441 0.404 7% -0.068 0.471 -1% 0.134 0.445 2% 
Civilians 0.938** 0.463 17% -1.6 1.4 -18% -0.183 0.809 -2% 
Total 
Number 
Killed 
0.583* 0.186 9% 0.668** 0.189 10% 0.565** 0.18 9% 
Civilian* 
Terrorism -------- -------- -------- 3.36* 1.54 68% -------- -------- -------- 
Civilian* 
Terrorism* 
Number of 
Casualties 
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- 1.29*** .745 21% 
Constant -2.58* 0.444  -2.54* 0.438  -2.43* .435  
 Number of Observations 174  
Number of 
Observations 174  
Number of 
Observations 174  
 LR chi2(4) 28.58  LR chi2(4) 23.69  LR chi2(4) 20.35  
 Prob > chi2 0.0000  Prob > chi2 0.0001  Prob > chi2 0.0004  
 Pseudo R2 0.1544  Pseudo R2 0.1280  Pseudo R2 0.1099  
 Log likelihood 
-
78.292876  
Log 
likelihood 
-
80.738227  
Log 
likelihood 
-
82.408751  
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The first model demonstrates that the context of the casualty events had no effect 
on civilian reactions. This is contrary to the findings of all Experiments I, II, and III, 
which showed multiple significant effects of the context of the casualty event. Second, 
this model shows that the identities and number of casualties had a significant positive 
effect of on civilian responses. The marginal effects reveal that the civilian casualties 
increase the probability of civilians responding by 17%. In essence, a change in identity 
from military to civilian casualties results in a 17% increase in the probability that the 
Israeli public will respond in some way to the casualty event. Interestingly, in the 
experiments the soldiers’ deaths resulted in a greater support for active foreign policies. 
Third, increasing the number of casualties in a given event increases the probability that 
civilians will react to the event. Specifically, a one-unit increase in the number of 
casualties increases the propensity of civilians to respond to the event by 9%. This is 
consistent with hypothesis H7-3 and the idea that current casualties are related to 
previous casualties. What is unique to this study is that the number of casualties has an 
independent effect. This contrasts with the experiments in which the primary impact of 
the number of casualties is in interaction with the identity and or the context of the 
casualty event.  
The second model introduces an interaction of the identity and context of the 
casualties. Again, the second model demonstrates that the context of the event has no 
effect on public responses. In addition, the identity of the casualties is no longer 
significant. There was, however, a significant interaction of the context of the casualty 
event and the identities of the casualties on civilian reactions to casualty events. The 
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marginal effects demonstrated that civilians killed in the context of terrorism increases 
the propensity of the public to react to the casualty event by 68%. The final independent 
effect in this model is the significant effect of the number of casualties. The marginal 
effects demonstrates that a one-unit increase (or one more death) in the number 
casualties increases the likelihood of a civilian reaction by 10%. In line with the results 
of the experiments, this demonstrates that the context and identities of the casualties 
have an important impact on responses to casualty events. These results, however, are 
the reverse of the findings found in the experiments. This demonstrates that real world 
cases may introduce unique elements to reactions to these events.  
The third model presents the three independent variables plus the interaction of 
all three variables. This model shows that the context of the casualty events and the 
identities of the casualties did not have an independent effect. However, the number of 
casualties again showed a positive effect on public reactions. The number of casualties 
increases the propensity for civilians to react to casualty events by 9%. Thus, the effect 
of the number of casualties is consistent across the three models. In this model, the 
interaction of the context, the identity, and the number of casualties also has a significant 
and positive effect on public reactions. The marginal effects reveal that an increase in 
civilian casualties in terrorism increased the propensity of civilians to react to these 
events by 21%. This interactive effect is similar to the results found in the experiment 
that found support for the idea that the effect of number of casualties is related to the 
identity of those casualties. Additionally, while this effect is implied by my model this 
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study is the first to support to the idea that all three independent variables have an 
interactive effect on public responses.  
From the above results, we can see that there is support for the effect of the 
context of the conflict only in conjunction with the other independent variables. This is 
supportive of the idea found in the experiments that casualty context has some effect 
even if it does not support its direct effect. The effects of the identities of the casualties 
are supportive of the findings of the experiment. Finally and unique to this study, the 
number of casualties in a casualty event always had a significant effect on civilian 
responses. As expected, this indicates that while the model holds, “real world” cases will 
introduce unique effects into the model. 
 
Conclusion of the Empirical Sections 
This study set out to replicate the findings of the three experiments presented in 
earlier chapters in a real world case across casualty events. Similar to the experimental 
results, I can say that the impact of casualty events is caused by more than just the 
number of people killed. Indeed this study shows that the context and identities of the 
casualties also have an effect on response to casualty events. Although all three 
independent variables had an impact on responses to casualty events, these effects 
differed from those I found in the experiments.  
First, in this chapter the primary effect of the context of the casualty event occurs 
in interaction with the other casualty characteristics. In contrast, the experiments showed 
that the context had independent as well as in interactions effects with other variables. In 
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this chapter, the largest effect of the context occurs together with the identity of the 
casualties. This is effect appears in all three experiments, in which alteration in the 
identity and contexts altered policy and emotional responses. In addition, there was also 
an effect of the context, identity, and the number of casualties. Again, this replicates the 
findings of the experiments. Thus, while many of the effects in the experiments were 
replicated, there was no independent effect of terrorism and war on civilian reactions 
similar to the preference for taking some action in the experiments.  
There are a number of possible explanations for these differences between the 
experiments and the study in this chapter. It is possible that the terrorism and war 
casualty events in this study are so close together geographically and temporally that 
they were hard to differentiate from one another. Given the political climate of this era in 
Israeli history, the perpetrators of terrorist attacks were seen as allies of (if not soldiers in 
disguise) sent directly by Egypt and its allies. In an experimental setting researchers are 
able to draw clear lines between groups, but this is not as easy to do in a real world 
setting. In addition, the experimental studies took place in the United States where 
terrorism and war casualty events have been widely spaced from one another and or are 
very far from the average citizen. Thus, respondents to my experiments are relatively 
‘safe’ from imminent attack and have the ‘time and space’ to react to each event 
individually. However, because some effects where similar to those found in the 
experiment I can say that context matters, but that how it matters may be altered by 
additional factors.  
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Unlike the experiments, the number of casualties had an independent effect on 
responses to the casualty event. In the experiments, the number of casualties in the 
scenarios is set up to distinguish between the current casualties and the previous 
casualties. Given this is a real world case it is likely that individuals are aware of 
previous casualties in part because they are often mentioned in the same article and 
multiple events happen in the same week or day. Therefore, the effect of the casualties 
was already in the context of previous casualties. The last two casualty experiments 
demonstrated that previous casualties set up reactions to the current casualty event. 
Thus, these findings remain consistent with my model.  
This study replicated many of the findings of the experiments reported in the 
previous chapters. As described above, there were several results that where unique to 
this study though still supportive of the model. This chapter thus strengthens the support 
for my model in a real world case. Ultimately, the effects of casualty events are greater 
than the number of those who are killed. Indeed who is killed and how they are killed (in 
terrorism or war) is at the very least equally as important if not more important in 
determining the effect that casualties have on public responses to these events.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
On September 11, 2001, jet liners crashed into the World Trade Center, the 
Pentagon, and a field outside of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. These events launched the 
United States into two wars and woke the nation to the reality that, like many other 
nations (e.g., Great Britain, Israel, India, etc.), the United States is vulnerable to 
terrorism. The public’s reactions to these terrorist attacks when contrasted with the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq indicate that the context of casualty events has a fundamental 
impact on responses to these events. Specifically, when the number of people killed in 
terrorist attacks is compared to the number of people killed in wars, the extreme 
response to terrorist attacks appears excessive.  
In this work I sought to explore this puzzle as well as to examine what other 
characteristics of casualty events affect responses to terrorism. In particular, I examined 
the relationship between different casualty characteristics (context, identity, and number 
of casualties) and individuals’ emotional and cognitive responses to these events. I 
proposed a model that depicts an interaction between cognitive cost/benefit calculations 
and specific negative emotions. I expected that specific negative emotions in some cases 
would influence an individual’s calculations of the optimal responses to these events. 
Furthermore, an examination of the existing literature on casualties shows us that little is 
known about the role of casualties or their characteristics in conflict events outside the 
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impact of the number of casualties. Even the literature on casualty numbers only 
discusses casualties in the context of militarized disputes across an accumulation of 
casualties, not individual events with variations in the characteristics of the events. 
Casualties, in essence, are a “black box” of unknown relationships and impacts. 
Therefore, the primary objective and contribution of this work and its model is to shed 
some light into this black box and more fully understand why some casualties result in 
different responses. This is especially important given the vivid coverage of both of the 
ongoing wars (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan) and international terrorist attacks (e.g., London 
and Madrid) in recent years.  
In this work, I set out to understand the independent and interactive effects of 
specific casualty event characteristics on public reactions including the context of the 
event, the identities of the casualties, and the number of casualties. Given world events, 
it seemed likely that variations in the above casualty characteristics could have 
fundamentally different effects on responses to these events. If these different casualty 
characteristics have distinct effects then the questions generally are “What are the 
effects?” and “How do these effects occur?” More specifically, I asked how do 
casualties affect public responses to foreign policies, what is the impact of context on the 
effects of casualties, and what role do emotions play in the effects that casualties have? 
To answer these questions I reviewed literature on casualties from terrorism and 
war, the costs of casualties, the unique impacts of terrorism on individuals, and the 
effects of specific negative emotions discussed in political psychology (Chapter II). 
From the literature, I formulated a model of how casualty events interact with emotional 
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and cognitive mechanisms to produce distinct reactions to these events (Chapter III). As 
discussed above, this model suggests that distinct negative emotions alter cognitive 
responses and foreign policy preference formation. Additionally, while the identity and 
the number of casualties are depicted as having important impacts, the context of 
casualties is a primary determinant of which negative emotions are evoked by the event. 
From this model, I extracted several hypotheses to be tested in the empirical section of 
my dissertation. This section included three experiments (Chapters IV-VI) and a 
statistical analysis of data collected from a case study of actual casualty events in Israel 
(Chapter VII).  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine the findings of the above studies 
as well as the implications of this work. In the section on findings, I will examine how 
well my model and hypotheses performed in describing the effect of casualties on the 
public. In particular, I will examine the role that casualty context and emotions play in 
public responses to these events. In addition, I will assess what findings are consistent or 
inconsistent with my model’s expectations. In the section on the implications of the 
findings, I will explore the theoretical and methodological implications of the results. In 
this section, I also discuss the policy implications of these findings. Finally, in the 
section on future work, I will suggest some areas for further study based on my findings.  
 
Findings 
Generally, my analyses are supportive of the idea that casualty characteristics 
play an important role in determining how individuals respond to casualty events. In 
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particular, the context and identities of the casualties play a pivotal role in emotional 
responses to these events. Alternatively, the primary impact of the number of casualties 
seems to be on cognitive cost calculations. The results also supports the idea that 
emotional responses to casualty events can alter cognitive calculations of the best 
response to these events based on the specific emotion evoked by the event. I will 
address each of these findings more specifically in the following paragraphs.  
One of the primary propositions of this model was that the context of the casualty 
event is dominant. In essence, it determines what effects casualties have on an 
individual’s responses. The findings support this proposition. In addition, the results of 
the four studies conducted here support the idea that the context of the casualty event is 
of central importance in determining both foreign policy preferences and emotional 
responses. In all three experiments, the context of the event had a direct impact on the 
policy preferences of individuals. Specifically, in Experiment I (Chapter IV) the context 
of terrorism increased the propensity of individuals to support non-aggressive foreign 
policy options (i.e. withdrawal, do nothing, or negotiation). In Experiments II and III 
(Chapters V and VI), the context of the casualty event had significant effects on both 
belligerent and non-belligerent foreign policies. In particular, when the context was 
terrorism individuals preferred to negotiate or take no action. Alternatively, when the 
context was war, the participants wanted to use force. Thus, the context alone had a 
fundamental impact on policy preferences. In contrast to the experiments, the statistical 
analysis (Chapter VII) demonstrated that the impact of the context in the real world 
occurs when the context interacts with identity. Specifically, it demonstrated that civilian 
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casualties in terrorism increase the likelihood of a reaction to these events. There were 
similar effects when identity interacted in conjunction with number of casualties in a 
casualty event.  
In all three experiments, there are no direct effects of the identity, but there was 
an interactive effect in line with my expectations. The experiments demonstrate that 
there are important interactive effects of the identities of the casualties with the other 
casualty characteristics. Civilian casualties result in a greater propensity for individuals 
to react to these events (Chapter VII) and in greater levels of support for active policies. 
In particular, support is highest when the casualties are soldiers as opposed to civilians 
(Chapters IV-VI). Alternatively, when the identities of casualties are considered in 
conjunction with the context the results change. When there are civilian casualties in 
terrorism, there is greater support for doing nothing or withdrawing from the situation. In 
addition, when the identities of the casualties differ from what is expected in a given 
context, such as soldiers during war, support for the different policy options is altered. 
For instance, in Experiment I when soldiers are killed in a terrorist attack rather than 
war, civilian support for the use of force is increased. Thus, the effects of the identities 
of the casualties are greatly affected by the context of the casualty event. 
As this discussion demonstrates, the above results are consistent with the 
expectations of my model. Indeed both context and identity played important roles in 
determining reactions to casualty events and foreign policy preference formation. The 
effects of the number of casualties, however, were inconsistent with my expectations and 
the findings of the literature on casualty events. I expected that the number of casualties 
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by themselves would have an effect on responses to casualty events and foreign policy 
preference formation. Specifically, I proposed that as the number of casualties increased, 
it was most likely to cause decreasing support for active foreign policies. Put differently, 
the higher the cost, the less willing individuals are to pay it. This is essentially the 
outcome expected by Mueller (1973; 1994) and Nincic and Nincic (1995), though for 
different reasons. In Experiment I, however, I found no effect of the number of 
casualties. Given these results, I then considered the possibility that the rate of casualty 
accumulation as proposed by Gartner and Segura (1998, 2000) and Gartner, Segura, and 
Wilkening (1997) plays a role in responses to numbers of casualties. I postulated that the 
previous number of casualties add information without which individuals do not have 
the necessary knowledge to interpret the current situation. The previous number of 
casualties tells the individual how bad or dangerous the circumstances surrounding the 
event are. Imagine, for instance, we hear that a man jumped out of a window. We are 
likely to expect different outcomes if we know the window was on the second floor or 
the fifteenth. Without knowing the floor the window was on, we could still guess that the 
outcome will not be good. However, this information tells us how bad the outcome could 
be in comparison to the actual outcome. Both Experiments II and III are supportive of 
the informational effect of the accumulation of previous casualties. More specifically, if 
the previous casualties when compared with current casualties indicate that the situation 
is worsening or improving, individuals respond accordingly. For instance, when the 
situations are worsening, individuals are supportive of taking forceful actions. 
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These findings, though initially inconsistent with my expectations, increase our 
knowledge of the effects of the number casualties in several ways. First, the number of 
casualties does not produce an easily calculated cost. Rather, calculations of the costs 
depend on what happened before the current event. Second, though some of the initial 
literature on casualties considered the effects of a worsening situation as indicated by the 
number of casualties, they did not explicitly examine the idea that an improving casualty 
situation might also alter responses to these events. Thus, casualties in some instances 
might represent a decreasing cost rather than increasing costs. In further support of this 
informational effect, the statistical study of a real world case supported the effect of 
previous casualties. Because the events occurred in the real world, the effect of the 
number of casualties was in the context of these previous casualties. Increasing the 
number of casualties increased the propensity of individuals to respond to these events. 
Although these findings were inconsistent with what I initially expected, ultimately they 
indicated that the number of previous casualties in fact actually represented an additional 
casualty characteristic. Without considering both current and previous casualties, 
discerning the actual responses of individuals to these events is problematic.  
However, what drives these effects? My model proposed and the findings 
indicate that the key to understanding these different effects is the type of negative 
emotion evoked by the incident. The results of the experiments show that there are 
distinct effects on specific emotions and these emotions are correlated with specific 
policy preferences. In all three experiments, anger and sadness were expressed at higher 
levels than fear. Fear, alternatively, is the emotion expressed at the lowest levels. 
 
169 
Furthermore, when we examine these emotional responses in conjunction with the 
context of the casualty events, the relationship between the two and the responses 
becomes clearer. These emotional effects seem to be driven primarily by the context of 
the event. In the experiments, the context of the casualty events resulted in different 
levels of overall negative emotions. Specifically, terrorism resulted in higher levels of all 
the negative emotions than did war. This supports the idea that there may be an 
emotional “overreaction” to terrorist attacks when compared to military clashes in war. 
In addition, while fear is expressed at the lowest levels it has a significant effect in the 
context of terrorism. This response corresponded with an increased propensity to support 
withdrawal/do nothing in a crisis.  
In all three studies, anger is correlated with the use of force and sadness is 
correlated with withdrawal. This supports the passive and aggressive policy implications 
of each emotion proposed in the literature. This finding is explicitly demonstrated in 
Experiment III (Chapter VI). In this experiment, sadness clearly dominates and as a 
result, there is no direct effect of the variables on support for the use of force. Finally, 
the independent variables in the experiments had similar effects on responses to 
observed effects in the statistical study. Therefore, it seems plausible that the emotional 
effects observed in the experiments may also occur in the real world case. However, 
because this study occurred in the real world nearly forty years ago, it is impossible to 
find a measure of emotions and I was not able to test it in this study.  
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Implications of the Findings 
As discussed above, the findings are generally supportive of my model of the 
effect of casualties on public reactions. The question is what they imply theoretically, 
methodologically, and for foreign policy decision making in response to these events. In 
this section, I will address each of these areas. First, I will examine what these finding 
imply for the overall study of casualties in international relations. Second, I will examine 
the implications of my findings for foreign policy decision making in response to these 
events. Finally, I will address how my methodology may affect interpretations of my 
findings. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
Given the above findings, I now ask what the findings imply about the model I 
presented in this work. Primarily these findings support my contention that casualties in 
international relations represent more than just a calculation of the cost of a conflict. 
Indeed, while the processes by which responses are generated include cognitive 
cost/benefit calculations they also evoke emotional responses. The dominant negative 
emotions (e.g. sadness, anger, and fear) alter the outcome of these cognitive calculations. 
This implies that if we do not take emotional responses to these events into 
consideration, we cannot accurately identify how the public will react to these events.  
Therefore, although the quote at the beginning of Chapter III implies that 
casualties affect individuals either as a tragedy or as a statistic, the relationship is much 
more complex. Specifically, low or high casualties can act as both a statistic (cost) or as 
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a tragedy (an emotional reaction). Which it is seems to be based largely on what all the 
characteristics of the casualty event together tell us about the event. Specifically, 
although the effects of the characteristics of the casualty event work independently, 
some of the most interesting effects occur when these effects interact. For instance, the 
characteristic with the greatest effect is the context of the event. It alters both cognitive 
and emotional reactions leading to different negative emotional and policy responses. 
Yet, when you add the identities of the casualties to the context, you see that it again 
alters policy preferences. In this instance, there is an increase in support for aggressive 
policies for soldiers killed in terrorist attacks, but a decrease of support for those policies 
when the casualties are civilian. This implies that the interaction of identity causes anger 
to dominate in one instance while an alternate identity leads to greater sadness. In the 
case of this interaction, the higher levels of sadness caused by a change of identity seem 
to counter the effects of anger caused by terrorism. This is associated more with the 
cognitive mechanism and cost calculations. In essence, the identities of the casualties 
seem to cancel out the emotive effects of terrorism.32 
Thus, to understand the effects of casualties in international relations it is 
necessary to consider not only casualty characteristics, but also how these characteristics 
interact with one another and negative emotions. Indeed, some of the well-established 
relationships discussed in the literature on war casualties, such as the “rally around the 
flag” effect, may be due in part to these emotional reactions and/or the interactions of 
these casualty characteristic. At the very least, from these results it is clear that war and 
                                                 
32 There are similar effects when the identity of the casualties and the previous casualties are interacted. 
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terrorism casualties have dramatically different impacts on responses. While the 
characteristics within these contexts are identical, they do not result in the same 
outcomes. If war, terrorism, and each characteristic within a casualty event cause 
dramatically different emotional responses and foreign policy preferences in the public, 
the question is “What are the implications of these findings for foreign policy decision 
making?” The following subsection will address these implications.  
 
Policy Implications  
When the results of the studies in this work are examined, we see that each of the 
casualty characteristics and the emotions they evoked had important effects on policy 
preferences. In particular, the context of the casualty event alters responses to these 
events. Furthermore, the context alters policy preferences in ways that have not been 
anticipated by decision makers. For instance, Kull and Ramsey’s (2001) work showed 
that regardless of the actual response of the public, leaders believe the public will not 
tolerate any war casualties. In addition, in the context of terrorism there is a perception 
that if leaders do not respond aggressively to terrorist attacks, then the public will 
become outraged and punish them for their failure to respond (see Chapter III). This 
work, however, contradicts both of these perceptions. In reality, it seems that the public 
has a greater willingness to support the use of force in war as compared to terrorism. 
Thus, rather than be averse to casualties in war, individuals seem to be somewhat more 
acceptant of them. Alternatively, in the context of terrorism the public wants to avoid 
further losses. It is plausible, however, given current world events (e.g., continuing 
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insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and worldwide terrorist attacks) that the public 
does not believe that the use of force will work. Instead, individuals seem to prefer to 
negotiate or do nothing/withdrawal in the context of terrorism. 
In addition to the above, the effects of the context are further altered by the 
identity of the casualties. When the casualties are soldiers, there is a greater level of 
support for the use of force and lower support for negotiation or doing nothing. 
Alternatively, when those killed are civilians, policy preferences are reversed. When the 
identity of the casualty is considered in conjunction with the context of terrorism these 
patterns are further complicated. These results imply that public responses to casualty 
events are more complex than a simple aversion to all casualties. Indeed, it seems that 
public is more willing to tolerate civilian casualties as compared to military casualties. 
Again, this is the reverse of what is generally expected. Therefore, despite the 
impression that all casualties will lead to adverse public responses the public reacts 
negatively, in terms of remaining involved in or escalating the conflict, to only certain 
types of casualties.  
In addition, the effects of the context and the identity of the casualties offer 
further evidence that the public supports policies in a conflict based on more criteria than 
the number of casualties. Indeed the public is seemingly more prudent in their policy 
evaluations than even some researchers (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998) 
would credit them. Specifically, individuals consider casualty characteristics as well as 
policy objectives. Essentially, the public evaluates how bad the current situation is, what 
the context is, who was actually killed in the event, and thus how successful policies 
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such as the use of force are likely to be. They then seemingly alter their foreign policy 
preferences according to these factors. This suggests that leaders need to consider more 
than just numbers of casualties when they are attempting to anticipate the public’s 
response to these types of events. Specifically, leaders need to consider that the public 
may react with anger or fear leading to opposing responses. Specifically anger may lead 
to calls for action, which if leaders do not respond to in a way the public wants, may lead 
to a politically tenuous situation. However, if sadness is the dominant response they (the 
public) may also react with a careful calculation of the best responses to these events. 
Which reaction dominates the public’s responses will be determined by the casualty 
characteristics. Therefore, when decision makers try to predict public responses to these 
events they must consider these additional characteristics if they wish to choose a policy 
that the public will support, or at least tolerate.  
 
Methodological Implications 
The studies in this work have important implications for both the study of public 
responses to international conflict events and of foreign policy decision making. 
However, it is plausible that how I analyzed the impact of casualty events in this work 
altered or in some way adversely affected my findings and therefore my conclusions. 
Thus, I will briefly review how I analyzed my data in the following paragraphs. By 
exploring my methodology in this way, I hope to illustrate that each of the multiple 
methods I used had strengths that countered any weakness that the other analyses I 
conducted may have had. Specifically, in this work I used a multi-method approach with 
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an emphasis on experimental methodology to assess my model of the impact that 
casualty events have on the public responses. Below, I will briefly review each method 
and it implications for my model.  
The purpose of experimental analysis is to examine the underlying assumptions 
and hypotheses of the model. In addition, experiments allow researchers to examine 
counterfactual cases that are possible in theory but are very unlikely to happen in the real 
world (Mook 1983). For instance, in this study I was interested in understanding how the 
public responds to both terrorism and war casualty events. Yet, in the United States, 
where my studies were conducted, citizens are very unlikely to be targeted in a terrorism 
casualty event. In fact, an American is more likely to die of drowning in a toilet then to 
die in a terrorist attack (Mueller 2004). Therefore, while there are casualty events from 
the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq there are few instances of both contexts to 
which Americans can react. Without variation across both contexts, it is difficult if not 
impossible to conduct an analysis of public responses to such events in the United States. 
Thus, experiments allow us to examine what may happen if the logic or internal structure 
of the model is accurate. In addition, assuming the experiments are good representations 
of the model, they can offer support for the internal validity or logic of the theory or 
model rather than attempting to generalize or predict what will or has already happened 
in reality. From this perspective, the model is generalized to the real world rather than 
the findings. Alternatively, statistical methods assess how well a given model reflects the 
real world. In this type of analysis if we examine a model that says X causes Y, we want 
to know how often that actually happens in the real world. Thus, this type of study 
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allows researchers to test the external validity and predictive capabilities of the model. I 
believe that by using both methods, the studies I conducted balance the needs of internal 
and external validity. Put differently, using both methods I found support for both the 
internal logic of the model and the potential predictive capabilities of my model.  
In addition to the above considerations, the experiments I conducted are 
potentially vulnerable to two additional criticisms. First, they were conducted using 
college students who may not accurately represent the population I am interested in 
investigating. Sears (1986), for example, pointed to several problems that might occur 
when using college students. The primary concerns are that college students may be 
naïve, may be more likely to conform to authority, and/or are more easily influenced. In 
essence, students may not make the same decisions or express the same preferences as 
elected decision makers. For instance, Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz (2006) demonstrate that 
as compared to military officers, college students are less likely to support military 
action. However, in this study I was interested in determining how the public responds to 
casualty events. Thus, I am not in danger of attempting to equate college students with 
elected decision makers. In addition, given the extensive media coverage of world events 
it seems plausible that the college students of the current generation are aware of what 
the judgments they are being asked to make entail (see also Gartner 2008). Therefore, I 
expect that they are more likely to react similarly to the way the general public reacted.  
The second potential criticism that could be leveled at my experiments is that 
they do not occur in the real world. As discussed above, the intent of the experiments 
was to test the internal logic of my model. My results demonstrate there is support for 
 
177 
the internal validity of my model and therefore I believe my model receives firm support 
from these experiments. Despite this evidence, if my model were a completely 
inaccurate representation of the real world, I would not expect it to withstand an 
application to a real world case. As the findings in Chapter VII demonstrate, my model 
does correspond with the way the public reacts to casualty events in a real world case. 
This is especially true considering that my experiments were conducted with United 
States citizens, in a different culture, and in the last decade while my statistical study 
examined Israeli citizens nearly forty years ago. Given the differences between the 
experiments and the statistical study, it is reasonable to expect no results in the statistical 
analysis rather than support I found for my model. Thus, the statistical study I conducted 
replicates the experimental findings, adding robustness and vigor to the work and 
specifically supports the external and internal validity of my model.  
 
Future Work 
This work shed light into the black box of the effects of casualties on public 
reactions to casualty events. In fact, these studies have shown that the characteristics of 
casualty events have important and complex effects on emotional and cognitive 
responses. However, there are several potential areas for further exploration of these 
effects, including other contexts and identities, a wider range in casualty numbers and 
base rates, distances of individuals from the casualty event, and studies in nations with 
more experience with terrorism.  
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First, this work has demonstrated the effects of two different types of 
international contexts. Other contexts may also dramatically affect responses to 
casualties such as insurgency, ethnic conflicts, or natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, 
tsunamis, and earthquakes). Given the differences between the effects of terrorism and 
war, it is plausible that other contexts will also have unique impacts. Second, this study 
only examined two general types of identities. It seems plausible that identities that are 
more specific may have important impacts on responses to casualties. For instance, in 
the second gulf war there have been a number of private contractors killed. The deaths of 
these individuals seemingly received a great deal less sympathy than soldier’s deaths and 
in some cases resulted in scorn for the dead in media coverage. What might be the 
difference between reaction to the deaths of for example civilian contractors and other 
groups? Other identities to consider might be in-group and out-group identities, local 
civilians versus foreign civilians, U.S. soldiers versus allied forces, local versus foreign 
public officials, soldiers versus police or security personnel, etc.  
A third area of future study might be an examination of a larger range in the 
number and base rate of individuals killed. Given the effects found here it would be of 
interest to establish exactly what types of numbers and rates of casualties achieve 
different effects. The fourth area of potential future work would be establishing the 
effect of distance of the casualty event from those responding to it. It seems plausible 
that the closer a casualty event is to an individual the greater the likelihood that it might 
result in different negative emotional responses especially fear. As demonstrated by this 
study, different negative emotions can result in significantly different behavior response 
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and therefore distance could significantly alter responses to these events. Fifth and 
related to this it seems plausible that nations and cultures that have more experience with 
terrorism might react differently to these types of events. For instance, it might be of 
interest to conduct similar experiments in Ireland, Israel, or India.  
Examining any or all of these additional areas would further shed light into the 
black box of the effect of casualties on international relations. This would in turn give us 
a better understanding of why the public supports or opposes different foreign policies in 
different conflict settings. It would also give decision makers a better understanding of 
when and why the public will support or oppose leader in a conflict. Given that the 
results show the public does not reflexively oppose conflicts based on casualties, the 
numbers alone this understanding may be vital to the political survival of these leaders.  
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